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INTRODUCTION
Rape is perhaps the most difficult aspect of criminal law to discuss ra-
tionally.1 At one extreme, some scholars maintain, in self-righteous re-
jection of reality, that all heterosexual sex is rape.2 At the other extreme,
troglodytical judges still occasionally express reluctance to sentence a
convicted rapist who was "led astray" by a woman who was "asking for
it."3 In balancing these extremes, difficult legal questions inevitably in-
termix with strongly held beliefs and powerful emotions, presenting
daunting challenges to reasoned discourse.'
1. See generally Susan Estrich, Teaching Rape Law, 102 YALE L.J. 509 (1992) (dis-
cussing her experiences with teaching rape law and exploring the difficult questions that
arise in the context of the criminal trial).
2. See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State:
Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNs 635, 646-55 (1983) (commenting on the distinction
between rape as defined by the legal system and rape as experienced by women socialized
into routine compliance).
3. S. REP. No. 197, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 33-34 (1991) (reporting results from a state
court system's study of blatant gender prejudices during rape and domestic assault pro-
ceedings in which various judicial officers ridiculed complainants). One of the most nota-
ble displays of the humiliation of a complainant occurred in a Florida state court in which a
judge remarked during sentencing "that he felt sorry for a confessed rapist because his
victim was such a 'pathetic' woman." Id. at 34.
4. See Estrich, supra note 1, at 515 (remarking on the need to balance in the class-
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Within this controversy, a key evidentiary question arises in rape cases:
to what extent, if at all, should a defendant, or a prosecutor, offer evi-
dence of the complainant's prior sexual history.5 Fortunately, the days
have passed when a rape accusation automatically would open the court-
room door to whatever gossip about the complainant the defendant could
scrape up.6 Congress and forty-eight state legislatures have enacted rules
to exclude such evidence unless a special showing of relevance can be
made.7
Although there is a general consensus that the evidentiary use of prior
sexual history must be restricted, legislation regulating such evidence and
judicial decisions applying this legislation have taken divergent ap-
proaches as to the circumstances in which such evidence merits consider-
ation, the degree of discretion offered to a trial judge in assessing
admissibility, and how the trial judge should exercise that discretion. This
uncertainty has, in turn, given rise to concern that excessive restrictions
on admissibility may infringe upon a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights
to present a defense and to confront and cross-examine his accusers. 8
room the emotional "passion" which rape discussions arouse with the drive to articulate
good legal arguments).
5. See id. at 517 (discussing this question in the context of acquaintance rape).
6. For critical examinations of attitudes and procedures predating legislative reform,
see Vivian Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77
COLUM. L. REv. 1, 12-14 (1977); Carol Bohmer, Judicial Attitudes Toward Rape Victims, 57
JUDICATURE 303, 304-05 (1974); Richard A. Hibey, The Trial of a Rape Case: An Advo-
cate's Analysis of Corroboration, Consent and Character, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 309, 325-28
(1973); Abraham P. Ordover, Admissibility of Patterns of Similar Sexual Conduct: The Un-
lamented Death of Character for Chastity, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 90, 95-97 (1977); Camille
E. LeGrand, Comment, Rape and Rape Laws: Sexism in Society and Law, 61 CAL. L. REv.
919, 935-36 (1973); Note, If She Consented Once, She Consented Again-A Legal Fallacy in
Forcible Rape Cases, 10 VAL. U. L. REV. 127, 127-28 (1975); James J. Wesolowski, Note,
Indicia of Consent? A Proposal for Change to the Common Law Rule Admitting Evidence
of a Rape Victim's Character for Chastity, 7 Loy. U. Cii. L.J. 118, 119-22 (1976).
7. See infra note 25 (identifying the state statutes).
8. See, e.g., Barbara A. Caulfield, The New Oregon Sexual Offenses Evidence Law:
An Evaluation, 55 OR. L. REv. 493, 499-500 (1976) (questioning whether the exclusion of
such evidence violated the Sixth Amendment); Harriett R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims
in the State and Federal Courts: A Proposal for the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV. 763,
802 (1986) (discussing the conflict between the criticism of the common law rules and the
defendant's Sixth Amendment rights); J. Alexander Tanford & Anthony J. Bocchino, Rape
Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 544, 590 (1980) (calling
for rape shield statutes to be struck down as unconstitutional and rewritten if they do not
allow a defendant to defend himself properly); Barbara Child, Comment, Ohio's New Rape
Law: Does it Protect Complainant at the Expense of the Rights of the Accused? 9 AKRON L.
REv. 337, 348-49 (1975) (noting the conflict between the constitutional rights of the victim
and the accused); Jerrilee Sutherlin, Note, Indiana's Rape Shield Law: Conflict with the
Confrontation Clause? 9 IND. L. REv. 418, 418-19 (1976) (relaying the purposes of the
confrontation clause).
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This article analyzes the theories cited by defendants, and occasionally
prosecutors, to admit evidence of a rape complainant's prior sexual con-
duct. On the whole, courts have adequately balanced the conflicting in-
terests presented by such evidence with concern for justice and equity.
Substantial clarification, however, is required as to whether a judge is
authorized, in deciding upon admissibility, to assess the credibility of the
complainant, defendant, and other witnesses.
I. TRADITIONAL THEORIES OF RELEVANCE;
"RAPE SHIELD" LEGISLATION
Although definitions of sexual offenses vary considerably in their de-
tails, the essence of these crimes is that (1) the defendant engaged in a
statutorily designated sexual activity with the complainant9 (2) without
her'0 consent and (3) against her will." Some rape 12 statutes also require
9. Because the word chosen to represent the person the defendant is accused of rap-
ing may effect how one's analysis of the issues is perceived, I thought it appropriate to
explain my choice. Legislatures, courts, and scholars have used, among others, the words
"victim," "alleged victim," "complaining witness," "complainant" and "prosecutrix." I re-
jected "prosecutrix" because it has an archaic, musty, sexist sound to it, and suggests that a
rape case is a private cause of action brought by the woman who alleges she was raped,
instead of a criminal charge brought by the public prosecutor on behalf of the state. "Al-
leged victim" and "complaining witness" were eliminated mainly because they are too
wordy. I chose "complainant" over "victim" because the latter term implies prejudgment
of what in many cases are contested issues, such as whether intercourse or other sexual acts
did occur, or if they occurred without the woman's consent. "Complainant" is judgment-
neutral. This is not to ignore the lamentable fact that the substantial majority of complain-
ants are in fact victims, i.e. they have been raped or molested. I note also that the word
"victim" accurately describes factual and legal reality in cases in which a defendant has
been convicted and an appellate court has affirmed, and in cases in which the defendant
defends only on the issue of identity while conceding that the complainant did in fact suffer
the assault she describes.
10. The law in most jurisdictions is now expressed in gender-neutral terms in recogni-
tion of the fact that women occasionally commit such crimes, and men are occasionally
victimized by women. The overwhelming majority of such crimes, however, are committed
by men against women. To employ gender-neutral language in discussing the evidential
issues that arise in rape cases would thus ignore reality and serve no useful purpose.
11. See 65 AM. JUR. 2D Rape § 1 (1972) (equating "against her will" as meaning "with-
out her consent"); cf MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (defin-
ing rape as when "[a] male ... has sexual intercourse with a female not his wife" where
force or the threat of force is present). If the nondefendant participant was a child of less
than a specified age, the conduct is criminal whether or not the child consented. See 65
AM. JUR. 2D Rape §§ 15-17 (1972) (describing the elements of statutory rape); cf. MODEL
PENAL CODE § 213.1(d) (1962) (defining rape as intercourse with female under ten years
old).
12. The terms "rape," "sexual assault," and "sexual offense" are used interchangeably
in this chapter. Where the particular nature of the sexual conduct in question is relevant to
the discussion, it will be specified.
19951
Catholic University Law Review
the prosecutor to prove that the defendant used force.13
As a practical matter, a man charged with a sexual offense has four
defenses available: (1) The complainant mistakenly has identified the de-
fendant as the perpetrator; (2) No sexual activity occurred; i.e., the com-
plainant is either lying or confused; (3) The complainant consented to the
sexual activity, and currently is lying; (4) If the complainant did not con-
sent, the defendant nevertheless reasonably believed she did. If the de-
fendant asserts the second or third defense, a jury will want to know the
complainant's motivation for falsely accusing the defendant. The failure
to provide a plausible answer may weigh very heavily against him.14
A. Traditional Theories of Relevance
Until recently, a defendant who asserted any of the latter three de-
fenses routinely would offer evidence, assuming such evidence existed or
could be manufactured," of the complainant's prior nonmarital or extra-
marital sexual activity. A defendant might elicit such information by
cross-examining the complainant about her prior sexual activity, by call-
ing one or more men to testify about their prior sexual relations with her,
or by calling witnesses to testify about the complainant's reputation of
unchastity or promiscuity.' 6 Even if such evidence had no direct rele-
13. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 462 (1992). There is now widespread accept-
ance of the principle that "no means no," i.e., that it constitutes rape if a defendant persists
to intercourse after the complainant has clearly said no. See State ex rel. M.T.S., 609 A.2d
1266, 1279 (N.J. 1992) (finding that no physical force was necessary beyond sexual penetra-
tion where the complainant did not consent). However, evidence of force, beyond that
necessary to perform the act of intercourse itself, is still required in many states. See Com-
monwealth v. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d 1161, 1164-65 (Pa. 1994) (reversing a rape conviction,
although the complainant said "no" throughout the encounter, because the defendant had
not used force); see also Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1125-28 (1986) (advocat-
ing reform to reflect that the lack of verbal consent translates into rape).
14. In a related context, recall Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas's inability,
during Senate Judiciary Committee confirmation hearings, to suggest a reason why Profes-
sor Anita Hill would falsely accuse him of sexual harassment.
15. At least according to popular wisdom, perjury by defense witnesses was distress-
ingly common in such cases.
16. Most jurisdictions admitted reputation testimony. See Kristine Cordier Karnezis,
Annotation, Modem Status of Admissibility, in Forcible Rape Prosecution, of Complain-
ant's General Reputation for Unchastity, 95 A.L.R.3D 1181, 1185 (1979) (maintaining that
cases generally allow evidence of a complainant's reputation for unchastity on the issue of
consent). As originally enacted, the Federal Rules of Evidence (hereinafter FRE) did like-
wise. FRE 404(a)(2) permits a defendant to offer reputation or opinion evidence of a
"pertinent trait of character of the victim of the crime .... " FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2). The
Advisory Committee Note commented, "an accused may introduce pertinent evidence of
the character of the victim, as in support of a claim of ... consent in a case of rape . . .
FED. R. EVID. 404 Advisory Committee's Note.
Some jurisdictions also admitted evidence of specific acts. See, e.g., Fuller v. State, 313
[Vol. 44:709
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vance to the specific facts of the case, it was considered relevant for the
following reasons:
1. Credibility. It was considered "a matter of common knowledge
that the bad character of a man for chastity does not even in the remotest
degree affect his character for truth... while it does that of a woman."' 7
In other words, evidence that a woman was unchaste was thought rele-
vant to prove that she was also a liar."
2. Consent; the "yes/yes inference." Evidence that the complainant
engaged in nonmarital sex was considered relevant to support a defend-
ant's claim that she consented to have sex with him on the occasion in
question because "common experience teaches us that the woman who
has once departed from the paths of virtue is far more apt to consent to
another lapse than is the one who has never stepped aside from that
path." 9 In essence, the evidence that the complainant consented to have
sex with some men 20 on some occasions makes it more probable that she
would consent to have sex with any man at any time. This is referred to
hereinafter as the "yes/yes inference,' i.e., the inference that "yes to
some men sometimes means yes to any man any time."
3. Defendant's reasonable belief that complainant consented. Even if
S.E.2d 505, 506 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984); Hamilton v. State, 365 S.E.2d 120, 123 (Ga. Ct. App.
1987); Critchlow v. State, 346 N.E.2d 591, 599 (Ind. 1976); Shay v. State, 90 So.2d 209, 211
(Miss. 1956) (superseded by Miss. R. EviD. 412); State v. Heisinger, 252 N.W.2d 899, 905
(S.D. 1977) (construing a rape shield statute which declared that evidence of the victim's
sexual conduct with persons other than the accused would be inadmissible unless relevant
to a fact at issue, as permitting such evidence on the issue of consent). See generally Kris-
tine Cordier Karnezis, Annotation, Modern Status of Admissibility, in Forcible Rape Prose-
cution, of Complainant's Prior Sexual Acts, 94 A.L.R.3D 257, 265 (1979).
17. State v. Sibley, 33 S.W. 167, 171 (Mo. 1895).
18. 3A JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 924a
(Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970). Consider the following passage:
[Rape complainants'] psychic complexes are multifarious, distorted partly by in-
herent defects, partly by diseased derangements or abnormal instincts, partly by
bad social environment, partly by temporary physiological or emotional condi-
tions .... The unchaste ... mentality finds incidental but direct expression in the
narration of imaginary sex incidents of which the narrator is the heroine or the
victim.
Id.
19. State v. Wood, 122 P.2d 416, 418 (Ariz. 1942). This -belief has been previously
articulated. One court noted that "it is certainly more probable that a woman who has
done these things voluntarily in the past would be much more likely to consent than one
whose past reputation was without blemish, and whose personal conduct could not truth-
fully be assailed." People v. Johnson, 39 P. 622, 623 (Cal. 1895).
20. Other than her husband, if she is married.
21. See generally Frank Tuerkheimer, A Reassessment and Redefinition of Rape Shield
Laws, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 1245, 1266 (1989) (discussing this inference in the context of
whether the accused's knowledge of prior sexual activity should have a bearing on
admissibility).
1995]
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the complainant did not in fact consent to intercourse, information con-
cerning the complainant's prior sexual activity, if known to the defendant
prior to the events giving rise to the rape accusation, was considered rele-
vant on the question whether the defendant reasonably believed that she
consented.
B. "Rape Shield" Legislation
In the past three decades, this evidentiary use of the complainant's
prior sexual behavior has been harshly criticized in four basic ways. First,
the attitudes underlying the "credibility" and "consent" theories of rele-
vance, previously accepted as "common knowledge," became recognized
as factually questionable and, eventually, politically unacceptable.22 Sec-
ond, indulgence in such beliefs had an unacceptable cost: a rape defend-
ant could subject the complainant to public embarrassment and
humiliation by eliciting evidence concerning her prior sexual conduct.
This not only compounded the trauma of the rape, but also discouraged
many victims from coming forward in the first place.23 Third, such evi-
dence injected collateral matters which prolonged the trial and distracted
the jury from the facts at issue. Fourth, admission of such evidence too
often resulted in acquittals of men who should have been convicted.24
The federal government and most states responded to the criticisms
22. See, e.g., People v. Sandoval, 552 N.E.2d 726, 730 (I11.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938
(1990); State ex rel Pope v. Superior Court, 545 P.2d 946, 950-53 (Ariz. 1976).
Contemporary attitudes and knowledge have led to other changes in the law of rape.
For example, the "marital exemption" holds that "the husband cannot be guilty of a rape
committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and
contract the wife hath given up herself in this kind unto her husband." 1 MAT-HEW HALE,
THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 628 (W.A. Stokes & E. Ingersoll eds., 1847).
This has been revoked by court decision or legislation in several states. Similarly, until
fairly recently, many states required substantial corroboration, not permitting a rape con-
viction based solely on the testimony of the complainant. See Vitauts M. Gulbis, Annota-
tion, Modern Status of Rule Regarding Necessity for Corroboration of Victim's Testimony in
Prosecution for Sexual Offense, 31 A.L.R.4TH 120, 124 (1984). Many jurisdictions required
a judge to instruct the jury to be skeptical of the complainant's testimony because rape is
an easy charge to bring and a difficult charge to defend against. See Kristine Cordier
Karnezis, Annotation, Propriety of, or Prejudicial Effect of Omitting or of Giving, Instruc-
tion to the Jury, in Prosecution for Rape or Sexual Offense, as to Ease of Making or Diffi-
culty of Defending Against Such a Charge, 92 A.L.R.3D 866, 868 (1979).
23. See State v. Williams, 580 P.2d 1341, 1343 (Kan. 1978) (remarking that the aim of
Kansas' rape shield statute was to stop the complainant from being placed on trial herself);
see also Commonwealth v. Fitzgerald, 590 N.E.2d 1151, 1155 (Mass. 1992) (quoting
Williams).
24. See Tberkheimer, supra note 21, at 1250-51 (discussing the need to keep the jury
focused on the pertinent issues and the need to minimize the complainant's fears that the
trial will produce negative results).
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and enacted "rape shield laws",25 to restrict the use of evidence of a corn-
25. The phrase "rape shield law" reflects the fact that such legislation helps shield the
complainant from the embarrassment of having her prior sexual behavior revealed (or lied
about) during the trial. The 48 state statutes are as follows:
Alabama: ALA. CODE § 12-21-203 (Supp. 1985).
Alaska: ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.045 (Supp. 1990).
Arkansas: ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-42-101 (Michie 1994).
California: CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 782, 1103(b) (West Supp. 1995).
Colorado: COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-3-407 (Supp. 1994).
Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86f (West 1994).
Delaware: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 3508-3509 (Supp. 1994).
Florida: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022(2)-(3) (West 1992).
Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2-3 (Supp. 1995).
Hawaii: HAW. R. EVID. 412.
Idaho: IDAHO R. EID. 412.
Illinois: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 725, para. 115-7 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994).
Indiana: IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-4 (Burns 1994).
Iowa: IOWA R. EviD. 412.
Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3525 (Supp. 1993).
Kentucky: Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.145 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990).
Louisiana: LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 412 (West 1995).
Maine: ME. R. EVID. 412.
Maryland: MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 461A (1992).
Massachusetts: MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 21B (West 1986).
Michigan: MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520j (West 1991).
Minnesota: MINN. R. EvID. 412.
Mississippi: MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 97-3-68, 97-3-70 (1994).
Missouri: Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.015 (Vernon 1994).
Montana: MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-511(2) (1993).
Nebraska: NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-321 (Supp. 1989).
Nevada: NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 48.069, 50.090 (Michie Supp. 1993).
New Hampshire: N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:6 (Supp. 1994).
New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-32.1-.3 (West 1994).
New Mexico: N.M. R. EvlD. 11-413.
New York: N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.42 (McKinney 1992).
North Carolina: N.C. R. EvID. 412.
North Dakota: N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-14 to -15 (1985).
Ohio: OHIO REv. CODE. ANN. § 2907.02(D) (Anderson 1993).
Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2412 (West Supp. 1993).
Oregon: OR. R. EVID. 412; OR. REv. STAT. § 40.210 (1993).
Pennsylvania: 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3104 (1992).
Rhode Island: R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-13 (1994).
South Carolina: S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-659.1 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
South Dakota: S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-22-15 (1988).
Tennessee: TENN. R. EVID. 412.
Texas: TEX. R. EVID. 412.
Vermont: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3255 (Supp. 1994).
Virginia: VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.7 (Michie 1988).
Washington: WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.020 (West 1988).
West Virginia: W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-11 (1992).
Wisconsin: Wis. STAT. ANN. § 972.11(2)(b) (West 1985).
Wyoming: Wvo. STAT. § 6-2-312 (1988).
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plainant's prior sexual conduct26 in prosecutions for sex offenses and re-
lated crimes.27 As a result, the general principle excluding evidence of
the complainant's prior sexual conduct if its only theory of relevance is
the "yes/yes inference" has won near-universal acceptance. Many rape
shield statutes also require a defendant to provide advance written notice
of the intent to use such evidence and provide for an in camera pretrial
hearing to determine its admissibility. Rule 412 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence (hereinafter "FRE 412") is typical of such statutes:
Sex Offense Cases; Relevance of Alleged Victim's Past Sexual
Behavior or Alleged Sexual Predisposition
(a) EVIDENCE GENERALLY INADMISSIBLE.-The fol-
lowing evidence is not admissible in any civil or criminal
proceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct except as
provided in subdivisions (b) and (c):
(1) Evidence offered to prove that any alleged victim en-
gaged in other sexual behavior.
(2) Evidence offered to prove any alleged victim's sexual
STATES (1987 & Supp. 1992) (listing some statutes); Kim Steinmetz, Note, State v. Oliver:
Children with a Past; The Admissibility of the Victim's Prior Sexual Experience in Child
Molestation Cases, 31 ARIz. L. REv. 677, 680 n.18 (1989) (presenting a list of other state
statutes).
The highest courts of the two remaining states, Arizona and Utah, have recognized the
principles underlying rape shield legislation. Pope, 545 P.2d at 950; State v. Johns, 615 P.2d
1260, 1263-64 (Utah 1980) (holding that absent circumstances enhancing its probative
value, evidence of a rape victim's general reputation for sexual promiscuity and specific
prior unchaste acts is generally irrelevant and inadmissible).
26. Rape shield legislation regulates evidence of the complainant's sexual conduct af-
ter the alleged rape as well as such conduct before the alleged rape. Several state statutes
explicitly so provide. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-7c (West 1994) (specifying post-
event as well as pre-event conduct); IDAHO R. EviD. 412(d); IOWA R. EVID. 412(d); LA.
CODE Evi. ANN. art. 412(F) (West 1995); Miss. R. EVID. 412(d); N.C. R. EVID. 412(a). For
court decisions to the same effect, see Evans v. State, 878 S.W.2d 750, 754 (Ark. 1994);
Kemp v. State, 606 S.W.2d 573, 575 (Ark. 1980); State v. Wattenbarger, 776 P.2d 1292, 1294
(Or. Ct. App. 1989); State v. Gulrud, 412 N.W.2d 139, 142 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
Logic dictates a similar rule even in the absence of a specific provision to this effect.
Barring unusual circumstances, the complainant's conduct subsequent to the alleged rape
or assault will be even less relevant than was her conduct before it.
The related issue of whether specific behavior constitutes a part of the sequence of
events that resulted in the alleged rape is discussed infra part VI.
27. See, e.g., United States v. Duncan, 855 F.2d 1528, 1533-35 (11th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 489 U.S. 1029 (1989) (applying FRE 412 to a kidnapping prosecution in which the
defendant allegedly raped the complainant); State v. Friend, 493 N.W.2d 540, 545 (Minn.
1992) (applying the state rape shield statute in a prosecution for murder and felony-murder
committed in connection with rape); FED. R. EVID. 412 Advisory Committee's Note (not-
ing that "[tihe reason for extending the rule to all criminal cases is obvious"). But see State
v. Sexton, 444 S.E.2d 879, 900 (N.C.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 525 (1994) (allowing the state
to offer evidence of a rape-and-murder victim's fidelity to her husband); see also discussion
infra part VIII. A.
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predisposition.
(b) EXCEPTIONS.-
(1) In a criminal case, the following evidence is admissible,
if otherwise admissible under these rules:
(A) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by
the alleged victim offered to prove that a person
other than the accused was the source of semen,
injury or other physical evidence;
(B) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by
the alleged victim with respect to the person ac-
cused of the sexual misconduct offered by the ac-
cused to prove consent or by the prosecution; and
(C) evidence the exclusion of which would violate the
constitutional rights of the defendant.
(2) In a civil case, evidence offered to prove the sexual be-
havior or sexual predisposition of any alleged victim is
admissible if it is otherwise admissible under these rules
and its probative value substantially outweighs the dan-
ger of harm to any victim and of unfair prejudice to any
party. Evidence of an alleged victim's reputation is ad-
missible only if it has been placed in controversy by the
alleged victim.
(c) PROCEDURE TO DETERMINE ADMISSIBILITY.-
(1) A party intending to offer evidence under subdivision
(b) must-
(A) file a written motion at least 14 days before trial
specifically describing the evidence and stating the
purpose for which it is offered unless the court, for
good cause requires a different time for filing or
permits filing during trial; and
(B) serve the motion on all parties and notify the al-
leged victim or, when appropriate, the alleged vic-
tim's guardian or representative.
(2) Before admitting evidence under this rule the court
must conduct a hearing in camera and afford the victim
and parties a right to attend and be heard. The motion,
related papers, and the record of the hearing must be
sealed and remain under seal unless the court orders
otherwise.28
28. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 40141(b), 108 Stat. 1918, 1919 (1994). The current version, as amended in 1994, is consid-
erably shorter than its predecessor. As enacted in 1978, the rule read:
Rule 412. Rape Cases; Relevance of Victim's Past Behavior
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in a criminal case in which a
person is accused of rape or of assault with intent to commit rape, reputation
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or opinion evidence of the past sexual behavior of an alleged victim of such
rape or assault is not admissible.
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in a criminal case in which a
person is accused of rape or of assault with intent to commit rape, evidence of
a victim's past sexual behavior other than reputation or opinion evidence is
also not admissible, unless such evidence other than reputation or opinion
evidence is-
(1) admitted in accordance with subdivisions (c)(1) and (c)(2) and is consti-
tutionally required to be admitted; or
(2) admitted in accordance with subdivision (c) and is evidence of-
(A) past sexual behavior with persons other than the accused, offered by
the accused upon the issue of whether the accused was or was not,
with respect to the alleged victim, the source of semen or injury; or
(B) past sexual behavior with the accused and is offered by the accused
upon the issue of whether the alleged victim consented to the sexual
behavior with respect to which rape or assault is alleged.
(c) [Procedure: notice and in camera hearing.]
(1) If the person accused of committing rape or assault with intent to commit
rape intends to offer under subdivision (b) evidence of specific instances
of the alleged victim's past sexual behavior, the accused shall make a writ-
ten motion to offer such evidence not later than fifteen days before the
date on which the trial in which such evidence is to be offered is sched-
uled to begin, except that the court may allow the motion to be made at a
later date, including during trial, if the court determines either that the
evidence is newly discovered and could not have been obtained earlier
through the exercise of due diligence or that the issue to which such evi-
dence relates has newly arisen in the case. Any motion made under this
paragraph shall be served on all other parties and on the alleged victim.
(2) The motion described in paragraph (1) shall be accompanied by a written
offer of proof. If the court determines that the offer of proof contains
evidence described in subdivision (b), the court shall order a hearing in
chambers to determine if such evidence is admissible. At such hearing
the parties may call witnesses, including the alleged victim, and offer rele-
vant evidence. Notwithstanding subdivision (b) of rule 104, if the rele-
vancy of the evidence which the accused seeks to offer in the trial
depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court, at the hear-
ing in chambers or at a subsequent hearing in chambers scheduled for
such purpose, shall accept evidence on the issue of whether such condi-
tion of fact is fulfilled and shall determine such issue.
(3) If the court determines on the basis of the hearing described in paragraph
(2) that the evidence which the accused seeks to offer is relevant and that
the probative value of such evidence outweighs the danger of unfair prej-
udice, such evidence shall be admissible in the trial to the extent an order
made by the court specifies evidence which may be offered and areas with
respect to which the alleged victim may be examined or cross-examined.
(d) For purposes of this rule, the term "past sexual behavior" means sexual be-
havior other than the sexual behavior with respect to which rape or assault
with intent to commit rape is alleged.
Privacy Protection for Rape Victims Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-540, § 2(a), 92 Stat. 2046,
2046-47 (1978), as amended by Act of Nov. 18, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7046(a), 102
Stat. 4395, 4400 (1988). The amendment substituted "Sex Offense" for "Rape" in the
heading and substituted "an offense under chapter 109A of title 18, United States Code"
and "offense" for "rape or of assault with intent to commit rape" and "rape or assault,"
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FRE 412 is intended to be extremely broad in scope.29 The exclusion
of the complainant's prior sexual behavior encompasses evidence sug-
gesting her alleged sexual predisposition3" and indirect evidence of sexual
behavior including evidence of the use of contraceptives, 3 the birth of an
illegitimate child,32 venereal disease,33 and "activities of the mind, such as
fantasies or dreams., 34 It also is intended to exclude evidence which,
although not referring directly to sexual activities or thoughts, may have a
sexual connotation for the factfinder "such as that relating to the alleged
victim's mode of dress, speech, or life-style ....
1. Constitutionality
Because rape shield laws exclude evidence traditionally considered rel-
evant to the defense of a sex crime prosecution, they implicate the Sixth
Amendment rights to confront and cross-examine one's accusers and to
present a defense. These rights, however, are not absolute. In Michigan
v. Lucas,36 the Supreme Court observed that "[t]he right to present rele-
vant testimony is not without limitation. The right 'may, in appropriate
cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial
respectively. Minor and Technical Criminal Law Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-690, § 7046(a), 102 Stat. 4395, 4400 (1988). Many state statutes are modelled to some
extent on the original version of FRE 412. See supra notes 25-26.
The 1994 version of FRE 412 differs from its predecessor primarily in style. The 1994
version contains a provision, absent in the 1978 version, regulating use of such evidence in
civil litigation. Moreover, the provisions differ somewhat in how the judge is to balance
the legitimate probative value of the evidence against the grounds for exclusion. See infra
notes 47-57 (addressing the issue of how the judge balances the probative value against
exclusion).
29. See generally FED. R. EVID. 412 Advisory Committee's Note (1994) (describing
the scope of the Rule).
30. Id. (explaining that Rule 412 intends to remove any sexual connotations that the
information may convey to the fact finder).
31. Id. (citing United States v. Galloway, 937 F.2d 542 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 418 (1992)).
32. Id. (citing United States v. One Feather, 702 F.2d 736 (8th Cir. 1983)).
33. Id. (citing Kansas v. Carmichael, 727 P.2d 918, 925 (Kan. 1986)); cf infra part II.C.
34. Id. (citing 23 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH A. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE § 5384 at 548 (1980)). Wright and Graham observe that "[w]hile
there may be some doubt under statutes that ... [speak of past sexual] 'conduct,' it would
seem that the language of [FRE] 412 is broad enough to encompass the behavior of the
mind." Id.
35. FED. R. EvID. 412 Advisory Committee's Note.
36. 500 U.S. 145 (1991). In Lucas, the trial court precluded the defendant from
presenting evidence of his prior sexual relationship with the complainant because the de-
fendant failed to comply with a statute requiring him to give pretrial notice of his intent to
offer such evidence. Id. at 146. The Supreme Court held that this was not a per se viola-
tion of the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 152-53.
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process.' ,17 Thus, " 'trial judges retain wide latitude' to limit reasonably
a criminal defendant's right to cross-examine a witness 'based on con-
cerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the
issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only mar-
ginally relevant.' "3
Several of the concerns mentioned by the Court underlie rape shield
statutes. Such legislation represents a legislative judgment that evidence
of a complainant's prior sexual conduct is "only marginally relevant"3 9
and that, barring unusual circumstances, it tends to confuse the issues,
unduly harass witnesses, and may also be unfairly prejudicial to the pros-
ecution.40 Accordingly, courts have upheld the general constitutionality
of rape shield statutes41 challenged for violating due process or equal pro-
tection4 2 for denying a defendant the right to confront and cross-examine
accusers,4 3  for violating a defendant's privilege against self-
37. Id. at 149 (quoting Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 55 (1987)).
38. Id. (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986)).
39. It is often argued that evidence of a complainant's prior sexual behavior is gener-
ally "irrelevant" on the question whether she consented on the occasion in question. This
overstates the case somewhat. Common sense suggests that a woman who regards going to
bed with a man as a pleasant way to end a pleasant evening, and has done so with a sub-
stantial number of men over the last few years, is more likely to have consented on a
particular occasion than is, for example, a woman who believes that sex outside of mar-
riage is immoral and sinful and has never engaged in it. Evidence of the first woman's
prior sexual conduct should be excluded, not because it is "irrelevant," but because, in the
absence of special circumstances, it is not relevant enough to overcome the reasons justify-
ing exclusion.
40. See infra notes 47-57 and accompanying text (discussing relevance and prejudice).
41. Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Constitutionality of "Rape Shield" Statute Restricting
Use of Evidence of Victim's Sexual Experiences, 1 A.L.R.4H 283, 285-300 (1980).
42. Ala-Darrow v. State, 451 So. 2d 394, 397 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984).
Ark-Kemp v. State, 606 S.W.2d 573, 575 (Ark. 1980).
Cal-People v. Blackburn, 128 Cal. Rptr. 864, 866-67 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
Ill-People v. Bachman, 414 N.E.2d 1369, 1374 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981).
Ind-Shaffer v. State, 443 N.E.2d 838, 839 (Ind. 1983).
Kan-State v. Williams, 580 P.2d 1341, 1343 (Kan. 1978).
Ohio-State v. Gardner, 391 N.E.2d 337, 340-41 (Ohio 1979).
Md-White v. State, 598 A.2d 187, 194 (Md. 1991).
Mo-State v. Madsen, 772 S.W.2d 656, 658-59 (Mo. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1096
(1990).
SC-State v. McCoy, 261 S.E.2d 159, 161 (S.C. 1979).
Wash-State v. Blum, 561 P.2d 226, 229 (Wash. 1977).
43. Ala-Fairchild v. State, 505 So. 2d 1265, 1269-70 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986).
Alaska-Kvasnikoff v. State, 674 P.2d 302, 306 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (homosexual
rape).
Ark-Marion v. State, 590 S.W.2d 288, 289 (Ark. 1979).
Colo-People v. McKenna, 585 P.2d 275, 279 (Colo. 1978).
Conn-State v. Preyer, 502 A.2d 858, 864 (Conn. 1985).
Ga-Lassiter v. State, 333 S.E.2d 412, 416 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985).
Ill-People v. Requena, 435 N.E.2d 125, 128 (I11. App. Ct. 1982), cert. denied, 459
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incrimination," for vagueness, 45 or a variety of other grounds. 46
2. Exceptions to Exclusion
Nevertheless, situations occur in which evidence of the complainant's
prior sexual conduct is highly relevant to impeach the complainant, rebut
an element of the government's case or support an affirmative defense.
In these situations, exclusion of such evidence would deprive the defend-
U.S. 1204 (1983).
Ind-Roberts v. State, 373 N.E.2d 1103, 1106-07 (Ind. 1978); Stephens v. Morris, 756
F. Supp. 1137, 1143 (N.D. Ind. 1991).
Kan-State v. Blue, 592 P.2d 897, 900-01 (Kan. 1979).
Ky-Smith v. Commonwealth, 566 S.W.2d 181, 183 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
Md-White v. State, 598 A.2d 187, 194 (Md. 1991).
Mich-People v. Arenda, 330 N.W.2d 814, 816-17 (Mich. 1982); People v. Williams,
330 N.W.2d 823, 827 (Mich. 1982),
Miss-Johnston v. State, 376 So. 2d 1343, 1346-47 (Miss. 1979).
Mo-State v. Brown, 636 S.W.2d 929, 934 (Mo. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1212
(1983).
Neb-Pratt v. Parratt, 615 F.2d 486, 487 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 852 (1980).
NJ-State v. Budis, 593 A.2d 784, 791 (N.J. 1991).
NM-State v. Herrera, 582 P.2d 384 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 580 P.2d 972
(N.M. 1978).
NY-People v. Mandel, 403 N.Y.S.2d 63, 66 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978), rev'd, 401 N.E.2d
185 (N.Y. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 949 (1980); People v. Conyers, 382 N.Y.S.2d
437, 444 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1976).
ND-State v. Piper, 261 N.W.2d 650, 655 (N.D. 1977).
OK-Cameron v. State, 561 P.2d 118, 122 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977).
Or-State v. Barrington, 570 P.2d 394, 395 (Or. Ct. App. 1977).
Pa-Commonwealth v. Quartman, 458 A.2d 994, 998 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983);
Commonwealth v. Dear, 492 A.2d 714, 720 n.2 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
SC-State v. McCoy, 261 S.E.2d 159, 161 (S.C. 1979).
Tex-Allen v. State, 700 S.W.2d 924, 932 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985); Garza Barreda v.
State, 739 S.W.2d 368, 370 (Tex. Ct. App.), rev'd on recons., 760 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1987).
Wash-State v. Hudlow, 659 P.2d 514, 518 (Wash. 1983).
W Va-State v. Persinger, 286 S.E.2d 261, 265 (W. Va. 1982).
But see State v. Herndon, 426 N.W.2d 347, 348 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988) (noting that a statu-
tory provision which absolutely prohibited evidence of complainant's prior sexual conduct,
even if it was probative of her bias or prejudice or showed a continuing pattern of conduct,
violated a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront adverse witnesses and to pres-
ent witnesses in his own behalf).
44. Marion, 590 S.W.2d at 290; Blackburn, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 868; Smith v. Common-
wealth, 566 S.W.2d 181, 183 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978); Holloway v. State, 695 S.W.2d 112, 119
(Tex. Ct. App. 1985).
45. Young v. State, 429 So. 2d 1162,1163 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983); Blackburn, 128 Cal.
Rptr. at 867; State v. Carmichael, 727 P.2d 918, 925 (Kan. 1986); Madsen, 772 S.W.2d at
659.
46. McKenna, 585 P.2d at 279 (separation of powers); Roberts, 373 N.E.2d at 1107
(separation of powers); Finney v. State, 385 N.E.2d 477, 480 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) (effective
assistance of counsel); Herrera, 582 P.2d at 389 (separation of powers).
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ant of the right to present a defense or to confront his accuser. The chal-
lenge presented is to permit a defendant to offer such evidence in
appropriate cases, without allowing the exceptions to, in effect, swallow
the rule, thereby returning the law to status quo ante.
Exceptions to the general rule of exclusion fall into a variety of catego-
ries, as indicated in parts II-VIII of the outline at the beginning of this
article. Each category is mentioned in some rape shield statutes; no cate-
gory is mentioned in all. Each exception, however, raises constitutional
questions that a court must address in determining admissibility.
3. "Relevancy" and "Prejudice"
After a court determines that evidence of the complainant's prior sex-
ual behavior has sufficient special relevance to merit consideration, the
court must assess that relevance against the risk of unfair prejudice, em-
barrassment, humiliation, and other similar factors. General evidence
principles dictate that if evidence is relevant on a contested issue, courts
should admit it unless "the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury" substantially outweighs its legitimate pro-
bative value.47 A number of rape shield statutes explicitly incorporate
such language;48 others contain no special language but effectively retain
the same meaning.4 9 Some statutes alter the traditional balancing test,
authorizing admission only if the "probative value of such evidence out-
weighs the danger of unfair prejudice .... ,5 Other statutes utilize differ-
ent formulations. 5 1
47. FED. R. EVID. 403. This rule provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be ex-
cluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Id. For a detailed discussion of
how the balance between probative value and its counterconsiderations should be struck,
see 2 C. FISHMAN, JONES ON EVIDENCE §§ 11:9-:18 (7th ed. 1994).
48. See, e.g., MINN. R. EVID. 412(2)(C).
49. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1); see, e.g., ME. R. EVID. 412; R.I. R. EVID. 412; TEX. R.
EvrD. 412(c).
50. State provisions containing this language include: IDAHO R. EVID. 412(c)(3);
IOWA. R. EVID. 412(c)(3); LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 412E(3) (West 1995); Miss. R. EVID.
412(c)(3); OR. R. EVID. 412(c). As enacted in 1978, FRE 412(c)(3) contained this lan-
guage. The 1994 version of FRE 412(b)(2) provides that such evidence is admissible in a
civil case "if it is otherwise admissible under these rules and its probative value substan-
tially outweighs the danger of harm to any victim and of unfair prejudice to any party."
FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(2).
51. For example, the Delaware Code authorizes the judge to admit such evidence if it
is relevant to "attack the credibility of the complaining witness." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 3508 (Supp. 1994).
New Mexico requires exclusion "unless, and only to the extent that the court finds, that
[the proffered reputation, opinion, or specific act] evidence of the victim's past sexual con-
[Val. 44:709
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The application of the term "relevant" or "probative value" in this con-
text needs no detailed explanation. Simply, a court should require a de-
fendant to specify the issue or issues the evidence is intended to address
and demonstrate how the evidence is truly probative on those issues ex-
clusive of the forbidden "yes/yes inference."
Application of the term "prejudice," however, causes some confusion
in this context. Scholarly commentary, court decisions, and even at least
one statute speak of the "unfair prejudice [of such evidence] to the victim
... "52 Traditionally, of course, the concept of "prejudice" applied solely
to parties, not to a witness, regardless of how closely identified with a
particular party the witness may be, as the complainant is to the prosecu-
tor in sex offense cases. General evidentiary principles require a judge to
protect a witness against "harassment or undue embarrassment. '' 53 Most
rape shield statutes enhance those protections with numerous additional
protections, both procedural and substantive.54 The assessment of "un-
fair prejudice" should therefore focus on the impact of the evidence on
the state, not the complainant. The Supreme Court of Washington, in
State v. Hudlow," stated this concept succinctly:
The issue is not whether evidence is prejudicial in the sense that
it is detrimental to someone involved in the trial. Rather, the
question is whether the evidence will arouse the jury's emotions of
prejudice, hostility, or sympathy. Arguments that sexual history
evidence is inadmissible because of its prejudicial impact on the
rape victim miss the point. Adverse psychological effects suffered
by crime victims, although regrettable, are not grounds for ex-
cluding probative evidence. 
56
duct is material and relevant to the case and that its inflammatory or prejudicial nature
does not outweigh its probative value." N.M. R. EVID. 413(A). The New Mexico rule does
not limit theories of relevance to any particular category.
N.C. R. EVID. 412 excludes reputation and opinion evidence, specifies the permissible
theories of relevance of specific act evidence, and directs the court to admit such evidence
providing it is "relevant." N.C. R. EVID. 412(b)-(d).
The Washington statute authorizes admission to the extent that the judge finds the evi-
dence "is relevant to the issue of the victim's consent; is not inadmissible because its proba-
tive value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will create a
substantial danger of undue prejudice; and that its exclusion would result in denial of sub-
stantial justice to the defendant ...." WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.020 (West 1988).
52. TENN. R. EVID. 412(d)(4) (emphasis added).
53. FED. R. EvID. 611(a). The rule states: "The court shall exercise reasonable control
over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to ...
(3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment." Id.
54. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
55. 659 P.2d 514 (Wash. 1983). See infra notes 336-48 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing State v. Hudlow).
56. Id. at 521 (quoting and adding emphasis to State v. Hudlow, 635 P.2d 1096, 1100
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Thus, after assessing the legitimate probative value of the evidence, the
court should "consider the effect of excluding such evidence on defend-
ant's right to a fair trial" and balance that effect against the "potential
prejudice to the truthfinding process itself ... to determine whether the
introduction of the victim's past sexual conduct may confuse the issues,
mislead the jury, or cause the jury to decide the case on an improper or
emotional basis." 57
4. Reputation and Opinion Evidence
As late as the mid-1970's, a defendant charged with forcible rape gen-
erally was permitted to offer evidence of the complainant's general repu-
tation for unchastity on the issue of whether she consented to sexual
intercourse with the defendant on the occasion in question.58 Most rape
shield statutes now regulate the use of such evidence. Such statutes can
be divided into the following categories:
1. Explicit exclusion. A number of state statutes explicitly exclude
reputation and opinion evidence including: Idaho,59 Iowa,60 Louisiana,6'
Maine,62 Maryland,63 Mississippi, 6 Missouri,65 North Carolina,66 Ore-
gon,67 Pennsylvania,68 and Texas.69
2. Exclusion by implication. Other statutes governing admissibility of
the complainant's past sexual behavior are concerned only with the cir-
cumstances under which specific act evidence may be admitted, without
explicit mention of reputation or opinion evidence. As such, these stat-
utes exclude reputation and opinion evidence by implication. Examples
include FRE 41270 and the rape shield provisions of Minnesota 7 ' and
(Wash. Ct. App. 1981), rev'd, 659 P.2d 514 (Wash. 1983)). The court reasoned that because
a rape shield law precludes the defendant from introducing relevant evidence, it could pass
constitutional muster only if justified by a compelling state interest. Id. at 522.
57. Id. at 521.
58. See Karnezis, supra note 16, at 1187.
59. IDAHO R. EVID. 412(a).
60. IOWA R. EVID. 412(a).
61. LA. CODE EVID. ANN. 412(A) (West 1995).
62. ME. R. EvID. 412(a).
63. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 461A(a) (1992).
64. Miss. R. EVID. 412(a).
65. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.015(1) (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1995).
66. N.C. R. EVID. 412(c).
67. OR. R. EviD. 412(1).
68. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3104(a) (1983).
69. TEX. R. EVID. 412(a).
70. FED. R. EVID. 412(a)-(b). Until its recent amendment, 412(a) explicitly excluded
such evidence. See supra note 28 (listing the pre-amended version of Rule 412).
71. MINN. R. EVID. 412(1)(A)(i) (allowing evidence of the complainant's previous sex-
ual conduct on the issue of consent only if the evidence establishes "a common scheme or
[Vol. 44:709
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New Jersey.72
3. Admissible under some circumstances. Some statutes dictate that a
court may admit reputation and opinion evidence upon a finding that its
probative value outweighs its inflammatory or prejudicial nature. In-
cluded in this category are rape shield provisions of Georgia, 73 New Mex-
ico,7 4 and Tennessee.75
4. Admissibility unclear. A few legislatures worded their statutes so
vaguely that it is unclear whether they restrict reputation or opinion evi-
dence at all.76
Exclusion of reputation and opinion testimony constitutes a legislative
finding that evidence of a woman's reputation regarding sexual behavior
is never relevant enough to be admitted.77 This finding effects a worth-
while change, not merely in the law of evidence, but the substantive law
of rape as well: a defendant can no longer rely upon what he had heard
about the complainant to justify a reasonable belief that she consented to
have sex with him.
plan of similar sexual conduct under circumstances similar to the case at issue..
72. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-7(c) (West 1994 & Supp. 1995) (allowing evidence of pre-
vious sexual conduct to be offered only if it concerned the source of the semen); cf. State v.
Ogburne, 561 A.2d 667, 670 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) (denying the defendant's
request to inquire if the complainant was a virgin and limiting questioning about previous
conduct to four days prior to the alleged assault).
73. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2-3 (1982). The statute provides that a complainant's "gen-
eral reputation for promiscuity, nonchastity, or sexual mores contrary to the community
standards" is admissible if the judge, after an in camera hearing, finds that the reputation
evidence "directly involved the participation of the accused or finds that the evidence ex-
pected to be introduced supports an inference that the accused could have reasonably be-
lieved that the complaining witness consented to the conduct complained of in the
prosecution." Id.
74. New Mexico's rape shield statute provides:
EVIDENCE OF THE VICTIM'S PAST SEXUAL CONDUCT. In prosecutions under Sec-
tions 30-9-11 to 30-9-15 NMSA 1978, evidence of the victim's past sexual con-
duct, opinion evidence thereof or of reputation for past sexual conduct shall not
be admitted unless, and only to the extent that the court finds, that evidence of
the victim's past sexual conduct is material and relevant to the case and that its
inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not outweigh its probative value.
N.M. R. EvID. 413(A).
75. The Tennessee Rules of Evidence admit such evidence if a judge finds after a hear-
ing that "the probative value of the evidence outweighs its unfair prejudice to the victim
.... TENN. R. Evrn. 412(d)(4).
76. In Rhode Island, Rule 412 merely provides that if a defendant seeks to offer proof
"that the complaining witness has engaged in sexual activities with other persons," the
judge at a hearing "shall rule upon the admissibility of the evidence offered." R.I. R. Evro.
412. In State v. Jette, however, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the defendant
cannot impeach the complaining witness' credibility by presenting evidence of her reputa-
tion for unchastity. 569 A.2d 438, 441-42 (R.I. 1990).
77. See, e.g., 124 CONG. REc. 34912, 34913 (1978) (statement of Mr. Mann).
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Defendants occasionally offer expert opinion testimony on complain-
ant's competency and credibility.78 Courts are divided on whether a
court has authority to order a sexual offense complainant to undergo a
mental examination to determine her competency or credibility. 79
II. ADMISSIBILITY OF COMPLAINANT'S PAST SEXUAL CONDUCT TO
REBUT PHYSICAL EVIDENCE
Most rape shield statutes authorize the trial judge to admit evidence of
the complainant's prior sexual conduct if relevant to rebut physical evi-
dence, such as evidence of the source of semen or injury, offered by the
prosecution.80 FRE 412(b)(1)(a), for example, states that if a defendant
provides pretrial notice, he may offer "evidence of specific instances of
sexual behavior of the alleged victim.., to prove that a person other than
the accused was the source of semen, injury, or other physical evidence
.... " Some corresponding state provisions are worded more broadly by
also permitting the introduction of evidence regarding pregnancy 8l and
disease.8 2 Courts in states whose statutes lack such a provision acknowl-
78. State v. Bingham, 776 P.2d 424, 428 (Idaho 1989), overruled by State v. Pizzuto,
810 P.2d 680 (Idaho 1991); State v. Hoisington, 657 P.2d 17, 29 (Idaho 1983).
79. Gregory D. Sarno, Annotation, Necessity or Permissibility of Mental Examination
to Determine Competency or Credibility of Complainant in Sexual Offense Prosecution, 45
A.L.R.4T 310, 315 (1986).
80. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 412(b)(1); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-407(1)(b) (West1990); FLA. STAT. ANN, § 794.022(2) (West 1995); IDAHO R. EVID. 412(b)(2)(A); IOWA R.
EviD. 412(b)(2)(A); LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 412(B)(1) (West 1995); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, § 461A(a)(2) (1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520j(1)(b) (West 1992); MINN.R. EVID. 412(1)(B); Miss. R. EviD. 412(b)(2)(A); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.015.1(2) (Vernon
1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-7(c) (West 1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(D)(Anderson 1993); ORE. R. EVID. 412(2)(b)(B); TENN. R. EVID. 412(c)(4)(ii); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 972.11(2)(b)(2) (West 1992). Courts in several states whose statutes lack such aprovision have held likewise. See State ex rel. Pope v. Superior Court, 545 P.2d 946, 953(Ariz. 1976); State v. Cosden, 568 P.2d 802, 806 (Wash. Ct. App. 1977), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 823 (1978).
81. Colorado: CoLo. REv. STAT. § 18-3-407(a)(b) (1992).
Florida: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022(2) (West 1992).
Maryland: MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 461A(a)(2) (1992).
Michigan: MICH. ComP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520j(1)(b) (West 1991).
Minnesota: MINN. R. EVID. 412(1)(B).
Mississippi: Miss. R. EVID. 412(b)(2)(A).
Missouri: Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.015.1(2) (Vernon 1992).
New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-7(1)(c) (West 1992).
Ohio: OHIO REv. CODE. ANN. § 2907.02(D) (Anderson 1993).
Wisconsin: Wis. STAT. ANN. § 972.11(2)(b)(2) (West 1992).
82. Colorado: COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-407(a)(b) (1992).
Florida: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022(2) (West 1992).
Maryland: MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 461A(a)(2) (1992).
Michigan: MICH. ComP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520j(1)(b) (West 1991).
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edge that, in appropriate circumstances, admission of such evidence is
constitutionally required.83
A. Source of Semen
This issue will most likely arise when the defendant denies having inter-
course with the complainant. The prosecutor will offer evidence that se-
men was found in the complainant (or on her clothing, sheets, etc.) to
corroborate, at least, her testimony that intercourse occurred. The de-
fendant then will seek to prove that the complainant had intercourse with
someone else contemporaneous to the alleged rape.8 Courts tend to ad-
mit such evidence if the complainant's alleged intercourse with another
occurred within a few days of the complainant's physical examination fol-
lowing the alleged rape, i.e., within the period that semen from the prior
act would remain motile.8" If the time is longer than a few days, however,
Minnesota: MINN. R. EVID. 412(1)(B).
Mississippi: Miss. R. EVID. 412(b)(2)(A).
Missouri: Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.015.1(2) (Vernon 1992).
New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-7(1)(c) (West 1992).
Ohio: OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2907.02(D) (Anderson 1993).
Tennessee: TENN. R. EviD. 412(c)(4)(ii).
Wisconsin: WIS. STAT. ANN. § 972.11(2),(b)(2) (West 1992).
83. Cf. Pope, 545 P.2d at 953; Commonwealth v. Majorana, 470 A.2d 80, 84 (Pa. 1983);
Cosden, 568 P.2d at 806.
84. The probative value of such evidence may depend considerably upon whether tests
have been performed comparing the defendant's DNA with that of the semen found in the
complainant.
85. Courts have held that it was error to exclude:
-testimony that earlier in the night of the alleged rape complainant told a man other
than the defendant that she wanted to have sex with him, that the witness had subsequently
seen complainant emerging from the woods with her pants unbuttoned after 15-30 minutes
alone with that man and that complainant told the witness, "I finally got it." State v. Ri-
naldi, 599 A.2d 1, 4-7 (Conn. 1991).
-results of two secretor semen tests which indicated defendant probably did not pro-
duce the semen collected from complainant, and the cross-examination of complainant
concerning the other source, limited to the morning of the alleged assault. This evidence,
coupled with inconsistent statements regarding her last date of intercourse and the fact
that two hours and fifteen minutes elapsed between her husband's early morning departure
and her report of rape, supported the inference she had engaged in consensual extramarital
intercourse, and would be relevant to a potential motive to fabricate rape. State v. Hagen,
391 N.W.2d 888, 891-92 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
-complainant's comments to the examining physician about sexual relations with her
boyfriend on the night defendant allegedly attacked her. State v. Gibson, 636 S.W.2d 956,
958-59 (Mo. 1982).
-cross-examination of the complainant with regard to her sexual activities on the day
preceding the alleged rape, precluding an attempt to establish that she had sexual relations
with someone other than the defendant which accounted for the presence of sperm in her
vagina on the day of the alleged rape. State v. LaClair, 433 A.2d 1326, 1329 (N.H. 1981).
-evidence of possible consensual intercourse between the complainant and her boy-
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courts generally exclude evidence of prior sexual conduct.86 If the time
between the prior conduct and the alleged incident was fairly brief, courts
still retain discretion to exclude the evidence if other facts render its pro-
friend on the evening of the alleged rape. Commonwealth v. Taylor, 487 A.2d 946, 947 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1985) (per curiam).
-evidence that the complainant had sex with her boyfriend the night before she was
allegedly raped. State v. Gibbons, 418 A.2d 830, 836-37 (R.I. 1980).
Similarly, see State v. Ogburne, 561 A.2d 667, 668 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) and
Commonwealth v. Jorgenson, 517 A.2d 1287, 1289-90 (Pa. 1986) (each holding that the
defendant was entitled to a hearing in order to determine the admissibility of evidence that
complainant had sex with another man prior to the alleged rape; three or four days in
Ogburne, minutes or hours in Jorgenson).
See also Majorana, 470 A.2d at 85 (holding that the trial court erroneously excluded the
defendant's testimony that he had consensual intercourse with the complainant two hours
before the alleged rape).
But see State v. Cervantes, 881 P.2d 151, 152 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that the trial
court properly excluded evidence that just prior to the rape the complainant was seen
"hanging all over" another man because the defendant could not prove that the complain-
ant had sex with that man and the complainant denied it).
86. In Louisiana, the rape shield statute expressly limits evidence of prior sexual con-
duct to intercourse that occurred within seventy-two hours of the alleged offense. LA. R.
Evno. 412(B)(1). Courts have excluded evidence relating to intercourse that preceded the
alleged rape by:
-five days: Lackey v. State, 671 S.W.2d 757, 759 (Ark. 1984) (notwithstanding medical
testimony that sperm might live for several days).
-four days: State v. Young, 668 S.W.2d 263, 265 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (noting that a
physician testified at the in camera hearing that sexual relations which occurred four days
prior to the alleged rape could not account for the presence of semen).
-four days: Ogburne, 561 A.2d at 670.
-seventy-two hours: Darrow v. State, 451 So. 2d 394, 396 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984).
See also Cosden, 568 P.2d at 802. The court upheld the exclusion of evidence that the
complainant had engaged in sexual intercourse four days prior to the alleged rape, which
defendant offered to corroborate his medical expert's testimony. Id. at 807. The expert
testified that so few sperm were found in her vagina within twelve hours after the alleged
act of intercourse with the defendant that intercourse must have occurred more than 12
hours prior to the pelvic examination. Id. at 805. The expert also testified, however, that a
douche or thorough washing after intercourse could account for the sparsity of sperm, and
the complainant testified that she took a bath prior to the hospital tests, which, the court
stated, greatly weakened the probative value of the offered testimony. In any event, the
offered evidence would not have explained the presence of sperm on the clothes of both
the defendant and the complainant. Id. at 807.
Similarly, see Pack v. State, 571 P.2d 241, 245 (Wyo. 1977) (admitting evidence of com-
plainant's recent sexual relations prior to the alleged rape only if combined with an offer of
medical testimony showing that motile sperm could survive the intervening period); State
v. Cunningham, 551 P.2d 605, 609 (Idaho 1976) (limiting such testimony to acts that oc-
curred within the time limitation disclosed by the medical testimony).
The reliance on time is consistent with the legislative history of FRE 412. Speaking of
the exceptions to the exclusion of specific act evidence generally, Congressman Mann, who
sponsored FRE 412 on the floor of the House, commented: "The greater the lapse of time,
of course, the less likely it is that such evidence will be admitted." 124 CONG. REc. 34912,
34913 (1978).
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bative value dubious.87
Occasionally a defendant, seeking to prove that he was not the source
of semen, will seek to prove that the complainant did not have sex with
multiple partners during the period in question. Because this evidence in
no way contravenes the policies underlying the rape shield statutes, such
statutes provide no basis to exclude it.88
87. Thomas v. State, 471 N.E.2d 681, 683 (Ind. 1984), holding that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in precluding cross-examination of the complainant's sexual con-
duct with her boyfriend earlier during the day of the offense, even though the cross-exami-
nation might elicit evidence that could have accounted for the presence of semen in her
vagina and scratches on her thighs. The Indiana Supreme Court recognized that there was
ample evidence establishing the defendant's identity and the forcible nature of the attack;
therefore, the slight probative value of the evidence was clearly outweighed by its prejudi-
cial nature in embarrassing the complainant and subjecting her to public denigration.
In Commonwealth v. Stansbury, the defendant admitted having a sexual encounter with
the complainant but insisted it was consensual. The trial court admitted evidence of sperm
inside the complainant's vagina, although scientific tests were inconclusive as to whether
defendant was the source, but excluded evidence of pubic hairs in the complainant's pant-
ies that did not belong to her or the defendant. 640 A.2d 1368, 1372 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
The Pennsylvania appellate court held that exclusion of evidence suggesting another man
might have been the source of semen was not error given the defendant's acknowledge-
ment that he had sex with the complainant. Id. A dissenting judge stressed that although
defendant conceded a sexual encounter, he denied ejaculating inside the complainant's
vagina; hence the pubic hairs should have been admitted to rebut the prosecutor's use of
semen to corroborate the complainant's allegation of vaginal rape. Id. at 1373.
See also Lassiter v. Georgia, 333 S.E.2d 412 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985). In Lassiter, the com-
plainant testified that she had spent the night with her boyfriend and was naked in bed
when the defendant broke into her room, raped her, abducted her at gunpoint, and raped
her again. Id. at 414. The defendant asserted an alibi defense, denying any connection
with the complainant. Id. at 416-17. The trial court refused to allow the defendant to
demonstrate that pubic hair, blood, saliva, and semen samples taken from defendant did
not connect him in any way with the complainant while similar samples did connect her to
her boyfriend. Id. at 416. The appellate court upheld the exclusion of such evidence based
on the fact that the samples taken from the defendant were "inconsistent and inconclu-
sive"-neither connecting the defendant with the victim nor ruling him out. Id. Thus,
because such evidence could not have exonerated the defendant, the trial court properly
excluded the evidence. Id. at 417.
88. See Commonwealth v. Fitzgerald, 590 N.E.2d 1151, 1152-55 (Mass. 1992). The
complainant testified that she had sex with her boyfriend early on the morning of June 5,
1985, got drunk that night at a party at defendant's home, and awoke to find defendant on
top of her having intercourse. Id. at 1152. The defendant did not contest that complainant
was raped, but argued that complainant misidentified her attacker. Id. at 1154. The de-
fendant presented evidence that he had a vasectomy several years earlier and therefore
secreted no sperm; that the crotch area of complainant's underpants revealed the presence
of bodily fluids from someone who secreted type B-antigens and, therefore, was a member
of blood group B; and that neither the complainant, her boyfriend, nor the defendant has
type B blood. Id. at 1153. The defendant also sought to ask complainant whether she had
intercourse with anyone other than her attacker on the night of the rape. Id. at 1155. The
defendant clearly hoped for a negative answer, which would point to the B-antigen secre-
tor, rather than the defendant, as the rapist. Id. The trial judge, invoking the state's rape
shield statute, held that the question was speculative, irrelevant and improper unless de-
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B. "Injury"; Loss of Virginity; Emotional Trauma
FRE 412 and numerous state statutes authorize admission of prior sex-
ual conduct evidence if it is sufficiently relevant to prove that someone
other than the defendant was the source of the complainant's "injury. 89
The term "injury" obviously includes bruises, abrasions, scratches and
other evidence of physical abuse. Not surprisingly, the injuries discussed
most frequently in the case law are vaginal injuries. Lamentably, most of
these cases involve girls in their early teens or even younger. Whether
evidence of the complainant's prior sexual behavior with others is admis-
sible in these cases depends primarily on whether the evidence is truly
probative on the source of the injury.9"
1. Virginity-Adult Complainant
Rape shield laws exclude evidence of a complainant's "past sexual be-
havior." Clearly, it is improper for a defendant to ask a complainant on
cross-examination if she was a virgin prior to the alleged rape.9' Logic
fendant could identify the B-secretor. Id. at 1154. The Massachusetts Supreme Court held
that the trial court committed reversible error. Id. at 1156. The statute prevents a defend-
ant from eliciting evidence of a complainant's promiscuity as part of a general credibility
attack. The defendant hoped to elicit evidence that the complainant was not promiscuous;
such evidence would not be banned by the statute. hd at 1155-56.
89. FED. R. EvID. 412; see also supra notes 80-82 (listing statutes with this provision).
90. United States v. Azure, 845 F.2d 1503, 1505 (8th Cir. 1988). In a prosecution of
her mother's common law husband for statutory rape, physicians testified that the ten-
year-old complainant had suffered a three-centimeter laceration on her vaginal wall caused
by a recent penetration. Id. at 1504. The trial court excluded the testimony of a thirteen-
year old boy who claimed, at a Rule 412 hearing, to have had consensual sex with the
complainant on a few occasions at unspecified times prior to the occasion in question. Id.
at 1506. The Eighth Circuit held that the trial court committed no error by excluding that
evidence. Id. The boy testified that he never forced the complainant and that she never
cried. Id. Thus, even if his allegations were true (which the court, stressing the vagueness
and self-contradictory nature of much of his testimony, doubted), the complainant's con-
duct with him could not have been the source of the injury. Unaccountably, the Eighth
Circuit undermined much of what Rule 412 is intended to accomplish by reciting the full
names of the complainant and her mother and sisters. Id. at 1504.
United States v. Eagle Thunder, 893 F.2d 950 (8th Cir. 1990). In a prosecution for kid-
napping and sexually abusing an eleven-year old girl, it was not error to exclude evidence
of a "non-recent tear" in the girl's hymenal ring, because its existence "was not relevant to
the source of the tears that were [only] hours old." Id. at 954.
State v. Nelson, 453 N.W.2d 454 (Neb. 1990). Evidence that the complainant had sexual
intercourse three days before the alleged attack was not admissible to explain her injuries
(including scratches on her calf and back, bruises on her left shoulder, and a bruised area
on the right perineal region, on the right side of the crotch), which, according to medical
testimony, occurred less than a day before the examination. Id. at 459-60.
91. State v. Ogburne, 561 A.2d 667,670 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989); see also State
v. Galloway, 284 S.E.2d 509, 513 (N.C. 1981) (stating that although a physician mentioned
several times in his testimony that his examination was consistent with a virginal pelvic
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suggests that, barring unusual circumstances, the prosecution likewise
should not be permitted to present evidence that, until the alleged rape,
the complainant was a virgin. If a defendant is not permitted to argue,
"She willingly had sex with other men, therefore she willingly had sex
with me," the State similarly should not be permitted to argue, "She
never consented to anyone previously, so it is unlikely she consented with
defendant."'92 At least one court has held that, in this situation, the de-
fendant can rebut the complainant's testimony. 93
2. Virginity-Child Complainant
In a prosecution for sexual abuse of a child, medical evidence that the
complainant was not a virgin may be relevant in ways unrelated to con-
sent. Evidence that her hymenal opening was enlarged or torn circum-
stantially corroborates that at some point an act of intercourse occurred.
In a case involving a girl of tender years, this fact alone may also help
persuade the jury that the defendant abused her - particularly if he was
the only adult male in the household, and consequently had unique access
to and control over the child. Evidence that the tear occurred recently
can circumstantially corroborate the complainant's testimony as to when
the abuse occurred. This may also circumstantially corroborate the de-
fendant's identification as the perpetrator.
If the prosecutor offers such evidence, the consensus is that, in appro-
priate circumstances, the defendant must be permitted to offer evidence
that someone else was the cause of the enlarged vaginal opening.94
exam, he also stated once that the use of the medical term virginal did not imply its non-
technical meaning; hence, his testimony did not open the door to cross-examining the
complainant as to whether she had been a virgin).
92. See, e.g., Veal v. State, 382 S.E.2d 131, 132 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that it was
error to deny defendant's motion in limine to preclude complainant from testifying that she
told defendant during the attack that she was a virgin, because the rape shield statute
superseded all evidentiary exceptions including the res gestae rule; also holding, however,
that the error resulted in no harm to defendant).
See also Dag E. Ytreberg, Annotation, Admissibility of Prosecution Evidence on Issue of
Consent, That Rape Victim Was a Virgin, Absent Defense Attack on Her Chastity, 35
A.L.R.3D 1452, 1453-54 (1971).
93. Government of the Virgin Islands v. Jacobs, 634 F. Supp. 933, 936, 940 (D.V.I.
1986) (basing its conclusion on FRE 412(b)(1), the "constitutionally required" provision);
see also Johnson v. State, 632 A.2d 152,155 (Md. 1993) (applying MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 461A(a)(4) (1992) which allows for the "defendant's right to inquire into the bias or
prejudice of the victim" regarding the complainant's motive for making a false accusation);
State v. Carpenter, 459 N.W.2d 121, 126-27 (Minn. 1990) (acknowledging that in a trial for
forcible rape, evidence of the complainant's prior virginity "might" entitle defendant to
rebut such evidence under the "constitutionally required" provision).
94. See Tague v. Richards, 3 F.3d 1133, 1135-36 (7th Cir. 1993). An eleven-year-old
girl accused her adult neighbor of rape. The court held that, in light of medical testimony
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Courts may exclude such evidence, where its probative value is compara-
tively minimal.95 A few courts, however, hold that such evidence is ex-
which stated an examination three months later showed hymenal damage, it violated the
defendant's Confrontation Clause rights to exclude evidence that the complainant had
been raped by her father at age six; this error, however, was found to be harmless. Id. at
1140; see infra note 96 (discussing other relevant cases).
See also United States v. Begay, 937 F.2d 515 (10th Cir. 1991). The prosecutor had
"specifically relied" upon the eight-year-old complainant's unusually enlarged hymenal
opening and a vaginal abrasion as evidence of defendant's guilt, it was therefore reversible
constitutional error to exclude evidence of an earlier assault upon her by someone else. Id.
at 523.
In Oswald v. State, the court agreed that where a state offers medical evidence that the
complainant has a ruptured hymen, most likely from sexual intercourse, it is permissible
for the defendant to show she engaged in sexual relations with others. 715 P.2d 276, 278
(Alaska Ct. App. 1986). The opinion does not indicate the complainant's age.
See also Audano v. State, 641 So. 2d 1356, 1360 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (announcing a
blanket rule that "[i]f the state introduces [medical] evidence ... that a child has engaged
in sexual intercourse, then the defendant is entitled to introduce evidence that the child
had previously engaged in sexual intercourse with persons other than the defendant"). In
Audano, the court admitted evidence that the thirteen-year-old complainant had been sex-
ually abused by her mother. Id. at 1360-61.
Steward v. State, 636 N.E.2d 143, 150 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (reversing a police officer's
conviction for molesting twelve and fifteen-year-old sisters where evidence of prior moles-
tations tending to explain the children's behavior as consistent with child sex abuse syn-
drome was excluded); Saylor v. Indiana, 559 N.E.2d 332, 335 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (holding
that the trial court committed reversible error by excluding evidence of prior molesta-
tions); see infra note 99 (concerning evidence of child sex abuse syndrome).
Barnett v. Commonwealth, 828 S.W.2d 361 (Ky. 1992). Prosecuting the defendant for
sexually abusing his less-than-twelve-year-old daughter, the government offered medical
evidence that she had experienced "chronic sexual contact." Id. at 362. The Kentucky
Supreme Court held that it was error to exclude evidence indicating that complainant's
brother, not defendant, had been her sexual partner. Id. at 363. "[I]n the case of a female
child who is presumed not to be sexually active, and with whom any sexual contact is
prohibited, a medical finding of frequent sexual activity establishes the relevance of evi-
dence that the perpetrator is one other than the person charged." Id. The court found
"manifest error" even though the defendant's trial counsel "conceded" that the evidence
was barred by the state rape shield statute. Id.
Goodson v. State, 566 So. 2d 1142 (Miss. 1990). "[E]mpirical data aside, many believe a
teenage girl may only lose her hymenal ring through sexual experience." Id. at 1148-49
(citation omitted). Hence, the fourteen-year-old complainant's testimony that the defend-
ant, her uncle, had molested and raped her at various times between the ages of six and
ten, coupled with medical testimony that her hymenal ring was gone, clearly pointed to the
conclusion that defendant had caused the loss of her hymenal ring by raping her. Id. at
1149. "As the point was central to the prosecution's case," the trial judge should have
permitted defendant to impeach her with a prior inconsistent statement made to a friend
that she had sex with a boyfriend after her family moved away from her uncle's town but
before the medical exam. Id.
95. State v. Zierhut, 631 So. 2d 1378, 1381 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that when a
fourteen-year-old girl accused her father of rape, medical testimony that she had a small
scar on the posterior fourchette of the vagina did not require admitting evidence that the
girl had been raped by an uncle when she was six because no emphasis was placed on the
scar as proof that defendant had raped his daughter).
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cluded per se by rape shield legislation. 6 One court, in an unusual
situation, held that a prosecutor could not rebut the defendant's version
of events by offering evidence that the child complainant was a virgin.97
State v. Laird, 732 P.2d 417 (Mont. 1987). Evidence of a possible prior "assault" on a
nine-year-old child was not admissible to explain medical evidence that indicated she had
been raped, because insufficient details about the prior assault were known. Id. at 420.
There was some indication that a man who picked the child up on the street as she was
walking home from school assaulted her. The child, however, could not recall the man's
name and was not able to describe what had occurred. Id. at 419-20.
State v. Peyatt, 315 S.E.2d 574 (W. Va. 1983). In a prosecution of a father for incest and
sexual assault of his twelve-year-old daughter, the trial court properly excluded indirect
evidence of sexual intercourse between the complainant and other men. This evidence was
excluded even though the prosecution allegedly put her past sexual conduct into issue
when the prosecution's expert testified that the twelve-year-old victim had the genitalia of
a married woman and the complainant testified that the only penis she had ever seen was
her father's. Id. at 579. The defendant elicited testimony from the complainant's mother
and siblings as to her past conduct with several males, but it was unclear from their testi-
mony whether the complainant's sexual activities with those males included sexual inter-
course. Id. at 580. The defendant was remiss, according to the court, for failing to
subpoena these males if he wished to pursue the issue. Id.
96. United States v. Shaw, 824 F.2d 601 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1068
(1988). In a prosecution of a foster father for sexual abuse of an eleven-year-old girl, after
the Government introduced physical evidence that complainant had engaged in sexual ac-
tivity, the trial court did not permit several boys to testify that they had intercourse with
the complaining witness (one of whom claimed he had intercourse with her 50 times). Id.
at 603. The Eighth Circuit held that the trial court committed no error by excluding this
testimony. Id. at 608. "IT]here is nothing in the legislative history to Rule 412 indicating
that we should expand the word 'injury' beyond its commonly understood meaning. ...
[C]alling the physical consequences to [the complainant's] hymen an 'injury' would contra-
dict Congress' intention to subject Rule 412 to stringent temporal limitations." Id. at 607.
The court also suggested that the probative value of the proffered evidence was out-
weighed by its unfair prejudicial impact. Id. at 606. In subsequent cases, the Eighth Cir-
cuit has excluded such evidence on the facts, rather than on a general principle of
exclusion. See United States v. Azure, 845 F.2d 1503, 1505 (8th Cir. 1988) and United
States v. Eagle Thunder, 893 F.2d 950, 954 (8th Cir. 1990) (described supra note 90).
State v. Carpenter, 459 N.W.2d 121 (Minn. 1990). The complainant, fourteen, testified
that the defendant, a church counselor, had been the first to penetrate her; medical testi-
mony indicated, however, that she had a hymenal scar that could have predated the inci-
dent in question. Id. at 125. The Minnesota Court held that under Minnesota's rape shield
statute (since redesignated as 412(c)(1)(B)), the defendant was not entitled to call a wit-
ness to testify that prior to the incident in question he had penetrated her digitally. Id. at
126 (citing MINN. R. EVID. 404(c)(1)(B)). In explaining why admission of the evidence was
not constitutionally required, the court stressed that the defendant had not complied with
the statutory notice requirement and had already managed (despite a court order to the
contrary) to insinuate the contested information, and much more, before the jury. Id. at
126-27.
Similarly, see Lewis v. State, 451 N.E.2d 50, 53 (Ind. 1983) (taking the same approach in
interpreting Indiana's rape shield law). Contra Tague v. Richards, 3 F.3d 1133, 1135-36
(7th Cir. 1993) (holding that this approach violated the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation
Clause, although this was harmless error).
97. Commonwealth v. Reed, 644 A.2d 1223, 1231 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994). The defend-
ant was accused of indecent assault on his son's fourteen-year-old ex-girlfriend. Id. at
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3. Emotional Trauma
Courts often must address the question of whether "injury" should in-
clude the emotional trauma and the fear of pregnancy and infection
which frequently accompany sexual assault. Although each may in a very
real sense injure a rape victim, to interpret the statutory term injury
broadly enough to include these harms may undermine the very protec-
tion the rule is designed to afford.98 A prosecutor could undermine this
protection by using evidence of the complainant's emotional distress to
corroborate her assertion that the defendant raped her. In this setting, a
defendant may have the right to offer evidence suggesting someone else
had raped the complainant on a prior occasion and that the prior assault,
not the defendant's alleged conduct, was the source or cause of the
trauma.99
1224. He claimed that he should be convicted of only corrupting a minor because she
consented to the sexual behavior (which did not involve penetration because, according to
defendant, he did not have a condom) and, in fact, she boasted about her previous sexual
experience. Id. at 1228-29. To rebut this defense, the prosecutor introduced medical testi-
mony that the complainant was a virgin, and used this evidence on summation to argue the
absurdity of the defendant's version of events. Id. at 1230. The Pennsylvania appellate
court held that the trial court committed reversible error by not allowing the defendant to
cross-examine the complainant about an improper motive and whether the complainant
previously had intercourse. Id. at 1231. "'The Rape Shield Law was intended to be a
shield not a sword.' " Id. (quoting Pennsylvania v. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d 1338, 1352 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1992)). Evidence of the complainant's prior sexual experience, or lack thereof,
was "irrelevant" whether offered to corroborate or rebut the defendant's version of events.
Id.
98. [I]f the term 'injury' embraces psychological damage, the accused is likely to
argue that the true causes of such damage lie in sexual experiences of the com-
plainant having no relation to the crime charged, and to offer as evidence in sup-
port of this defense the sexual history of the complainant. Ultimately the defense
argument would be that the complainant is 'biased' or 'sick' and trying to find a
scapegoat for her difficulties.
2 DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 198, at 611
(1985 rev. vol. & Supp. 1993).
99. Steward v. State, 636 N.E.2d at 150. The prosecutor offered evidence that a fif-
teen-year-old complainant's behavior was consistent with the child sexual abuse syndrome,
including the fact that her behavior improved once she identified the defendant as her
abuser. The court held it was error to exclude evidence that she also identified four other
men who allegedly molested her. Id. This evidence reasonably supported the defendant's
theory that they, not he, had molested her and that the improvement in her behavior was
attributable to her identification of them. Cf. State v. Huebner, 513 N.W.2d 284 (Neb.
1994). An expert, who had not examined the complainant, testified in general terms that
children sometimes delay in reporting that they were abused for a variety of reasons, but
did not testify regarding the specific reasons for which this complainant waited nearly
seven months. Id. at 290-91. The court held that this did not open the door to evidence
that she had been assaulted a few years earlier by another male. Id. at 291.
For a case failing roughly halfway between Steward and Huebner, see Connecticut v.
Christiano, 637 A.2d 382 (Conn. 1994). The defendant was charged with raping his mildly
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C. Infection
Evidence that relates to a sexually transmitted disease (STD) may be
relevant in a variety of circumstances. A clear-cut case is presented when
a vaginal smear taken from the complainant shows sperm carrying an
STD, while a timely test of the defendant shows that he is free of that
disease. Suppression of such evidence denies the defendant a fair trial
because it strongly corroborates his denial that he did not have sex with
the complainant on the occasion in question.'00
A somewhat different situation arises if the defendant denies having
intercourse with the complainant and, in order to circumstantially corrob-
orate his denial, wants to offer evidence that she is infected with a STD
and that he is not. The fact that he did not catch her disease suggests that
he did not have sex with her. Because such evidence indicates that the
complainant has engaged in prior sexual conduct (from which she con-
tracted the disease), courts have struggled with its admissibility.'"' One
court excluded testimony that the complainant, but not the defendant,
had gonorrhea, because medical testimony indicated there was only one
chance in three that he would have contracted the disease during inter-
course with the victim.10 2 Another court excluded evidence that the com-
retarded foster daughter when she was twenty-one; she reported the abuse to the police
two months later. Id. at 384. After the defendant, who denied any sexual contact with the
complainant, sought to impeach her credibility by questioning her about the prolonged
delay in bringing the charges, the prosecutor called an expert witness to answer hypotheti-
cal questions about why a child might delay reporting sexual abuse by a parent or other
authority figure. Id. at 385. The expert emphasized that his opinion was based on his
clinical experience, and that he had not examined the complainant. According to the
court, the close parallel between the State's evidence and the hypothetical question did not
open the door to evidence that the complainant had engaged in consensual intercourse
with her natural brothers when she was eight and with her foster brothers when she was
eleven or twelve:
[The expert's] testimony did not address these situations. A situation in which a
very young girl is being sexually abused by her equally young brothers or foster
brothers is not analogous to the situation described by [the expert], in which a
victim delays disclosing abuse because of the power exerted by an abuser who is a
parent, or one who is exercising parental authority. The proffered evidence was
properly excluded as irrelevant.
Id at 391.
100. Ex Parte Geeslin, 505 So. 2d 1246 (Ala. 1986). Suppression by the prosecutor of
evidence that, shortly after the complainant reported that she was raped, a vaginal smear
showed the presence of sperm carrying gonorrhea, coupled with evidence that twelve days
later, a semen sample taken from defendant proved negative for the disease, deprived the
defendant of a fair trial. Id. at 1248.
101. State v. Ervin, 723 S.W.2d 412, 415 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (noting the evidence's
relevance, but the greater concern of protecting the victim).
102. Id. (excluding because the evidence would have an "inflammatory and prejudicial
impact"). Perhaps influencing the court's decision was the fact that there was an eyewit-
ness to the defendant "grab[bing] the [victim's] arm," and that the arresting officer testified
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plainant had chlamydia °3 when she was raped because the defendant's
negative medical culture for the disease, four months after the alleged
rape, was inconclusive "as to whether he had intercourse with the [com-
plainant] on the night of the assault.' 10 4 Another court, by contrast, sug-
gested that evidence that the complainant had chlamydia and the
defendant did not must be admitted over a rape shield objection.' 0 5
D. Pregnancy
Where penetration is a contested issue, most courts have allowed a
prosecutor to offer evidence that penetration occurred and that the com-
plainant became pregnant as a result of the alleged rape.' 6 On the other
hand, a court rejected evidence that a married complainant was pregnant
with her husband's child at the time of the alleged rape as having no
probative value while likely arousing the jury's indignation. 10 7
A defendant may not elicit the fact that the complainant was pregnant
at the time of the alleged rape to imply her lack of chastity.' 0 8 Where the
that the victim had a red mark on her face which was consistent with the victim's claim that
the defendant had struck her. Id. at 414. Absent this evidence, the court may have de-
cided the gonorrhea issue differently.
103. PERSONAL HEALTH REPORTER 111 (Alan M. Rees & Charlene Willey eds., 1993)
(reporting that "chiamydia can be cured quickly and painlessly with antibiotics").
104. State v. Jarry, 641 A.2d 364, 366 (Vt. 1994).
105. State v. Steele, 510 N.W.2d 661 (S.D. 1994). The complainant alleged the defend-
ant subjected her to a continuous and brutal two-and-one-half to three hour rape; the de-
fendant testified to two incidents of brief consensual sex. Id. at 666. After the defendant
was convicted, his attorney learned that the prosecutor had suppressed information that
the complainant had originally accused him of giving her chlamydia; the defendant and his
wife both tested negative for the disease. Id. The court held that the evidence was rele-
vant as to which version of the events in question was the truth. Id. Moreover, evidence
that the complainant had the disease was not banned by the rape shield statute, as it was
not evidence of "specific instances ... of prior sexual conduct." Id. at 667 (emphasis
omitted). Hence, its suppression by the prosecutor deprived defendant of a fair trial and
due process of law. Id.
106. Hall v. State, 378 So. 2d 1193, 1195 (Ala. Crim. App. 1979), cert. denied, 378 So. 2d
1196 (Ala. 1980).
People v. Schober, 22 Cal. Rptr. 318, 320 (Cal. Ct. App. 1962).
Martin v. Commonwealth, 476 S.W.2d 834, 836 (Ky. 1972).
State v. Kitto, 373 N.W.2d 307, 312 (Minn. 1985).
State v. Stanton, 353 S.E.2d 385, 388 (N.C. 1987).
Shockley v. State, 585 S.W.2d 645, 649 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978).
Contra State v. Chambers, 309 P.2d 1055, 1057 (Wash. 1957) (holding that pregnancy is
irrelevant where the issue to be resolved is consent).
See generally Annotation, Admissibility, in Nonstatutory Rape Prosecution, of Evidence
of Pregnancy of Prosecutrix, 62 A.L.R.2D 1083, 1084-85 (1958) (discussing case law per-
taining to evidence of a rape complainant's pregnancy).
107. Wilson v. State, 70 S.E. 1128, 1135 (Ga. Ct. App. 1911).
108. State v. Smith, 250 So. 2d 724, 725 (La. 1971); Commonwealth v. Pilosky, 362 A.2d
253, 256 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976).
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government uses the complainant's pregnancy to corroborate her testi-
mony, however, such evidence plays the same role as evidence of semen
or injury. Therefore, the defendant should maintain the right to rebut it
with evidence (assuming it is of sufficient probative value' 0 9) that another
man is the father. Several states' rape shield statutes so provide." 0
Where the defendant argues that the complainant's pregnancy by another
man motivated her to accuse him falsely of rape, the admissibility of such
evidence depends upon an assessment of its probative value and the risk
of unfair prejudice or unnecessary embarrassment."'
If a complainant is pregnant with another man's child when she testifies
and the timing indicates that the jury might believe that the child is the
defendant's, the fact of her pregnancy should, if possible, be concealed
from the jury." 2 If it is not possible to conceal the pregnancy, the court
109. Cf. State v. Miller, 870 S.W.2d 242, 244-45 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (noting that in a
prosecution for consensual statutory rape of a fourteen-year-old, after the trial judge per-
mitted defendant to cross-examine complainant as to whether she had sex with two others
during the relevant period, it was proper to preclude further inquiry into her "dating rela-
tionships" with others during that time).
110. COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-3-407(b) (1986) (evidence is admissible to show that "the
act or acts charged were or were not committed by the defendant").
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022(2) (West 1992) (evidence is admissible if it "may prove that
the defendant was not the source of the ... pregnancy").
MINN. R. EVID. 412(1)(B) (evidence is admissible "to show the source of the . . .
pregnancy").
Miss. R. EVID. 412(b)(2)(A) (evidence is admissible "upon the issue of whether the
accused was or was not ... the source of ... pregnancy").
Mo. Am. STAT. § 491.015.1(2) (Vernon 1992) (evidence is admissible to "show [] ...
origin of pregnancy").
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-7(1)(c) (West 1992) (evidence is admissible "to prov[e] that the
source of ... pregnancy ... is a person other than the defendant").
111. See State v. Parker, 730 P.2d 921, 924-25 (Idaho 1986) (maintaining it was prejudi-
cial error to exclude complainant's admission that she had left home just prior to the al-
leged rape because she was pregnant). In Parker, such evidence was probative of victim's
motive to fabricate and, by trying to blame her pregnancy on rape, to deflect suspicion
particularly on the part of her parents, that she had engaged in consensual sexual activity.
Id. at 925.
Cf State v. Robinson, 431 N.W.2d 165 (Wis. 1988). Excluding evidence of complainant's
pregnancy and her desire to obtain an abortion did not violate the defendant's Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment right to present a defense or his Sixth Amendment Confrontation
Clause right. Id. at 170-71. The defendant's post-trial assertions that he would not have
assaulted his pregnant former girlfriend because he would not have wanted to harm the
fetus he had fathered, and that complainant had a motive to testify falsely because she
wanted to be free of his efforts to dissuade her from having an abortion, came too late to
be a basis of relief. Id. at 171. The court also noted that there was no evidence to establish
that complainant was in fact pregnant with defendant's child and that "the defendant's
alleged opposition would have provided no legal impediment whatsoever to the complain-
ant's obtaining an abortion." Id.
112. Moore v. Duckworth, 687 F.2d 1063, 1064 (7th Cir. 1982); Moore v. State, 393
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should inform the jury that the child is not the defendant's. 113
III. PRIOR CONSENSUAL SEX BETWEEN DEFENDANT AND
COMPLAINANT
A significant number of rape shield statutes authorize the trial judge to
admit evidence of the complainant's past sexual behavior with the de-
fendant 14 if offered to support a claim that the complainant consented to
the conduct in question. 115 Even in the absence of such a provision, this
evidence may be sufficiently relevant that excluding it would violate a
N.E.2d 175, 177 (Ind. 1979).
113. Duckworth, 687 F.2d at 1067.
114. Cf. People v. Wilhelm, 476 N.W.2d 753, 759 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 2359 (1993) (explaining that sexual conduct by the complainant with another
man in the defendant's presence does not fall within the statutory category of activity with
the defendant); New York v. Goodwin, 579 N.Y.S.2d 805 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (determin-
ing it was not error to preclude the defense counsel from questioning the complainant
about an alleged incident in which she engaged in oral sex with a third person while de-
fendant was present, as this did not involve prior sexual conduct with the defendant). See
infra notes 136-42 and accompanying text (discussing the significance of the complainant
engaging in group sex).
115. See supra note 30. Similarly, see GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2-3(b) (1992); IDAHO R.
EVID. 412(b)(2)(B); IOWA R. EVID. 412(b)(2)(B); LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 412(B)(2)
(West 1995); MiNN. R. EVID. 412(1)(A); Miss. R. EVID. 412(b)(2)(B); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 491.015.1(1) (Vernon 1992); N.C. R. EVID. 412(b)(3); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3104(a)
(1993); TENN. R. EVID. 412(c)(3); TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. 412(b)(2)(B); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 9A.44.020(2) (West 1993); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-7(c) (West Supp. 1994)
(allowing admission of evidence of previous sexual conduct if it is material to negating the
element of force or coercion).
Some courts have held that merely asserting a defense of consent is not enough. The
defendant must adduce some evidence at the rape shield hearing, by offer of proof or
otherwise, tending to show that the complainant consented to the charged sexual offense,
before a judge can consider admitting evidence of prior consensual sex between them at
trial. See, e.g., State v. Hopkins, 377 N.W.2d 110, 117 (Neb. 1985); State v. Herrera, 582
P.2d 384, 393 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978).
These provisions provide no basis to admit such evidence if the defendant denies engag-
ing in sexual behavior with the complainant at the time of the alleged rape or assault. State
v. Small, 631 S.W.2d 616, 617 (Ark. 1982) (holding that prior sexual conduct is irrelevant
where consent is not at issue); People v. Smith, 340 N.W.2d 855, 857 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983);
State v. Farmer, 719 S.W.2d 922, 929 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (same); People v. Westfall, 469
N.Y.S.2d 162, 164 (N.Y. 1983); State v. Graham, 390 N.E.2d 805, 807 (Ohio 1979) (per
curiam) (same); State v. Bennett, 637 P.2d 208, 210 (Or. Ct. App. 1981) (same). Even if
the defendant denies having sex with the complainant on the occasion in question, how-
ever, prior consensual sex between them may be relevant to show a motive for a false
accusation, e.g., revenge or spite, or an attempt to conceal her consensual intercourse with
someone else. See infra part IV.
Such evidence may also be admissible if, in addition to or instead of a defense of con-
sent, the defendant asserts the defense that he reasonably believed that complainant con-
sented. See infra part VIII.B.3. (explaining the mistake of fact defense).
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defendant's constitutional right to introduce relevant evidence." 6
A. Relevance
Rape shield legislation is justified because (among other reasons) the
traditional "yes/yes inference""' 7 has so little probative value. A wo-
man's decision to have sex with a man on a particular occasion is based
on a variety of factors-the time, the place, her state of mind or mood in
general and, presumably most important, the man himself: his behavior
toward her, what she knows about him, his appearance, and so forth.
Thus, a woman's willingness to have sex with other men on other occa-
sions is generally a very poor indicator of whether she consented to have
sex with the defendant on the occasion in question." 8
By contrast, evidence that a woman found the defendant attractive" 9
enough to have sex with him on a previous occasion could make it consid-
erably more probable that she consented to have sex with him again on
the occasion in question. Clearly it is reasonable to infer, absent evidence
to the contrary, that the attraction was more or less the same on both
occasions. If the attraction was the same, it is also reasonable to infer
that her reaction was the same on both occasions.
These inferences are, of course, rebuttable. The man might have be-
come physically less appealing in the interim; he may have behaved badly
toward her; she may have learned something about him that diminishes
him in her eyes; or the "spark" simply may have expired. Or the woman
might have declined to have sex with him again because the circum-
stances were inconvenient, because she had since developed a relation-
ship with someone else, or simply because she felt like saying no, as is her
right regardless of how many people she willingly had sex with
previously. 120
Despite their rebuttability, these inferences from consensual inter-
course nevertheless carry substantial probative value. Moreover, evi-
dence of prior consensual intercourse with the defendant is much less
likely to embarrass or humiliate the complainant or unfairly prejudice the
116. United States v. Saunders, 736 F. Supp. 698, 703 (E.D. Va. 1990); State v. Williams,
477 N.E.2d 221, 226-28 (Ohio 1984), aff'd, 487 N.E.2d 560 (Ohio 1986).
117. See supra text accompanying note 21, and infra note 296 and accompanying text.
118. But see infra notes 320-48 and accompanying text (discussing patterns of
behavior).
119. The word "attractive" encompasses both nonphysical and physical characteristics.
120. See State v. Stellwagen, 659 P.2d 167, 170 (Kan. 1983) (stating that the rape shield
act sends a clear message to the courts that "a rape victim's sexual activity is generally
inadmissible since prior sexual activity, even with the accused, does not of itself imply
consent to the act complained of").
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prosecution, than would, for example, evidence of general promiscuity.
In many communities, an affair between an unmarried woman and an
unmarried man no longer carries the social disgrace of a generation
ago. 121 Thus, there may be less reason to exclude such evidence.
Even if the prior relationship is of sufficient relevance to warrant ad-
missibility, a judge retains discretion to restrict its admittance to protect
the complainant to the extent possible consistent with the defendant's le-
gitimate need for the evidence. 22
B. Factors in Assessing Admissibility
Although a defendant may assert a consent defense, this assertion does
not automatically open the door to evidence of his prior sexual relation-
ship with the complainant. Rather, a court must weigh the legitimate
probative value of the evidence against the risk of unfair prejudice, em-
barrassment and harassment of the complainant, confusion of issues, and
so forth.' 23 Courts consider a variety of factors in exercising this discre-
tion, including: witness credibility (discussed separately in part IX of this
article), 24 the nature of the previous relationship, the length of time be-
tween the prior consensual sex and the alleged rape, the similarity be-
tween the prior conduct and the alleged assault, and the presence of
physical evidence to corroborate the complainant's testimony that the
sexual encounter giving rise to the charges was violent and forced rather
than consensual. Many of these factors are legitimate, some are question-
able. Inevitably, the weight a court gives each factor poses difficult ques-
tions of judgment.
1. Nature of the Prior Relationship
The nature of the prior relationship between complainant and defend-
ant is especially important in assessing whether the relationship evidence
121. EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, ET AL., THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF SEXUALITY, SEX-
UAL PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES 198-99 (1994) (hereinafter "SOS") (charting and
discussing the increase in the average number of sex partners).
Nevertheless, women might still find it embarrassing to acknowledge to a dozen or so
attentive strangers that she had consented to have sex with the defendant on occasions
prior to the alleged rape. In fact, special circumstances may greatly increase the embar-
rassment or humiliation of public disclosure.
122. See, e.g., Wood v. State, 736 P.2d 363, 365 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987); see also infra
note 293 (discussing the Wood case in greater detail); State v. Lykken, 484 N.W.2d 869,
874-75 (S.D. 1992) (the complainant testified that she and defendant had a prior consen-
sual sexual relationship; the court held the trial judge properly precluded the defendant
from introducing explicit photographs and tape recordings of their previous sexual en-
counters, and from testifying in unnecessarily explicit details about those encounters).
123. See discussion supra part I.B.3.
124. See discussion infra part IX.
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is relevant on the issue of consent. Evidence that complainant and de-
fendant were living and sleeping together at the time of the alleged
rape,'125 or had shared an extended period of intermittent intimacy, 126 is
far more relevant on the question of consent than evidence of a single
casual sexual encounter.
Similarly, evidence that the complaining witness was pregnant with the
defendant's child at the time of the alleged rape may suggest a more sta-
ble and consensual relationship than might a mere casual encounter.1
27
Of course, it does not necessarily follow that a woman will be willing to
have sex again with the man whose child she is carrying. But evidence
that the complainant chose the defendant as the father of her child-to-be
suggests a substantial attraction toward him that strongly supports his
consent claim.
2. Passage of Time
The length of time between the prior consensual encounters and the
alleged rape may be important in assessing the relevance and, therefore,
the admissibility of the evidence concerning the prior encounter. 28
Some states create a statutory limitation beyond which evidence of prior
consensual sex is inadmissible. 129 With or without a statutory provision,
some courts have held that prior incidents not reasonably contemporane-
ous with the crime are inadmissible; 3° while other courts have admitted
125. This is not to suggest that a woman who lives with a man loses the right to say
"no"; it only recognizes that her willingness to live and sleep with him is relevant in decid-
ing whether she did or did not say "no" to him on the occasion in question.
126. State v. Gonyaw, 507 A.2d 944, 947 (Vt. 1985) (discussing evidence that the de-
fendant and complainant lived together more than three years before the act complained
of and engaged in consensual sex as recent as four days before the alleged rape); see infra
note 132 and accompanying text.
127. But see State v, Zuniga, 703 P.2d 805, 810 (Kan. 1985) (stating that evidence that
the victim was pregnant at the time of the alleged rape does not tend to show that the
intercourse was consensual).
128. United States v. Saunders, 736 F. Supp. 698, 702 (E.D. Va. 1990) (quoting 124
CONG. REC. H11944 (1978)) (statement of Congressman Mann that the passage of time is a
significant consideration).
129. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.045(b) (1990) (indicating that 'jin the absence of
a persuasive showing to the contrary, evidence of the complaining witness' sexual conduct
occurring more than one year before the date of the offense charged is presumed to be
inadmissible").
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.015(1) (Vernon Supp. 1994) (requiring that the prior act be "rea-
sonably contemporaneous with the date of the alleged crime").
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-7(b) (West Supp. 1994) (stating that "[i]n the absence of clear
and convincing proof to the contrary, evidence of the victim's sexual conduct occurring
more than one year before the date of the offense charged is presumed to be
inadmissible").
130. See Commonwealth v. Vieira, 519 N.E.2d 1320 (Mass. 1988). The court held that
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such evidence despite lengthy passage of time.13 1
An approach recognizing that time is only one of a totality of circum-
stances to be considered is preferable over a rigid limitation or an un-
yielding requirement that the prior incidents be reasonably
contemporaneous. In a Vermont case, for example, the complainant con-
ceded at the rape shield hearing that she and the defendant had lived
together and were sexually intimate for three years and continued to be
sexually intimate for another two years. 32 The complainant denied the
defendant's claim that she had consented to have sex with him four days
before the alleged rape. 133 The trial court excluded all of this evidence;
the state supreme court reversed, holding the trial court should have ad-
mitted it. 134 Assuming the consensual encounter prior to the alleged rape
occurred, it is clearly relevant in determining whether the complainant
consented four days later. Evidence of their prior relationship tends to
corroborate the defendant's claim about the encounter four days earlier
and, therefore, his version of the events that resulted in the rape charge.
3. Similarity of Facts
If the nature of the previous consensual relations between defendant
and complainant differ significantly from those in the alleged rape, courts
sometimes restrict the evidence that the defendant may offer relating to
the prior conduct.' 35
exclusion of the complainant's alleged statement to the defendant several months prior to
the alleged rape, expressing interest in engaging in sex with the defendant and others for
money, was proper. Id. at 1328. The statement was too remote in time and substance to
give rise to a reasonable inference of consent. Id.
State v. Jones, 716 S.W.2d 799, 800-02 (Mo. 1986) (noting that conduct approximately
three months prior to the alleged rape was inadmissible, particularly in view of medical
testimony consistent with violent nonconsensual intercourse); State v. Boyd, 643 S.W.2d
825, 829-30 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (ruling that acts occurring earlier on the date of the al-
leged offense were admissible while acts occurring six months before that date were
inadmissible).
State v. Lavalette, 578 A.2d 108, 109 (Vt. 1990) (excluding evidence of consensual sex 18
months prior to the alleged rape because it was not reasonably contemporaneous).
131. Saunders, 736 F. Supp. at 703 (holding sexual conduct that took place three years
earlier was admissible as "having some probative value on the consent issue, but little, if
any, risk of unfair prejudice"); People v. Schuldt, 577 N.E.2d 870, 876 (II1. App. Ct. 1991)
(finding two consensual episodes four years prior to the alleged rape probative on the issue
of consent but excluding the details of these episodes as irrelevant); Bixler v. Common-
wealth, 712 S.W.2d 366, 368 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986) (concluding that 18 months time was too
long).
132. State v. Gonyaw, 507 A.2d 944, 946 (Vt. 1985).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 947.
135. People v. Zysk, 386 N.W.2d 213, 216 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (per curiam). The
complainant alleged that the defendant forced her at knife point to submit to vaginal and
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4. Allegations Involving Group Sex
Courts' emphasis on the similarity of the previous conduct and the
charged conduct to determine its admissibility is particularly clear in
cases involving allegations of multiple-participant rape. Generally, courts
exclude evidence of prior consensual single-partner intercourse with the
defendant if the evidence is offered to suggest that the complainant con-
sented to group sex with the defendant and other men on the occasion in
question. One court recognized:
There seems to be little, if any, logic to the proposition that be-
cause the complainant might have voluntarily consented to sex-
ual intercourse with [one] defendant ... in the past, in ... an
encounter between just the two of them, she would more proba-
bly have consented in this case to intercourse with not only
[that] defendant ... again, but also group intercourse with three
other men in his company.'36
anal sex and inserted the knife handle into her vagina. Id. at 215. When arrested shortly
thereafter, the defendant possessed a knife matching the one the complainant described.
Id At the rape shield hearing, the complainant acknowledged prior consensual oral sex
and bondage episodes with defendant. Id. at 216. At trial the court allowed the defendant
to testify and question the complainant about previous consensual vaginal and anal sex but
held that prior episodes of oral sex and bondage "were distinct and unrelated to the brutal
acts involved in the charged offense" and thus, "had no relevance to the issue of consent
and were highly prejudicial." Id. at 217.
People v. Schuldt, 577 N.E.2d 870 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991). The complainant accused the
defendant of binding, gagging and beating her and forcing her to submit to oral and anal
sex; the defendant claimed that she asked to be bound and slapped and that he "became
disgusted with the situation," cut her loose with a knife, and they engaged in consensual
sexual relations. Id. at 873. At the rape shield hearing, the complainant acknowledged
that she and the defendant previously engaged in vaginal sexual intercourse, but not anal
intercourse; the defendant's offer of proof did not contradict this. Id. at 876. The appellate
court held that it was proper to limit the defendant to eliciting testimony from the com-
plainant that she had engaged in sexual intercourse with the defendant twice in the past
four years and that the details of their previous sexual intimacy would be relevant only if
the defendant could show that it had involved consensual sadomasochist sexual conduct
similar to what the defendant claimed had occurred on the occasion of the alleged rape.
Id. Absent such a showing, the details of their prior intimacy would unduly prejudice the
complainant. Id
136. People v. Williams, 330 N.W.2d 823, 827 (Mich. 1992); accord People v. Hastings,
390 N.E.2d 1273, 1277 (I11. App. Ct. 1979) (ruling that evidence of previous consensual
intercourse between the complainant and one defendant was inadmissible where the
charged act involved several other defendants).
Ex rel. Nichols, 580 P.2d 1370, 1376 (Kan. Ct. App. 1978) (stating that the "defendant
should not have presumed that [the complainant's] prior consensual activity with him alone
would imply her consent to having intercourse with [him in the presence of] his friends [or
with his friends]").
But see Bixler, 712 S.W.2d at 368-69 (holding that where the defense is one of consent,
the court should have admitted evidence of a prior sexual relationship 18 months earlier
between one defendant and the complainant on the issue of whether she consented to sex
19951
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Exclusion of this evidence is the proper result even where the com-
plainant previously had engaged in intercourse separately with two of the
defendants "in circumstances which could be described as less than dis-
crete and private.' 37
Where both the prior consensual encounter and the alleged rape in-
volve multiple partners including one or more of the defendants, by con-
trast, the case for exclusion is not as clear. 138 On the one hand, such
testimony allows the defendants to humiliate and embarrass the com-
plainant to an extreme degree-possibly with perjured testimony which is
easy to manufacture and difficult to disprove. On the other hand, the
with that defendant and his friend on the night in question). In reaching the conclusion,
the court noted the lack of physical evidence corroborating the complainant's testimony,
the two-week delay between the alleged crime and her report of it, and the complainant's
testimony denying a prior sexual relationship with the defendant. Id.
137. State v. Sheard, 870 S.W.2d 212, 216 (Ark. 1994) (Newbern, J., dissenting). Ten
teenage boys were charged with gang-raping one defendant's fifteen-year-old girlfriend.
Id. at 213. At a pretrial hearing, defendants testified that the complainant had an ongoing
sexual relationship with her boyfriend (Dl); that the couple frequently had sex-always
alone behind a closed door-while other defendants were in the house; that on several
occasions, one or more defendants among D2, D3, D4 and D5 watched D1 and the com-
plainant by peering through a gap between the door and the floor, that on one occasion
D3, D4 and D5 "busted in" the room but left when told to do so; and that on another
occasion a few months before the rape, the complainant had sex with D2 (also behind a
closed door) the same day she had sex with D1. Id. In reversing the trial judge's order
admitting the evidence, the state supreme court stated that, "whether a victim may have
consented to prior normal, individual sexual relations with a defendant is simply not rele-
vant to the situation alleged here, where the defendants assert [the complainant] consented
to being restrained and subjected to sexual intercourse and conduct ly multiple parties."
Id. at 214.
Judge Newbern, dissenting, protested:
It seems clear to me that the evidence that this alleged victim had engaged in
sexual intercourse with [Dl] and others of the defendants in circumstances which
could be described as less than discrete and private is relevant to the question
whether she consented to the acts charged against these defendants. The Trial
Court decided that the prejudicial nature of the evidence, which he so clearly
recognized, was outweighed by its probative value. There is no clear right or
wrong in such a decision, yet the majority.., holds the Trial Court's decision was
"clearly erroneous."
Id. at 216 (Newbern, J., dissenting).
Complainant's behavior was, as the dissent noted, "less than discrete and private." Id. at
216. Perhaps she derived an extra measure of excitement from the knowledge that Dl's
friends knew she and D1 were having sex. But to consider this indiscretion relevant as to
whether a woman (let alone a fifteen-year-old girl) would suddenly consent to group sex
with eight males is a staggering, logic-defying leap. The dissent is incorrect: there is a clear
right or wrong in such a case. The majority was right.
138. It is worth noting that prior group sex with the defendant and others constitutes
both "past sexual conduct with the accused," FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(2)(B), which may be
admissible on the issue of consent, and also "past sexual behavior with persons other than
the accused," FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(2)(A), which is generally excluded.
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possibility that a woman would consent to have sex with two or more men
at the same time strikes most people as bizarre, disgusting, and unlikely.
In fact, a recent survey' 3 9 found that "only 1% of women found group sex
appealing.' 141 Thus, a jury may be inclined to view a consent defense
with inherent disbelief. In this regard, evidence that the complainant pre-
viously consented to group sex with two or more men including one or
more of the defendants does have legitimate probative value on the issue
of consent, beyond the forbidden "yes/yes inference.' 14 1 In any event,
courts tend to admit such evidence. 142
139. See SOS, supra note 121. The survey, when released to the press, won wide praise
as the most thorough, objective, representative and scientifically sound survey ever con-
ducted of American sexual practices and attitudes. See, e.g., Tamar Lewin, Sex in America:
Faithfulness in Marriage Thrives After All, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 7, 1994, at Al; Editorial, Sex,
American Style, N.Y. TiMEs, Oct. 8, 1994, at 22; Barbara Vobejda, Survey Finds Most
Adults Sexually Staid; Americans' Average Is Once Per Week, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 1994, at
Al. Within a few weeks, however, some critics found methodological flaws in the study
that cast serious doubt on the validity of its findings. See, e.g., Charles C. Mann, A More
Perfect Union, WASH. POST BOOK WORLD, October 30, 1994, at 8 (relating that the survey
did not include people who spoke no English, nor people residing in college dormitories,
military barracks or prisons). Moreover, according to the survey, men claimed a median of
six sex partners since age 18, whereas women claimed a median of two; the survey did not
find women with a large enough number of partners to account for the differential. Per-
haps those women were too busy doing other things to respond to the survey; or perhaps,
as even the authors of the survey speculated, men tend to overstate their sexual experi-
ence, while women tend to understate theirs. Id.
140. SOS, supra note 121, at 159. By contrast, 13% of men found the practice, or
fantasizing about it, very appealing. The authors report that group sex was unpopular with
all groups surveyed, and overwhelmingly so with women:
very
Race/gender age appealing somewhat not not at all
white men 18-44 14.8% 33.3% 20.7 31.3
white men 45-59 9.8% 18.9% 24.5% 46.8%
white women 18-44 0.9% 8.2% 14.0% 76.8%
white women 45-59 0.8% 4.2% 6.9% 88.1%
black men 18-44 14.3% 32.9% 13.7% 39.1%
blick men 45-59 6.7% 8.9% 11.1% 73.3%
black women 18-44 1.6% 7.6% 16.0% 74.8%
black women 45-59 0.0% 4.5% 15.9% 79.5%
Id. at 162-65 Table 4.3.
141. Many scholars of this aspect of the law have expressed concern that to admit such
evidence might render the complainant legally "unrapable": if a jury believes a defendant's
evidence about the previous episode, it may conclude that the complainant is not worthy of
the law's protection and deserves whatever befalls her. See, e.g., Estrich, supra note 1, at
518-19 (noting that admitting evidence of a complainant's psychiatric history may render
her "unrapable, at least at a matter of law"). Although his admission that he participated
in prior group sex episodes may also prompt the jury to think less of the defendant, the
damage such evidence does to the complainant's credibility produces a significant advan-
tage to the defendant.
142. See People v. Keith, 173 Cal. Rptr. 704, 707 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (indicating that it
was reversible error to exclude evidence that the complainant had engaged on three sepa-
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5. Evidence of Violence
Where the prosecution offers substantial evidence, in addition to com-
plainant's testimony, that the complainant was beaten or injured, a
number of courts hold that evidence of prior consensual sex between the
defendant and complainant should be limited' 43 or excluded. 144 This re-
sult is appropriate: unless the defendant can offer a plausible explanation
for the complainant's injuries, the legitimate probative value of prior con-
sensual sex (unaccompanied by physical injury) to suggest consent on the
occasion in question is virtually nonexistent.
6. Complainant's Prior, Unconsummated Sexual Interest in
Defendant
Case law is mixed regarding the admissibility of evidence that the com-
plainant previously indicated an interest in having sex with the defendant.
Courts have held third-person testimony that the complainant expressed
a desire to have sexual relations with the defendant was admissible as
relevant on the issue of consent,145 while excluding evidence that was
rate occasions in group sex with some, but not all, of the defendants in the alleged rape);
State v. Blalack, 434 N.W.2d 55, 57 (S.D. 1988) (noting that evidence of previous "sex
trios" involving defendant, the then complainant's husband from whom she had been di-
vorced at the time of the alleged rape, and a third man, was properly admitted on the issue
of complainant's consent to group sex with defendant and another man on the occasion in
question).
But see Joyce v. State, 474 A.2d 1369 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984). The complainant ac-
cused the defendant of restraining her to assist other men (who were neither defendants
nor witnesses) in raping her; the defendant claimed she had consented to have intercourse
with the others, and sought to elicit testimony from two witnesses that a few months before
the alleged rape, she had consensually engaged in group sex with the witnesses, defendant,
and a fourth man. Id. at 1373. The court held the evidence was properly excluded. The
court distinguished Keith, supra, noting that in this case there was no common sexual part-
ner in the two incidents. Id. at 1373-74. Similarly, see People v. Goodwin, 579 N.Y.S.2d
805 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (holding that it was not error to prohibit defense counsel from
questioning the complainant about an alleged incident in which she engaged in oral sex
with a third person while defendant was present, because the incident did not involve ac-
tual prior sexual conduct with the defendant).
As to whether a court should admit evidence of a woman's willingness to participate in
group sex with one group of men to support the inference that she consented to do so with
a completely different group of men, see infra part VII.A.
143. People v. Zysk, 386 N.W.2d 213, 216-17 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984); see supra note 135
(discussing the Zysk case in greater detail).
144. McLean v. United States, 377 A.2d 74, 77-78 (D.C. Cir. 1977); State v. Iaukea, 616
P.2d 219, 221 (Haw. 1980); People v. Hastings, 390 N.E.2d 1273, 1277-78 (Ill. App. Ct.
1979); State v. Foulk, 725 S.W.2d 56, 61-62 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); State v. Jones, 716 S.W.2d
799, 801 (Mo. 1986); Holloway v. State, 695 S.W.2d 112, 117 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985), aff'd,
751 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
145. In re Johnson, 573 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (holding this was not
evidence of a sexual conduct within the purview of the rape shield law); Massey v. Com-
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more suggestive of promiscuity than of desiring the defendant as an indi-
vidual."4 Each result seems consistent with the purposes underlying rape
shield legislation. A Massachusetts court held that evidence of kissing
and a risqud conversation with the defendant on a prior occasion was not
probative as to whether the complainant consented on the occasion at
issue. 47 This result is questionable: that a woman kissed and verbally
flirted with a man on one occasion certainly does not mean she consented
to sex on another occasion, but surely this evidence has some tendency to
make her subsequent consent more probable than it would be without the
evidence.
IV. BIAS; MOTIVE TO LIE
Often the greatest challenge a defendant will face is to present a plausi-
ble explanation as to why the complainant would accuse him falsely. De-
fendants frequently argue the complainant's prior sexual conduct 1 48
provides such a motive. These cases fall into four basic patterns.
(1) The defendant asserts the complainant consented to sex, then
falsely claimed it was rape to persuade her husband or lover that she had
not consented. 49
(2) The defendant asserts that the complainant consented to sex, then
monwealth, 337 S.E.2d 754, 758 (Va. 1985) (admitting witnesses' testimony concerning
complainant's alleged sexual solicitation of defendant at a dance on the night of the alleged
rape because it was relevant to complainant's consent and credibility); accord FED. R.
EviD. 412 Advisory Committee Note (noting that "statements in which the alleged victim
expressed an intent to engage in sexual intercourse with the accused, or voiced sexual
fantasies involving the specific accused" are included within the exception for sexual "be-
havior" with the accused).
146. Commonwealth v. Vieira, 519 N.E.2d 1320, 1327-28 (Mass. 1988). The Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld the trial judge's exclusion of a statement allegedly
made by the rape complainant to the defendant two to three months prior to incident,
expressing interest in engaging in sex with the defendant and others for money, because
the statement was too remote in time and substance to give rise to a reasonable inference
of consent. Id. at 1328.
147. Commonwealth v. Fionda, 599 N.E.2d 635, 639 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992).
148. Although motive and bias are most often cited in support of admitting evidence of
the complainant's prior sexual behavior with others, sometimes the evidence involves prior
sexual conduct with the defendant. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Stockhammer, 570 N.E.2d
992 (Mass. 1991) (admitting evidence to show complainant was motivated by desire to
avoid alienating her boyfriend) (see infra part IV.A.1.); Commonwealth v. Taylor, 487
A.2d 946 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (reversing trial court's exclusion of evidence of past consen-
sual sexual relation between complainant and defendant) (see infra part IV.A.4.); Garza
Barreda v. State, 739 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. Ct. App.), rev'd on recons., 760 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1987) (excluding evidence of complainant's motive to prevent exposure of prior sex-
ual acts with others) (see infra part IV.A.3.).
149. See infra part IV.A.1.
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falsely claimed it was rape to avoid being charged with prostitution. 150
(3) The defendant denies engaging in sexual behavior with the com-
plainant and claims she falsely accused him of rape to hide the fact that
she was having consensual sex with someone else.' 5 '
(4) The defendant offers evidence of the complainant's prior sexual
conduct to bolster a defense that she fabricated charges against him to
avenge some real or imagined slight. 152
A defendant's assertion of motive or bias should not automatically
strip the complainant of the protection of rape shield legislation. If the
evidence is of insufficient probative value, it should be excluded. 153 The
Supreme Court has made it clear, however, that as a general rule, "cross-
examination directed toward revealing possible biases, prejudices, or ul-
terior motives of the witness as they may relate directly to issues or per-
sonalities in the case at hand ... is a proper and important function" of
the Sixth Amendment rights to confront one's accusers and to present a
defense. 54 These rights guarantee, not merely the opportunity "to ask [a
witness] whether [s]he is biased," but also the right "to make a record
from which to argue why [she] might have been biased" or motivated to
testify falsely.' 55
Thus, rape shield legislation must, in appropriate circumstances, yield
150. See infra part IV.A.2.
151. See infra part IV.A.3.
152. See infra part IV.A.4.
153. Hall v. State, 500 So. 2d 1282, 1286 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986).
Wright v. State, 513 A.2d 1310, 1314 (Del. 1986).
People v. Sandoval, 552 N.E.2d 726, 737 (Ill.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990) (dictum);
People v. Vaughn, 371 N.E.2d 1248, 1251 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978).
Commonwealth v. Domaingue, 493 N.E.2d 841, 845 (Mass. 1986); Commonwealth v.
Elder, 452 N.E.2d 1104, 1110 (Mass. 1983).
White v. State, 598 A.2d 187, 193 (Md. 1991).
People v. Hackett, 365 N.W.2d 120, 124-25 (Mich. 1984) (dictum).
People v. Halbert, 572 N.Y.S.2d 331, 332 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991), aff'd, 587 N.Y.S.2d 891
(N.Y. 1992); People v. Laundry, 504 N.Y.S.2d 840, 842 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986).
State v. Morrison, 351 S.E.2d 810, 813 (N.C. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 354 S.E.2d 724 (N.C.
1987).
State v. Bennett, 637 P.2d 208, 209-10 (Or. Ct. App. 1981).
State v. Lovato, 702 P.2d 101, 105 (Utah 1985).
State v. Bevins, 439 A.2d 271, 272-73 (Vt. 1981).
154. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974). Bias may include a witness' self-interest
or his favor, fear or dislike of another party or witness "which might lead the witness to
slant, unconsciously or otherwise, his testimony in favor of or against a party." United
States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52 (1984).
155. Davis, 415 U.S. at 318. A defendant must be given the opportunity "to expose to
the jury the facts from which jurors, as the sole triers of fact and credibility, could appropri-
ately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness." Id
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to a defendant's right to offer probative evidence of bias or motive to
lie. 156 Several state statutes explicitly recognize this constitutional re-
quirement by including bias among the valid purposes for which evidence
of the complainant's prior sexual conduct may be offered. 57 Further-
more, courts generally acknowledge that, with or without such a provi-
sion, admission of such evidence often is constitutionally required. 58
156. Id. at 319-20. In Davis, the Supreme Court held that this right takes precedence
even over a statute, intended to safeguard a witness from stigma and embarrassment, pro-
tecting the confidentiality of juvenile delinquency adjudications. Id. at 319. A government
witness identified Davis as the person he saw possessing stolen property, Id. at 310. Davis
sought to show that the witness might have been motivated to testify falsely out of fear that
otherwise the police might suspect the witness of involvement. Id. at 311. To support this
inference, defense counsel sought to elicit on cross-examination that the witness was then
on probation for a juvenile court adjudication for burglary. Id. The trial court, relying
upon a state law protecting the confidentiality of such adjudications, refused to permit it.
Id. The Supreme Court held that the Confrontation Clause entitled defense counsel to
confront the witness with this information despite the state statute. Id. The parallels be-
tween the statute in Davis and rape shield legislation are obvious.
157. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 461A(a)(3) (1992) (excepts from the rule of inadmissi-
bility "[e]vidence which supports a claim that the victim has an ulterior motive in accusing
the defendant of the crime...").
OR. R. EVID. 412(2)(b)(A) (excepts from exclusion evidence that "[rjelates to the mo-
tive or bias of the alleged victim . ,").
TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. 412(b)(2)(C) (provides likewise).
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.7(B) (Michie 1988) provides:
B. Nothing contained in this section shall prohibit the accused from presenting
evidence relevant to show that the complaining witness had a motive to fabricate
the charge against the accused. If such evidence relates to the past sexual conduct
of the complaining witness with a person other than the accused, it shall not be
admitted and may not be referred to at any preliminary hearing or trial unless the
party offering [the] same files a written notice generally describing the evidence
prior to the introduction of any evidence, or the opening statement of either
counsel, whichever first occurs, at the preliminary hearing or trial at which the
admission of the evidence may be sought.
Id.
158. Daniels v. State, 767 P.2d 1163, 1166-67 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989).
Lewis v. State, 591 So. 2d 922, 925 (Fla. 1991); Castro v. State, 591 So. 2d 1076, 1076-77
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
People v. Vaughn, 371 N.E.2d 1248, 1250-51 (I11. App. Ct. 1978).
Lewis v. State, 440 N.E.2d 1125, 1128-29 (Ind. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 915 (1983).
State v. Vaughn, 448 So. 2d 1260, 1262 (La. 1983).
State v. DeLawder, 344 A.2d 446, 449 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975).
Commonwealth v. Stockhammer, 570 N.E.2d 992, 998-99 (Mass. 1991); Commonwealth
v. Joyce, 415 N.E.2d 181, 186-87 (Mass. 1981); Commonwealth v. Fetzer, 476 N.E.2d 981,
982-83 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985).
People v. Hackett, 365 N.W.2d 120, 124-25 (Mich. 1984).
State v. Hagen, 391 N.W.2d 888, 892 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
State v. Madsen, 772 S.W.2d 656, 658-59 (Mo. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1046 (1990).
People v. Mandel, 403 N.Y.S.2d 63, 66 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978), rev'd, 425 N.Y.S.2d 63
(N.Y. 1979).
State v. Wattenbarger, 776 P.2d 1292, 1294 (Or. Ct. App. 1989); State v. Bennett, 637
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A. Relevance
1. To Deny Infidelity
In a substantial number of cases, the defendant concedes he had inter-
course with the complainant, insists it was consensual, and alleges the
complainant falsely accused him of rape to prevent her husband or lover
from learning that she had been unfaithful. In Olden v. Kentucky,'5 9 the
defendant, an African-American, was convicted of sexually assaulting a
Caucasian woman named Matthews."6 Matthews testified that after the
assault, the defendant and a friend drove her to the vicinity of the home
of another African-American named Russell. 6' Russell circumstantially
corroborated Matthews by testifying he heard a noise, saw Matthews get
out of the defendant's friend's car, and that Matthews immediately told
him she had been raped by the defendant and his friend.'62 The defend-
ant asserted the defense of consent. 63
At the time of the alleged rape, Matthews and Russell, although mar-
ried to and living with other people, apparently were involved in an extra-
marital relationship and by the time of trial, were living together. 164 The
defendant maintained that Matthews concocted the rape story to protect
her relationship with Russell, who otherwise would have grown suspi-
cious upon seeing her disembark from the friend's car.165 To demonstrate
Matthews' motive to lie, the defendant sought to introduce evidence that
Matthews and Russell were cohabiting, but the trial court granted the
P.2d 208, 209-10 (Or. Ct. App. 1981).
Commonwealth v. Wall, 606 A.2d 449, 457-63 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); Commonwealth v.
Poindexter, 539 A.2d 1341, 1343-44 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
State v. Finley, 387 S.E.2d 88, 90 (S.C. 1989).
Garza Barreda v. State, 739 S.W.2d 368, 370 (Tex. Ct. App.), rev'd on recons., 760
S.W.2d 1 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
State v. Bevins, 439 A.2d 271, 272 (Vt. 1981).
Winfield v. Commonwealth, 301 S.E.2d 15, 21 (Va. 1983).
State v. Hudlow, 659 P.2d 514, 520 (Wash. 1983) (dictum); State v. Roberts, 611 P.2d
1297, 1300-01 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980).
State v. Herndon, 426 N.W.2d 347, 362-63 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988).
See also Berger, supra note 6, at 98-99 (setting forth a model rape shield statute);
Tanford & Bocchino, supra note 8, at 591-602 (comparing 46 rape shield state statutes).
159. 488 U.S. 227 (1988) (per curiam).
160. Id. at 228.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 229. Defendant and the friend were originally indicted for kidnapping and
raping the complainant. Id. at 230. In what the Court called a "somewhat puzzling turn of
events," the friend was acquitted of all charges and defendant was convicted only of forci-
ble sodomy. Id.
163. Id. at 230.
164. Id. at 229-30.
165. Id. at 230.
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prosecutor's motion in limine to keep all evidence of Matthews and Rus-
sell's living arrangement from the jury.1 6 6 A state appellate court af-
firmed, reasoning that although evidence of Matthews and Russell's
cohabitation at the time of trial was not barred by the state's rape shield
law, the court properly excluded it because " 'Matthews was white and
Russell was black,' " and testimony that they were living together at the
time of the trial " 'may have created extreme prejudice against
Matthews.' ,167
A nearly unanimous 68 Supreme Court reversed:
"[Tihe exposure of a witness' motivation in testifying is a proper
and important function of the constitutionally protected right of
cross-examination." ... "[A] criminal defendant states a viola-
tion of the Confrontation Clause by showing that he was prohib-
ited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination
designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the
witness, and thereby 'to expose to the jury the facts from which
jurors ... could appropriately draw inferences relating to the
reliability of the witness'."
In the instant case, petitioner has consistently asserted that he
and Matthews engaged in consensual sexual acts and that Mat-
thews-out of fear of jeopardizing her relationship with Rus-
sell-lied when she told Russell she had been raped and has
continued to lie since. It is plain to us that "[a] reasonable jury
might have received a significantly different impression of [the
witness'] credibility had [defense counsel] been permitted to
pursue his proposed line of cross-examination.' '169
Although Olden is not a rape shield case per se (the "prejudice"
against which the trial court sought to protect the complainant stemmed
from her relationship's biracial nature, rather than its sexual nature), if
the state court had excluded the evidence on rape shield grounds, it is
doubtless the Supreme Court would have reached the same result for the
same reasons. A number of courts, employing similar reasoning, hold
that evidence of a complainant's sexual relationship with another man
must be admitted where the evidence is relevant to suggest a motive to
166. Id. Even after Matthews claimed during direct examination that she was living
with her mother, the trial court refused to allow the defense to cross-examine Matthews
about her living arrangements. I&
167. Id. at 231 (quoting the unpublished opinion of the Kentucky Court of Appeals).
168. Justice Marshall dissented because the Court disposed of the case summarily with-
out first hearing oral argument. Id. at 233.
169. Id. at 231-32 (quoting and citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316-17 (1974));
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680
(1986)).
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falsely accuse the defendant of rape.' 7 °
Several state courts, however, have excluded similar evidence in cir-
cumstances not easily distinguishable from those in Olden.'7' Common-
wealth v. Berkowitz ,172 a decision by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
provides a particularly troubling example. The defendant, a college stu-
dent, asserted that his accuser had consented to intercourse, but then
charged rape because she feared her boyfriend's jealousy.' 73 To support
this defense, the defendant sought to introduce evidence that the com-
plainant's boyfriend previously had accused her of infidelity. 174 Although
the trial court allowed defense counsel to offer evidence that the couple
had argued frequently, it held that the state rape shield statute banned
testimony about the cause or content of the arguments. 175 Despite the
defendant's argument on appeal that he was not seeking to prove the
complainant actually had been unfaithful to her boyfriend, but only to
show they had argued about whether she had been unfaithful, the state
supreme court affirmed the trial court's ruling.' 76 The court noted that
"the rape shield law does not recognize such a distinction.... [T]he alle-
gation that the victim and her boyfriend had argued over the issue of her
infidelity is so closely tied to the issue of the victim's fidelity itself that,
. 170. Commonwealth v. Fetzer, 476 N.E.2d 981, 982-83 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985) (conclud-
ing that the trial court should have permitted inquiry into the existence of a romantic rela-
tionship between complainant and another as the foundation of defendant's argument that
complainant had a motive to lie concerning whether she consented to sexual activity with
defendant).
Similarly, see Commonwealth v. Stockhammer, 570 N.E.2d 992, 997 (Mass. 1991). The
court implicitly approved the trial court's decision to allow defense counsel to elicit testi-
mony that the complainant had maintained a sexual relationship with her boyfriend prior
to the alleged rape. The testimony would be used to show the complainant had a motive to
accuse the defendant falsely of rape to avoid alienating her boyfriend.
State v. Hagen, 391 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). The trial court refused to admit
results of two secretor semen tests which indicated that defendant was most probably not
the source of semen collected from complainant; excluded statements she made inconsis-
tent with her testimony regarding her last date of intercourse; and precluded defendant
from cross-examining complainant about other sexual behavior during the two or so hours
between her husband's early morning departure and her report of rape. Id. at 890-91. The
appellate court held this was reversible error. Id. at 893. The excluded evidence could
support the inference that the complainant had engaged in consensual extramarital inter-
course with someone other than her husband and defendant, and would be relevant to a
potential motive to fabricate a rape charge. Id. at 892.
171. See infra notes 182-86.
172. 641 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 1994).
173. Id. at 1165.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. An intermediate appellate court had reversed defendant's conviction; the state
supreme court reversed the reversal. Id. at 1166.
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for the purposes of the Rape Shield Law, they are one and the same." '177
The court was wrong, both in its explicit minor premise and in its im-
plicit major premise. First, whether the complainant's boyfriend had ac-
cused her of being unfaithful and whether she had been unfaithful are not
"one and the same." Rather, they are significantly different. Cross-ex-
amination of the complainant about the accusations would be much more
limited, and therefore less of an ordeal to the complainant, than cross-
examination about the underlying question of fidelity.' 78 The same is
true of extrinsic evidence on the question.179 Procedures exist to mini-
mize the impact on the complainant 8 ° and to assure the jury will under-
stand what they should and should not do with the evidence.' 8 '
More disturbing, however, is the fact that the Pennsylvania Supreme
177. Id. at 1165. The court held, however, that defendant's rape conviction could not
stand because, although complainant testified that she repeatedly told defendant "no," the
defendant had not used force to compel the complainant to submit. Id. at 1164-65. This
aspect of the decision was harshly criticized. See, e.g., Dale Russakoff, Where Women
Can't Just Say 'No'; Pennsylvania Supreme Court Rules Force is Needed to Prove Rape,
WASH. POST, June 3, 1994, at Al (noting criticisms of the Commonwealth v. Berkowitz
decision); Robert Moran and Emilie Lounsberry, Revisions Sought in Rape Law, PHIL.
INQUIRER, June 7, 1994, at B1 (discussing Commonwealth v. Berkowitz).
178. Compare, for example,
(1) Q: Isn't it true that you cheated on your boyfriend several times by having sex with
other men? (With A, and with B, and with C .... )
Q: Isn't it true that he found out about your infidelity and threatened to dump you if
you didn't stop? with
(2) 0: Isn't it true that your boyfriend had accused you in the past of being unfaithful to
him, and threatened to dump you if you didn't stop?
To be subjected to either cross-examination would of course be unpleasant, but the first
would be far more offensive.
179. Extrinsic proof that the complainant's boyfriend had accused her would be limited
to questioning her boyfriend ("Did you accuse her ....") and, perhaps, testimony of wit-
nesses who overheard them arguing. Evidence of actual infidelity-testimony by other
men that they had sex with the complainant or saw her having sex with other men, testi-
mony by witnesses that complainant had told them about her sexual behavior with other
men, etc.-would be far more embarrassing to her, distracting to the jury, and prejudicial
to the State.
180. The judge could have admonished defense counsel and defense witnesses that
questioning and testimony must relate only to whether the boyfriend accused the com-
plainant of infidelity, not whether the accusation might have been true. In addition, while
allowing testimony as to the frequency and vehemence of the arguments, the judge could
have precluded testimony about the specific details of the accusations. And, if it was ap-
parent that the boyfriend's accusations were unjust, the judge could allow the complainant
to testify that she had not in fact been unfaithful.
181. If we cannot trust juries to understand that the making of an accusation is not
proof that the accusation is true, how can we trust juries to decide whether the defendant is
guilty of the crime he is accused of committing? Moreover, the judge could instruct the
jury as to the limited purpose evidence of the accusations was being admitted. See, e.g., 2
C. FISHMAN, JONES ON EVIDENCE §§ 11:27, 11:30 (7th ed. 1994); FED. R. EVID. 105 (con-
cerning limited admissibility of evidence).
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Court failed to acknowledge a defendant's right to offer evidence, despite
the rape shield statute, that strongly suggests the complainant had a mo-
tive to accuse the defendant falsely. The defendant was not merely at-
tempting to bolster a "tenuous"" or "speculative ' '183 argument that the
complainant had a motive to lie; he had hard evidence of the complain-
ant's concern about her boyfriend's jealousy and suspicions.' 84 The state
supreme court apparently did not consider this even worth mentioning.
Several other courts also have excluded evidence under similar circum-
stances.185 Although each case must be considered on its facts, some of
these decisions, too, are questionable. 186 The desire to prevent one's
182. State v. Madsen, 772 S.W.2d 656, 661 (Mo. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1046 (1990)
(disallowing cross-examination which could only produce a "tenuous" inference); see infra
note 185.
183. People v. Laundry, 504 N.Y.S.2d 840, 842 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (upholding exclu-
sion where the premise of the evidence was too "speculative" to show motive to lie); see
infra note 185.
184. Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d 1161, 1165 (Pa. 1994).
185. Hall v. State, 500 So. 2d 1282, 1286-87 (Ala. Ct. App. 1986). Evidence that com-
plainant had sex with her boyfriend shortly before the alleged rape was not admissible to
show complainant's motive to deny that intercourse with the defendant had been consen-
sual or to show her need to fabricate an excuse for returning home late. Id.
Madsen, 772 S.W.2d at 661. Defense counsel sought to bring out on cross-examination
that the complainant was living with "S." and had regular sexual relations with him, argu-
ing that her relationship with S. gave her a motive for making false claims of rape when she
appeared in their shared room during the early morning hours following the incident. Id.
at 658. "S. arguably would ask where she had been and would not be pleased if she admit-
ted having been picked up at a pool hall." Id. at 661. The court categorized this inference
as "tenuous" at best, because no one had testified that S. demanded an explanation; rather,
"the testimony shows.., that S. was sleeping soundly and was stirred to waking only with
some difficulty after she told him that she had been raped ... [tjhere is no indication that
she parried a demand for accounting with a false accusation of rape." Id. Balancing this
"attenuated" inference against the policy underlying the rape shield statute, the court held
that the trial court acted within its discretion to exclude the evidence. Id.
Laundry, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 842. The cross-examination of a sodomy complainant con-
cerning her prior sexual relationship with her boyfriend was properly excluded where such
testimony was offered to demonstrate that her boyfriend disbelieved her story and that the
incident was fabricated to gain her boyfriend's sympathy. Id. The boyfriend testified that
he never told the complainant that he disbelieved her story; hence, the defense thesis that
the complainant lied about the entire episode was clearly speculative. Id.
See also White v. State, 598 A.2d 187, 189-93 (Md. 1991) (discussed in greater detail,
infra notes 220-23 and accompanying text).
186. Each of the cases cited in the previous note rejected as "tenuous" or "speculative"
the very inference that the Supreme Court in Olden found to be compelling, and under
similar circumstances. Madsen, 772 S.W.2d at 661; Laundry, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 842. But see
Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 266 (1988). As in Madsen, Laundry, and White, the defendant
offered no evidence that the complainant's lover demanded an explanation or disbelieved
her story. Id. at 228-31. Nevertheless the Court in Olden held that the very nature of the
relationship gave the defendant a basis to argue to the jury, either that the complainant's
lover may have demanded an explanation, or that the complainant fabricated a rape charge
to beat her lover to the punch. Id. at 230.
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lover from suspecting infidelity is, as the Court said in Olden, a "proto-
typical form of bias"; to prevent a defendant from attempting to offer
evidence ". .. from which jurors . . . could appropriately draw infer-
ences. . ." of such bias constitutes a violation of the Confrontation
Clause. 87
2. To Avoid Prosecution for Prostitution
Many states generally exclude evidence that the complainant is a pros-
titute.188 However, evidence of prior arrests or convictions for prostitu-
tion can be highly relevant circumstantial corroboration where the
defendant insists that the complainant consented but then alleged rape to
avoid a prostitution arrest.' 89
3. To Protect Reputation for Chastity
Some defendants have also argued, with mixed results, that evidence of
other sexual conduct would help establish that a complainant's sexual as-
sault allegation was motivated by a desire to protect her reputation for
Several factors present in Olden, however, may have made admitting the evidence in
that case more imperative than in other cases. Olden presented an apparently strong de-
fense, calling several witnesses who directly or circumstantially corroborated his claim that
Matthews willingly accompanied defendant and his friend. Id. at 229. Moreover, Mat-
thews and Russell both testified that Russell saw her get out of the defendant's friend's car,
which, according to defendant's theory, made it imperative for Matthews to allege rape
immediately. Id. at 230. And Matthews lied on direct examination about her living ar-
rangements at the time of the trial. Id. These factors appear to be missing from the cases
cited supra note 185. Also missing, however, even in the those cases decided after Olden,
is a serious discussion of the importance of permitting a defense counsel to offer evidence,
or ask questions, which would support a defendant's argument of motive to lie to the jury.
187. Olden, 488 U.S. at 231-32 (quoting Davis v. Alaska, 475 U.S. 308, 318 (1974)).
188. See infra notes 349-60 and accompanying text.
189. Commonwealth v. Joyce, 415 N.E.2d 181,187 (Mass. 1981). The defendant had the
right to show that the complainant had been charged with prostitution twice in the previ-
ous eight months after being found naked in a car with men, to support his claim that her
accusation of rape after being found by police in a similar situation with defendant was
motivated by a desire to avoid being charged a third time; see also State v. Herndon, 426
N.W.2d 347, 362-63 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that a defendant has a Sixth Amend-
ment right to inquire into complainant's prior arrests for prostitution in the area of the
alleged rape as evidence of complainant's bias and willingness to fabricate a rape
allegation).
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fidelity or chastity with her parents, 190 members of her church, 191 and
neighbors; 192 to explain a pregnancy; 193 or to obtain an abortion.194
190. Lewis v. State, 591 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1991). The defendant, accused of sexual activ-
ity with a child under 18 while in a position of familial or custodial authority, contended
that the complainant fabricated the charges to hide her sexual relationship with her boy-
friend from her mother. Id. at 923. The court held that exclusion of her sexual history
violated defendant's constitutional right to confront his accuser and develop his defense
through reasonable cross-examination. Id. at 926.
State v. DeLawder, 344 A.2d 446 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975). The court held that the
defendant's right of confrontation required the admission of evidence supporting the de-
fense theory that the complainant accused the defendant of rape because she was afraid to
tell her mother that she had engaged in sexual intercourse with certain men other than the
accused and was pregnant. Id. at 455.
Commonwealth v. Stockhammer, 570 N.E.2d 992 (Mass. 1991). The complainant ac-
cused a fellow college student, with whom she had been best friends, of rape several
months after the incident in question. Id. at 995. The defendant claimed that the com-
plainant had consented, and that she charged him with rape only after her father, who
adamantly opposed premarital sex, learned of the incident. Id. at 998. The trial judge
permitted the defendant to elicit evidence of the complainant's prior sexual relationship
with her boyfriend, but prevented defense counsel from asking her on cross-examination
whether her parents had known, prior to her rape accusation, that she was sexually active
with that boyfriend. The court held that this was highly relevant to complainant's bias and
motive to lie and should have been allowed. d at 1000.
State v. Roberts, 611 P.2d 1297 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980). The complainant and two friends
who had been present at the scene testified that three initial statements made by them to
the police were untrue. Id. at 1301. The court held that the failure to permit the defendant
to pursue on cross-examination a theory that the complainant's testimony was motivated
by a parental compulsion to cooperate with the prosecutor constituted denial of the de-
fendant's right to effective cross-examination. Id.
191. Garza Barreda v. State, 739 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. Ct. App.), rev'd on recons., 760
S.W.2d 1 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987). Evidence of the complainant's past sexual conduct with the
defendant was admissible to show that her accusation of rape was motivated by fear that if
others learned of the relationship, it would affect her church membership. Testimony,
however, regarding her sexual conduct with third parties offered for a similar purpose, the
court held, properly was excluded as irrelevant and highly prejudicial. Id. at 369-70.
192. State v. Finley, 387 S.E.2d 88 (S.C. 1989). After an evening of dinner, watching
television and drinking tequila in the complainant's living room, the complainant and de-
fendant fell asleep; she on a love seat, he on the floor in the same room. Id. at 89. The
complainant alleged that the defendant attempted to rape her after they both woke up the
following morning. Id. The defendant denied any attempt at sexual conduct, and claimed
that at approximately 2:30 that morning he woke up and saw a male from a neighboring
apartment having sex with the complainant on the love seat. Id. After the neighbor left,
the defendant and complainant fell asleep without conversing. Later in the morning they
argued about her sexual activity with the neighbor. Id. The court held that it was error to
exclude this evidence, which supported the defendant's theory that the complainant
fabricated the charges against him for fear he would tell others about her behavior with the
neighbor. Id. at 90.
193. Wright v. State, 513 A.2d 1310, 1313-15 (Del. 1986) (holding that the evidence was
properly rejected because if the complainant's motive had been to invent an excuse in case
she became pregnant, she would have had no reason to report that the defendant also
forced her to engage in oral sex). See supra note 190 (discussing DeLawder).
194. State v. Lovato, 702 P.2d 101 (Utah 1985). Evidence that the complainant had
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4. Vengeance or Spite
Another commonly asserted defense in sexual assault cases is that the
complainant fabricated the charge out of vengeance or spite.195 In cases
involving adult complainants, the defense typically alleges that the com-
plainant is trying to get back at the defendant, or someone close to the
defendant, for embarrassing or humiliating her. In light of Olden ,196 the
amount of discretion a court has to exclude such evidence is unclear, even
if the evidence reveals information or contains allegations about the com-
plainant's prior sexual conduct. 197 To reject a defendant's proffer be-
cause it is not logical for the complainant to have acted as defendant
claims' 98 does not sufficiently acknowledge that those who feel spurned
engaged in sexual intercourse two days before the alleged rape was held not admissible to
show that she had lured the defendant into consensual intercourse and then fabricated the
rape charge to obtain, from a rape crisis volunteer, medication that would cause an abor-
tion. Id. at 105.
195. Some decisions have admitted such evidence. See DeLawder, 344 A.2d at 455 (dis-
cussed supra note 190); State v. Hagen, 391 N.W.2d 888, 892 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); State
v. Colbath, 540 A.2d 1212, 1217 (N.H. 1988) (discussed infra part VI.D.); Finley, 387
S.E.2d at 89-90 (discussed supra note 192).
Other cases have excluded such evidence. See Stephens v. Miller, 13 F.3d 998, 1003 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 57 (1994) (discussed infra notes 202-12); State v. Bennett, 637
P.2d 208, 210 (Or. Ct. App. 1981) (discussed infra note 201 and accompanying text); Marr
v. State, 494 So. 2d 1139, 1143 (Fla. 1986); supra notes 148-52 and accompanying text (re-
lating to other evidence of bias).
196. Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227 (1988). See supra notes 159-69 and accompanying
text.
197. People v. Mandel, 403 N.Y.S.2d 63 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978), rev'd, 425 N.Y.S.2d 63
(N.Y. 1979), and cert. denied, 446 U.S. 949 (1980). The appellate court concluded that
evidence that the complainant had refused to allow anyone to touch her breasts while
engaging in sexual intercourse should have been admitted because under the particular
circumstances of the case such evidence went to the very core of the defense. The defend-
ants sought to prove that the complainant charged the defendants with rape because she
was humiliated and embarrassed when water balloons fell out of her brassiere and burst
upon the floor, prompting the defendants to laugh. Id. at 71.
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 487 A.2d 946, 947 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (per curiam) (holding
that the trial court should have admitted evidence of past consensual sexual conduct be-
tween the complainant and defendant, which, when coupled with the defendant's claimed
reluctance to spend time with her on the night of alleged rape, supported a defense of bias
leading to fabrication of charges).
198. Consider, for example, State v. Bevins, 439 A.2d 271 (Vt. 1981). The defendant
sought to offer evidence that the complainant unsuccessfully tried to induce his brother-in-
law to have sexual intercourse with sexually provocative conduct. Id. at 272. His theory:
furious at being spurned, she consented to have sex with the defendant, then falsely ac-
cused the defendant of rape to get back at the defendant's brother-in-law. Id. The Ver-
mont Supreme Court held that the trial judge properly excluded the evidence. Id. at 273.
The court stated:
It defies belief that a woman who has been publicly scorned and humiliated
would retaliate by subsequently consenting to sexual intercourse with a third per-
son, and then falsely accusing that person of rape. It makes absolutely no sense
Catholic University Law Review
in matters relating to love and sex sometimes react irrationally and
vindictively. 199 This reaction, similar to the situation in Olden, is a "pro-
totypical form of bias." '2 ° It is clearly proper, however, to reject evi-
dence where the defendant's offer of proof is speculative and
unsubstantiated .20 1
The Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, divided sharply on motive-to-lie
evidence in its 1994 decision, Stephens v. Miller.20 2 To explain why the
complainant would accuse him of rape after allegedly consenting to inter-
for the prosecuting witness to avenge herself against one person by claiming an-
other person raped her. Evidence without probative value is irrelevant. The evi-
dence was for this reason inadmissible as to motive.
Id. at 272-73.
Similarly, see Commonwealth v. Reed, 644 A.2d 1223 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994). The defend-
ant was accused of indecent assault on his son's fourteen-year-old ex-girlfriend. Id. at
1224. The defendant argued that he should be convicted of only corrupting a minor be-
cause she consented. The defendant sought to testify that, while he was driving her home,
she discussed intimate details of her prior sexual relationship with his son, and told him
that she had been expelled from school for threatening to kill his son's current girlfriend.
Id. at 1227. The court held that it was not error to exclude this evidence. "Any suspicion
that L.R.'s hostility toward her ex-boyfriend's new relationship would 'spill-over' toward
Reed is entirely speculative and properly excluded." Id. at 1228 n.4. Although the defend-
ant's behavior was despicable in any event, the result is questionable, particularly given
other evidence of the complainant's mental and emotional instability: it is quite plausible
that a fourteen-year-old who is unstable enough to threaten her ex-boyfriend's new girl-
friend with a knife might also decide to get back at the ex-boyfriend by having sex with his
father and then accusing him of rape.
199. "Heaven has no rage like love to hatred turned,/ Nor hell a fury like a woman
scorned." WILLIAM CONGREVE, THE MOURNING BRIDE, act III, sc. viii (1697)-except,
sometimes, a man scorned.
200. Olden, 488 U.S. at 231 (1988) (quoting Davis v. Alaska, 475 U.S. 308 (1975)) (dis-
cussed extensively supra note 186).
201. See, e.g., State v. Besk, 640 A.2d 775, 777 (N.H. 1994). Prior to defendant's trial
for molesting two boys under the age of thirteen, the state sought to exclude evidence that
one of the complainants had molested the defendant's younger son. Id. at 776. Objecting,
the defense counsel argued, "[T]his boy has molested my client's son and was caught, and
was caught perhaps with the help of my client and perhaps now he holds a grudge against
my client." Id. Affirming the trial court's exclusion of the evidence, the state supreme
court held that the defendant had failed to establish a sufficient nexus between the alleged
incident and the complainant's motivation to lie. Id. at 777. The court noted that the
defendant's offer of proof was "tentative and speculative," and offered no proof that the
defendant in fact played a part in the complainant's apprehension or that complainant
knew of defendant's role in the matter. Id.
State v. Bennett, 637 P.2d 208 (Or. Ct. App. 1981). Evidence of prior sexual relations
between the complainant and defendant, which occurred nine years prior to trial, was
properly excluded. Id. at 210. Its only possible relevance would have been to show that
the complainant had a motive for making a false accusation, so that her husband would not
find out about her infidelity. Id. The defendant, however, denied that the incident for
which he was tried had occurred; hence its relevance to show a motive to fabricate the
current charge was minimal. Id.
202. 13 F.3d 998 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
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course, 1 3 the defendant sought to testify that as the two of them were
doing it "doggy fashion," he said to her, "[d]on't you like it like this?...
Tom Hall said you did." The defendant also testified that he mentioned
something about switching partners; that she got mad at him, ordered him
to leave her trailer (which he did), and subsequently accused him of
rape.2 °4 The trial court only allowed him to testify that he "said some-
thing that upset" the complainant, but not the specifics of what he said.
The state supreme court affirmed the conviction.2 °5 On habeas, the Sev-
enth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the trial court properly balanced
the defendant's rights and the policies underlying the state rape shield
statute, in particular the need to protect the complainant from embarrass-
ment and humiliation.20 6
Four judges dissented:
The plausibility of Stephens' defense turned in substantial part
on whether the jury could be persuaded that something Ste-
phens had said to the complainant could have so enraged her
that she would have responded in the manner he alleged. Cen-
tral to Stephens' case then are the words he claims to have said
that night, words the jury never heard .... The jury might well
have disbelieved Stephens' testimony even if he had testified
fully; however, it is hard to imagine his story being believed ab-
sent this evidence.20 7
The dissent appears to have the more persuasive argument. The Supreme
Court previously held that a party should not be restricted to eliciting
testimony to the fact of a witness's bias. Where the witness's testimony is
crucial to the case, impeachment should also include information neces-
sary to reveal the "source and strength" of the bias.20 8 The bland, sani-
203. Id. at 1000. Complainant testified that the defendant entered her trailer late at
night while she was asleep and forced himself upon her; he testified that she invited him in
and consented-at first-to intercourse. Id.
204. Id. at 1010 (Cummings, J., dissenting). His defense was essentially this: "she ac-
cused me of rape because I am a clod, a pig and a total jerk."
205. Stephens v. Indiana, 544 N.E.2d 137 (Ind. 1989).
206. Stephens, 13 F.3d at 1002.
207. Id. at 1010 (Cummings, J., dissenting).
208. United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 54 (1984). Abel and two confederates were
indicted for bank robbery. Id. at 47. The codefendants pleaded guilty and one of them,
Ehle, testified against the defendant. Id. To impeach Ehle, the defendant called another
witness, Mills, who testified that Ehle had falsely incriminated Able in order to receive
favorable treatment from the Government. Id. To impeach Mills, the prosecutor ques-
tioned him on cross-examination as to his membership in a secret prison organization that
required its members to lie, steal or kill on behalf of another member. Id. at 47-48. After
Mills denied any knowledge of the organization, the prosecutor, in rebuttal, recalled Ehle
to testify that he, the defendant and Mills were all members of the organization. Id.
The Supreme Court, per Chief Justice Rehnquist, unanimously upheld the action of the
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tized, content-empty version of events to which the court restricted
Stephens deprived his defense of its "source and strength."
Immediately after concluding that "[t]he interests served by the Indi-
ana Rape Shield Statute justify this very minor [sic] imposition on Ste-
phens' right to testify," the Seventh Circuit added, "We note also that
Stephens and [complainant] told drastically different stories of what hap-
pened and that Stephens directed [a friend] to commit perjury."2 °9 This
helps to justify and explain the exclusion of the defendant's testimony,
however, only if a trial court is permitted to assess witness credibility in
ruling on evidence that relates to the complainant's prior sexual behav-
ior."' If, on the other hand, a judge is required to assume that a defend-
ant's testimony is true when deciding its admissibility, exclusion on this
ground would be unjustified.211 Other options short of exclusion could
have adequately protected the complainant.212
trial judge. Id. at 49. Ehle's testimony concerning Mills' and Abel's membership in the
gang was sufficiently probative of Mills' possible bias towards Abel to warrant its admis-
sion into evidence. Id. The Court rejected the defendant's contention that this "inflamed"
and unduly prejudiced the jury against him and that the district court therefore abused its
discretion under FRE 403 in permitting Ehle to describe the organization's beliefs and
practices. The Court also rejected the defendant's claim that the trial court should have cut
off testimony after the prosecutor had elicited that Mills knew Abel and belonged to an
organization together. Id. at 53. The court noted:
This argument ignores the fact that the type of organization in which a witness
and a party share membership may be relevant to show bias .... [T]he attributes
of the [organization]-a secret prison sect sworn to perjury and self-protection-
bore directly not only on the fact of bias but also on the source and strength of
Mills' bias.
Id. at 54.
The Court noted that the district court took steps to limit the prejudicial effect of the
contested evidence. Id. at 48. The trial judge instructed the prosecutor and Ehle not to use
the organization's name ("Aryan Brotherhood"), and sustained Abel's objections to the
prosecutor's questions to Ehle concerning the punishment meted out to unfaithful mem-
bers (death). Id. Moreover, the judge offered to give a limiting instruction concerning the
use the jury could make of Ehle's testimony. Id. at 54. Thus, while the trial court could
not prevent all prejudice, it successfully averted any undue prejudice to the defendant. Id.
at 53.
209. Stephens, 13 F.3d at 1002. When arrested, the defendant told police that Stone, a
friend, had given him a lift to a local store and that he then walked to the trailer of other
friends. Id. at 1000. Stone confirmed this version on direct examination; on cross, he ad-
mitted that he had dropped the defendant off at complainant's trailer and had lied on
direct pursuant to defendant's instructions. Id.
210. Evidence that a defendant sought to fabricate evidence supports the inference of
consciousness of guilt, and therefore the inference of guilt itself. 2 C. FISHMAN, JONES ON
EVIDENCE § 13:13 (7th ed. 1994).
211. See infra part IX.
212. The judge could have restricted the defendant without depriving him of the right
to present a meaningful defense: unless the defendant could show that the identity of the
person who allegedly told Stephens about the complainant's supposed preferences was a
significant factor in her reaction, the court could have instructed the defendant to testify
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In cases involving child complainants, defendants often offer evidence
to support a defense that the complainant falsely accused the defendant
to get back at him for interfering with her sexual relationship with some-
one else,213 although other situations also arise.2 14
that "someone" told him this, without naming the particular individual. Immediately after
admitting such testimony, the judge could instruct the jury: "You can consider what the
defendant said to the complainant, if you believe he said it, only in deciding whether that
may have motivated the complainant to accuse the defendant falsely. It is not evidence of
any prior sexual behavior on the part of the complainant, and you must draw no conclu-
sions about the complainant from it." The prosecutor could have recalled the complainant
in rebuttal to deny the defendant made any such statement, assuming she denied that he
did so, and to reiterate that she accused him of rape because he raped her. Finally, the
court could have instructed the defendant to make no attempt, either by cross-examination
of the complainant or otherwise, to introduce evidence of her prior sexual behavior.
213. State v. Kulmac, 644 A.2d 887 (Conn. 1994). Evidence that the complainants had
been sexually abused by other men was not admissible to support the defendant's argu-
ment that they had blamed him for assaults perpetrated by others in order to shield the
actual abusers from harm where the complainants had also reported the other abusers to
the police. Id. at 894-95.
Commonwealth v. Black, 487 A.2d 396 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). The defendant was
charged with statutory rape and incest of his thirteen-year-old daughter. Id. at 397. The
court ruled that defendant should have been allowed to demonstrate (1) that the complain-
ant had maintained an ongoing sexual relationship with her fifteen-year-old brother which
ended when the brother left home after a violent argument with the defendant; and (2)
that complainant wanted to punish defendant for his interference with her sexual relation-
ship with her brother and to remove defendant from home so her brother might return. Id.
at 401.
Commonwealth v. Elder, 452 N.E.2d 1104, 1110 (Mass. 1988) (excluding evidence of
prior sexual history because the defendant offered ample other evidence of bias). See
supra note 210.
Commonwealth v. Poindexter, 539 A.2d 1341, 1344 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (excluding evi-
dence as irrelevant because the defendant offered ample other evidence of motive for
retaliation).
214. Daniels v. State, 767 P.2d 1163 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989). The complainant, a four-
teen-year-old, accused her foster father of rape. Id. at 1165. The defendant alleged that
the complainant falsely accused him in retaliation for being told she could not remain in his
home. Id. The Alaskan appellate court held it was reversible error to preclude the defend-
ant's wife from testifying that shortly before the complainant made the accusation, she had
told the complainant that a school counselor had informed her that the complainant had
sodomized a five-year-old boy, and that because she and her husband had young sons of
their own, the complainant could no longer stay with them, but would have to go to a state
institution. It was also error to preclude the defendant from cross-examining the complain-
ant about this. Id. at 1166-67. Although the trial judge had permitted the defendant's wife
to testify she had told the girl she could not stay any longer with the family, this was not
enough. Id. at 1166.
Stripped of any meaningful detail and communicated to the jury only in the most
abstract and conclusory terms, the claim that the Daniels had reached the deci-
sion not to keep S.B. as a foster child just before S.B. accused Daniels of sexual
abuse could only have seemed an anemic contrivance .... Evidence disclosing
the specific nature of Debra Daniels' communication with S.B. would have estab-
lished a potentially strong reason for S.B. to have wanted to retaliate against the
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5. Motive Related to Drugs
In some cases the defendant may seek to introduce evidence that sup-
ports his allegation that the complainant accused him of rape after a disa-
greement relating to drugs. Drugs, like love and sex, have been known to
prompt strong and irrational reactions. Three Maryland decisions illus-
trate the difficulties presented in these cases.
In Johnson v. State,215 the complainant acknowledged at a rape shield
hearing that she was a crack addict, and that when she wanted to get high,
she would "freak" (i.e., exchange sex for drugs). She admitted "freaking"
in the immediate neighborhood of the alleged rape for approximately six
months, most recently one week before the alleged rape.216 At trial, the
complainant testified that she was a crack addict, that she had spent all of
her money on an eight-hour crack binge, but had obtained additional
money from a friend, and was attempting to purchase more crack from a
man, when he, the defendant, and another man raped her.217 The de-
fendant alleged that the complainant willingly had sex with the three men
because one of the men promised to give her crack in return, then falsely
accused them of rape when the would-be supplier reneged.218 The state's
highest court concluded that her addiction created a "disposition" to
"freak," and that this disposition provided sufficient special relevance to
overcome the inflammatory and prejudicial nature of the evidence. The
Maryland court held it was reversible error to preclude the defendant
from cross-examining the complainant about her "freaking":
Daniels. Moreover, by suggesting that S.B.'s accusation against Daniels was in
effect a quid pro quo, the excluded line of inquiry would have tended to explain
why S.B.'s anger found expression in the form of an accusation of sexual abuse.
Id.
Commonwealth v. Wall, 606 A.2d 449 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992). Evidence that a twelve-
year-old child had previously been removed from her mother's home and placed with her
aunt and uncle after she was sexually abused by her mother's paramour was admissible in a
prosecution of the child's uncle for involuntary deviate sexual intercourse and corruption
of a minor. Id. at 462. The court concluded that the evidence supported the uncle's con-
tention that the child fabricated the sexual abuse allegations against him in the hope that
she would be removed from her aunt and uncle's home in order to avoid her aunt's harsh
discipline; the evidence was relevant, noncumulative, and more probative than prejudicial.
Id. at 458.
State v. Lucero, 784 P.2d 1041 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989). Held: it was error to exclude
evidence suggesting that the complainant's mother, afraid she might lose custody of the
complainant to her ex-husband because of the incident, convinced the child to blame the
defendant instead of someone else, perhaps the mother's boyfriend. Id. at 1044.
215. 632 A.2d 152 (Md. 1993).
216. Id. at 154.
217. Johnson v. Maryland, 613 A.2d 450, 452 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992), cert. granted,
613 A.2d 547 (Md.), and rev'd, 632 A.2d 152 (Md. 1993).
218. Id. at 452-53.
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As we have seen, the critical issue in this case is whether, on
this occasion, the victim was freaking for cocaine or was raped.
And, because these are the only possible explanations for what
occurred, evidence that she has freaked for cocaine in the past
and, particularly, the very recent past, has special relevance to
that issue; such evidence transcends mere evidence of bad char-
acter or, in the context of this case, sexual promiscuity. In turn,
it is relevant to, and probative of, the victim's motive. From a
finding that on this occasion she was freaking for cocaine but did
not receive the bargained for cocaine, the jury could then infer
that the victim had an ulterior motive for making a false accusa-
tion of rape against the petitioner.219
In so holding, the court contrasted White v. State,220 in which the same
court upheld the exclusion of similar evidence. In White, the defendants,
accused of kidnapping and rape, insisted that they merely had smoked
cocaine with the complainant and then rejected her offer of sex in ex-
change for more cocaine. The defendants sought to introduce testimony
that on previous occasions, the complainant had asked other individuals
to provide cocaine in return for sex. The court concluded that because of
the prejudicial effect, such testimony was not admissible to support their
defense that she falsely accused them of rape out of anger from rejection
of her offer and to conceal from her fiance that she had been out smoking
cocaine with two men. In distinguishing White, the Johnson Court
commented,
[I]n White, the issue was not whether the victim had exchanged
sex for drugs, but rather, whether she had [sex] at all. Under the
circumstances, there could be no direct relationship between the
proffered testimony of the witness who would have testified to
the victim's having previously engaged in sex for drugs with him
and the ulterior motives the defendant offered in defense.22'
It appears the court correctly decided both cases. The evidence in
Johnson was far more probative than that in White in four ways. First,
Johnson's proof that the complainant bartered herself for cocaine was
from an unimpeachable source-the complainant herself; second, it was
clear that she had done so frequently and recently;222 third, there was
greater similarity between the complainant's prior conduct and the de-
219. Johnson, 632 A.2d at 159-60.
220. 598 A.2d 187 (Md. 1991).
221. Johnson, 632 A.2d at 160.
222. Id at 160-61. "[E]vidence that the victim freaked for cocaine one week prior to
the alleged rape.., is weaker-than [would be] evidence that she had freaked for cocaine
the day before or an hour before. On the other hand, it is more probative than that she
had done so within the six months before the alleged rape." Id.
1995]
Catholic University Law Review
fendant's version of events; and finally, the alleged motive to lie was
more plausible and persuasive.223
An intermediate state court arrived at a more questionable result in
Miles v. State.224 One of two defendants accused of rape and robbery
alleged that he sold drugs for the complainant and had a sexual relation-
ship with her.225 He asserted she had a motivation to bring false charges
against him when he failed to pay her for drugs she had advanced him on
consignment.226 The complainant denied these allegations at an in cam-
era hearing, and the trial court did not permit the defendant to question
her about them before the jury.227 On appeal, the intermediate court
concluded this exclusion did not constitute reversible error because de-
fense counsel would have received the same negative answers if the same
questions were provided before the jury.228 Thus, the evidence was ex-
cluded "not ... because of the trial judge's ruling, but ... because the
witnesses . . . did not testify as they had hoped. '229 That an accusing
witness will not answer a question as the defendant would prefer, how-
ever, does not justify depriving the defendant of the opportunity to con-
front the witness with the question.
B. Restricting Admissibility
Admission is not an all-or-nothing proposition. Where possible, a
court should restrict the evidence that goes before the jury to protect the
complainant to the greatest extent possible while also affording the de-
fendant his constitutional right to confront his accuser and present his
case. A number of courts, embracing the distinction that the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court rejected in Berkowitz, have admitted evidence
concerning allegations of sexual conduct, while excluding evidence of the
conduct itself,23° although occasionally courts have gone too far in sani-
223. Compare Johnson, supra note 217 with White, supra note 220.
224. 594 A.2d 634 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.), cert. denied, 599 A.2d 447 (Md. 1991).
225. Id. at 636.
226. Id. The defendant had consumed the drugs himself and did not have any money to
pay the complainant for them.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 636-37.
230. State v. Rogers, 642 A.2d 932, 934-35 (N.H. 1994) (holding, in a prosecution for
having sex with a child under the age of consent, that the trial court properly restricted
cross-examination of the complainant to asking her whether the defendant had told her he
had observed her having sex with other men and was going to report that to her mother,
while precluding cross-examination about the truth of the alleged other episodes).
Commonwealth v. Poindexter, 539 A.2d 1341 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988). The complainant
accused her father of incest and rape. Id. at 1343. The defendant maintained that she
fabricated the charge out of revenge because he had brought charges against her boyfriend
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tizing such evidence.23'
Several courts have justified exclusion on the ground that ample evi-
dence of the witness's bias diminished the probative value of the com-
plainant's prior sexual conduct.232 Given the impact sexual intimacy so
for his sexual activity with her. Id. at 1344. The court held the fact that the defendant had
filed sex offense charges against the boyfriend was properly admitted, but that evidence of
her prior sexual activity with the boyfriend was inadmissible as irrelevant. Id.
231. See Stephens v. Miller, 13 F.3d 998, 1002 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 57
(1994) (discussed supra note 202 et seq); Daniels v. State, 767 P.2d 1163, 1166 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1989) (discussed supra note 214).
232. See Marr v. State, 494 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 1986). The court held that the complain-
ant's prior sexual activity with her boyfriend was not admissible to show that she fabricated
the charges solely because of personal animosity between her boyfriend and the defendant,
because the defendant was able to show the depth of the relationship between the com-
plainant and her boyfriend without evidence of their sexual relationship, and his question-
ing of the boyfriend elicited details of incidents demonstrating the animosity between the
boyfriend and defendant. Id. at 1243.
Commonwealth v. Domaingue, 493 N.E.2d 841 (Mass. 1986). In a prosecution for incest,
evidence of past sexual conduct was excluded because there was no substantial evidence of
bias. Id. at 846.
Commonwealth v. Elder, 452 N.E.2d 1104 (Mass. 1983). Complainant, a fourteen-year-
old girl, accused the man she and her mother were living with of statutory rape. Id. at
1106. The defendant sought to prove the charge was motivated by hostility because he
interfered with her desire to have sex with her boyfriend. Id. at 1109. The court held the
defendant was able to establish complainant's hostility and bias against him without intro-
ducing evidence of her prior sexual history; hence, the trial court properly refused to admit
the proffered evidence. Id. at 1109-10.
State v. Morrison, 351 S.E.2d 810 (N.C. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 354 S.E.2d 724 (N.C.
1987). T, a friend of the complainant, testified that on the night in question, the complain-
ant, naked below the waist and in hysterics, pounded on his apartment door crying that the
defendant had attempted to rape her. Id. at 811-12. At trial, the complainant testified that
though she and T had dated, they were not "boyfriend and girlfriend." Id. at 813. In a
hearing out of the jury's presence, T confirmed this assessment of their relationship,
although he also testified that he and complainant had slept together a few times. Id. The
North Carolina Court of Appeals held that the trial court properly excluded evidence of
their sexual relationship from the jury. Id. Though relevant to impeach T as well as the
complainant, the court reasoned that the probative value was slight because she and T had
admitted that they were friends and had dated, and its admission "would greatly increase
the risk of prejudicing the jury." Id.
The decision is correct, but it could have been better explained. The fact that a man and
a woman are "friends" and have "dated" suggests his possible bias in her favor to a certain
extent, but evidence that they have slept together suggests it much more powerfully. A
better basis for the decision was that T's bias, if any, was rendered practically irrelevant by
the presence of overwhelming evidence of guilt. The complainant alleged, and the state
offered considerable corroboration, that the defendant, a police officer, had developed an
obsession with her and had called her dozens of times daily, demanding that she date him
despite her repeated refusals. Finally, she agreed to see him, hoping to persuade him to
leave her alone. He coaxed her into his apartment and then attacked her; during their
struggle she hit him in the head with a hammer, cut him with a knife, set fire to a towel on
the stove and finally escaped into an open area of the apartment complex and began bang-
ing on T's door. Another policeman who happened to be at the apartment complex asked
19951
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often has on human emotions and conduct, however, a court should be
cautious in relying too readily on this justification to exclude such evi-
dence.233 Additionally, an exclusion that deprives the defendant of an
opportunity to demonstrate a complainant's supposed motive to lie, as
occurred in Stephens v. Miller,2" violates a defendant's constitutional
guarantees to confront his accusers and present a defense.2 35
V. PRIOR RAPE ALLEGATIONS MADE BY COMPLAINANT
Other than murder, sexual assault is perhaps the most serious accusa-
tion one person can make against another. The accusation alone is likely
to permanently damage the accused's reputation, jeopardize his profes-
sional standing, and disrupt and traumatize his family. To accuse some-
one falsely of sexual assault is, therefore, a despicable and malignant act
which reveals far more about the accuser's character than do other, more
common, less destructive falsehoods.
It is scarcely surprising that a defendant accused of sexual assault
would want the fact-finder to learn that the complainant previously made
one or more false accusations of sexual assault. Such evidence is highly
relevant on the question of whether the complainant fabricated the cur-
rent charges against the defendant. The consensus is that the defendant
has a constitutional right to introduce such evidence.236 Evidence that
the complainant made one or more previous sexual assault complaints,
without sufficient evidence that those complaints were false, is, by con-
trast, generally excluded.237
Thus, several issues arise when a defendant offers evidence of prior
accusations or complaints. First, does rape shield legislation apply to such
evidence? Second, does relevancy (the threshold requirement of admissi-
T and T's fiance (who was visiting at the time) to take complainant in, then went to the
defendant's apartment; signs of a struggle were evident and the defendant was covered
with blood. Moreover, the defendant did not testify. Given all this evidence, the probative
value of T's bias in the complainant's behalf was minimal at best.
233. In some cases, an appellate court's refusal to reverse a conviction on the ground
that evidence of bias was of low probative value might better have been based on a harm-
less error analysis.
234. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
235. For suggestions as to how the trial court could have better balanced the conflicting
interests in Stephens, see supra note 212.
236. See infra note 238; see also Nancy M. King, Annotation, Impeachment or Cross-
Examination of Prosecuting Witness in Sexual Offense Trial by Showing that Prosecuting
Witness Threatened to Make Similar Charges Against Other Persons, 71 A.LR.4TH 448,453
(1989); Nancy M. King, Annotation, Impeachment or Cross-Examination of Prosecuting
Witness in Sexual Offense Trial by Showing that Similar Charges Were Made Against Other
Persons, 71 A.L.R.4T 469, 474-75 (1989).
237. See infra note 255.
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bility) depend upon whether the defendant can offer proof that the prior
allegation was false? Third, what quality of proof is required to establish
that the complainant made a prior complaint and that the prior complaint
was false? Fourth, assuming evidence relating to prior complaints is ad-
missible, is its use restricted to cross-examination of the complainant, or
may the defendant also offer extrinsic evidence of the prior complaints
and their falsity?
A. Applicability of Rape Shield Legislation
1. Prior False Accusations
Rape shield legislation should not exclude evidence that the complain-
ant previously made false sex offense accusations. Several statutes con-
tain explicit provisions to this effect.238 Even in the absence of such
provisions, the consensus is to admit this type of evidence over a rape
shield. objection.239 Rape shield legislation is designed to protect a com-
238. Colorado permits the judge to admit "evidence that the victim has a history of
false reporting of sexual assaults" if, after a hearing, the evidence "is relevant to a material
issue to the case." COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-3-407(2) (1986).
Mississippi similarly categorizes evidence of "[f]alse allegations of past sexual offenses
made by the alleged victim at any time prior to the trial" as an exception to the general ban
of evidence of the complainant's past behavior. Miss. R. EVID. 412(b)(2)(C).
Wisconsin similarly excepts from the general ban "[e]vidence of prior untruthful allega-
tions of sexual assault made by the complaining witness." Wis. STAT. § 972.11 (2)(b)(3)
(1985).
239. United States v. Stamper, 766 F. Supp. 1396, 1400 (W.D.N.C. 1991).
West v. State, 719 S.W.2d 684, 686-87 (Ark. 1986).
Smith v. State, 377 S.E.2d 158, 160 (Ga.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 825 (1989).
People v. Sandoval, 552 N.E.2d 726, 737-38 (I11.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990)
(dictum).
Stewart v. State, 531 N.E.2d 1146, 1148-49 (Ind. 1988).
People v. Hackett, 365 N.W.2d 120, 124-25 (Mich. 1984) (dictum); People v. Makela, 383
N.W.2d 270, 276 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (despite the rape-shield statute, the defendant
could seek an in camera hearing to determine whether the complainant had made false
accusations of rape against a third party).
Efrain M. v. State, 823 P.2d 264, 265 (Nev. 1991); Miller v. State, 779 P.2d 87, 89 (Nev.
1989).
People v. Mandel, 425 N.Y.S.2d 63, 64 (N.Y. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 949 (1980);
People v. Lippert, 525 N.Y.S.2d 390, 391 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988).
State v. LeClair, 730 P.2d 609, 613 (Or, Ct. App. 1986) (dictum).
Clinebell v. Commonwealth, 368 S.E.2d 263, 264 (Va. 1988).
State v. Moats, 457 N.W.2d 299, 312 (Wis. 1990); State v. Padilla, 329 N.W.2d 263, 265
(Wis. Ct. App. 1982).
See Ex parte Foster, 548 So. 2d 478 (Alaska 1988). The Court apparently held that the
trial judge should have admitted evidence of a sign, posted in the local court's warrant
clerk's office, warning officers not to accept complaints from the complainant due to her
history of making false complaints. Id. at 480. The opinion does not state whether the sign
1995]
Catholic University Law Review
plainant from exposure of her prior sexual conduct. A prior false accusa-
tion is not "sexual conduct, 24 ° thus the statute should not protect the
complainant from exposure of prior lies or falsehoods. 24' Likewise, there
is no reason to exclude evidence of prior untrue accusations from a cor-
roborating witness.242
A few courts, nevertheless, have ruled that rape shield legislation bars
evidence of prior false accusations.2 43 Ohio's Supreme Court held that if
the complainant admits she made a prior false rape accusation, the trial
judge should hold an in camera hearing to ascertain whether she lied
completely (i.e., accused a man of rape when no sexual activity occurred),
or only lied partially (i.e., consented to the sex and then falsely accused
the man of rape). The court ruled, in State v. Boggs,2 " that if the com-
plainant's prior accusation was totally unfounded, the defendant could
inquire about it on cross-examination.24 But, if according the complain-
ant, consensual sexual activity occurred in the prior incident which the
complainant then falsely claimed was rape, the state's rape shield statute
prohibited cross-examination. This result is unfair, unjust, and hopefully,
unconstitutional. It is appropriate for the law to protect a woman's deci-
sion to have sex with other men from unnecessary exposure because,
among other reasons, it has only minimal probative value as to whether
or not she consented with the defendant. A false accusation of rape, by
contrast, reveals flaws in character-a ruthless disregard of the truth and
a willingness to use sexual allegations unjustly-which are highly relevant
as to whether she has falsely accused the defendant. Such conduct de-
specified the kind of complaints. The sign, the court held, was admissible evidence of com-
plainant's reputation for untruthfulness. Id. at 479.
240. This is clearly so where no sexual conduct had occurred between the complainant
and the person she previously accused. Even where there had been consensual sexual
conduct which the complainant falsely alleged was forcible, the evidence is offered to
prove the falsity of the accusation. This, in most cases, would be sufficiently relevant to
survive a rape shield law objection.
241. This reasoning explicitly or implicitly underlies each of the cases cited earlier in
this paragraph. See supra note 239.
242. Lawrence v. United States, 482 A.2d 374, 377 (D.C. 1984).
243. United States v. Cardinal, 782 F.2d 34, 36 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1161
(1986); Hollis v. State, 380 So. 2d 409, 411 (Ala. Ct. App. 1980); Carter v. State, 451 N.E.2d
639, 644-45 (Ind. 1983) (interpreting a statute that had since been repealed); see Common-
wealth v. Gaddis, 639 A.2d 462, 466-67 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (suggesting that false accusa-
tions against others would not be admissible because it was not established that "they were
motivated by any bias or hostility toward appellant"). This comment appears to confuse
two separate exceptions to rape shield exclusion. The result in Gaddis is better defended
on an alternate ground. See infra note 266.
244. 588 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1992).
245. Id. at 818. If either consensual sex or a rape had occurred, cross-examination
would be prohibited. Id
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serves exposure, not protection.
2. Prior True Accusations
A number of courts hold that rape shield legislation does not exclude
evidence that the complainant previously has been raped or otherwise
abused. These courts reason that a previous sexual assault on the com-
plainant does not reflect on her character for chastity.246 Although the
argument that being raped is not "sexual conduct" within the scope of
rape shield legislation is superficially plausible, it ignores the fact that
many rape victims feel a deep sense of shame.247 Exposure of this infor-
mation could cause some women as much or even more embarrassment
and humiliation than exposure of consensual sex.248 Moreover, the rape
of the complainant on a prior occasion generally will have little relevance,
and may distract the jury.249 Such evidence, therefore, should be ex-
cluded 25° except in unusual circumstances where its relevance is clearly
shown.25'
246. A number of courts have so held with regard to victims of child abuse, see supra
note 230. Some courts, however, have so held regardless of the age of the complainant.
See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 311 S.E.2d 50, 52 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (explained in greater
detail, infra note 251); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 638 A.2d 940, 942 (Pa. 1994) (involving
a minor, but the court's discussion of the question is not limited to such cases).
247. See Pamela A. Wilk, Comment, Expert Testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome: Ad-
missibility and Effective Use in Criminal Rape Prosecution, 33 AM. U. L. REv. 417, 427
(1984) (listing shame as one of the symptoms of the acute phase of rape).
248. E.g., State v. Sieler, 397 N.W.2d 89, 92 (S.D. 1986) (concluding that requiring the
defendant to show that the complainant's previous sex offense accusation was "demonstra-
bly false" appropriately keeps the focus on the defendant rather than the complainant).
I sympathize with those who urge that the best way to remove the stigma that tradition-
ally accompanies being raped is for rape victims to speak out. See, e.g., Elaine Johnston,
'Survivors Should Be Able to Share the Horror': Changes Will Come Only if We Speak Out,
A Rape Victim Argues, VANCOUVER SUN, May 29, 1993, at B5; Tony Perry, Rape Victim
Fights Back and Takes Story Public; Crime: Woman Breaks a Taboo and Spurs Community
to Act., L.A. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1995, at Al; Megan Rosenfeld, Breaking the Silence; Rape
Victims, REDBOOK, Dec. 1993, at 98. To have to testify about a prior, unrelated assault
may nevertheless be a difficult and humiliating experience to some complainants.
249. State v. LeClair, 730 P.2d 609, 616 (Or. Ct. App. 1986) (even when the defendant
introduces proof that the complainant made prior similar untrue allegations, the result is
often a minitrial within the trial about the facts in the prior incident).
250. Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 378 N.E.2d 987, 991 (Mass. 1978) (distinguishing the
question's relation to prior allegations of rape from the complainant's prior sexual activ-
ity); accord LeClair, 730 P.2d at 613 (ruling that only a prior accusation of rape which has
been proven to be false will be admissible); Sieler, 397 N.W.2d at 92. The Pennsylvania
and North Carolina cases cited supra note 246 also acknowledge that such evidence gener-
ally is not relevant in the trial of an unrelated rape charge against a different defendant.
251. Steward v. State, 636 N.E.2d 143, 149-50 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (discussing the error
of excluding evidence of prior molestation which supported the defendant's case); see
supra note 99.
Commonwealth v. Baxter, 627 N.E.2d 487 (Mass. Ct. App. 1994). The court held that it
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B. Matters of Proof
1. Proving Complainant Made a Prior Accusation
Several courts hold that before a defendant may cross-examine a com-
plainant about previous accusations of sexual assault, the defendant must
first satisfy the trial judge that the complainant in fact made the accusa-
tions. 2 In most cases adequate proof consists of evidence that the com-
plainant made a complaint or accusation to the police or other
authority.253 Courts also accept evidence, however, that the complainant
made an accusation to a friend or other private citizen, even if the com-
was error to exclude evidence that complainant had been raped on a prior occasion and
was suffering from psychological problems as a result of that assault as well as evidence
indicating numerous remarkable similarities between that event and the present incident.
The court found that the evidence presented a plausible case that the complainant was
unable to distinguish the two events. Id. at 489-90.
State v. Johnson, 311 S.E.2d 50, 52-53 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that testimony that
the complainant told the defendant about a prior rape should be admitted where the de-
fendant contended that the very fact she had told him about such a personal event demon-
strated that they had shared an emotional intimacy which, in turn, suggests she may have
consented to sexual intimacy as well).
As discussed earlier, some courts have found sufficient relevance in child abuse cases,
either to show an alternate source for sex-related injuries, see supra note 95 and accompa-
nying text, or to overcome the "sexual innocence inference," see infra notes 395-96 and
accompanying text.
252. State v. Superior Court of Arizona, 744 P.2d 725 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987). The com-
plainant testified at a rape shield hearing that she had been raped three years prior to the
incident involving the defendant, but had not reported the matter to the authorities. Id. at
730. The appellate court held that cross-examination at trial about the prior incident
would be improper because the defense had not provided sufficient evidence that the vic-
tim had previously accused anyone of the crime. Id. at 731.
People v. Simbolo, 532 P.2d 962 (Colo. 1975). In a statutory rape prosecution the trial
court denied the defense permission to ask the eleven-year-old complainant whether she
had made similar accusations against another man in another state. Id. at 963. The Colo-
rado Supreme Court held this was not error. Defendant had offered no proof as to
whether such an event took place and was unable to identify his source of such informa-
tion. Id.
Koo v. State, 640 N.E.2d 95 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994). Complainant acknowledged at a rape
shield hearing that several years earlier she had gone to a clinic because of a "forced sexual
encounter" with a former boyfriend, but protested that personnel at the clinic "might ...
have construed it as rape, but in my mind, it wasn't." Id. at 103. The Indiana Court of
Appeals held this was insufficient to establish that she had charged the former boyfriend
with rape. Id.
For cases that similarly uphold an exclusion for insufficient proof that complainant made
prior accusations see, e.g., People v. Ellison, 411 N.E.2d 350, 358 (Ill. Ct. App. 1980); Com-
monwealth v. Blair, 488 N.E.2d 1200, 1202 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986); Commonwealth v. Gad-
dis, 639 A.2d 462, 466-67 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994); State v. Sieler, 397 N.W.2d 89, 92 (S.D.
1986).
253. See Ellison, 411 N.E.2d at 359 (denying admissibility of prior accusations of rape
because the defendant failed to offer evidence of charges that the plaintiff had made or
documentation of those charges).
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plainant later denies having done SO. 2 5 4
2. Proving the Prior Accusation Was False
The defendant may prove the falsity of the prior accusation through
evidence demonstrating that the complainant later recanted the prior ac-
cusation.255 In unusual circumstances, evidence of prior accusations with-
254. People v. Burrell-Hart, 237 Cal. Rptr. 654. 657 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
255. Id. at 657. During cross-examination at a rape shield hearing, defense counsel
asked the complainant if she had ever accused a named third party of having attempted to
rape her. Id. at 656. She testified to a fight between herself and the third party and stated
that following the fight she had told someone about the incident but denied stating that the
man had either raped or attempted to rape her. Id. Held: the trial court erred, albeit
harmlessly in light of ample other evidence of guilt, in excluding the testimony of the per-
son to whom the prior accusation allegedly was made. Id. at 656-58. Such evidence could
support a finding that the complainant, having previously made a false accusation of physi-
cal and threatened sexual abuse against a man with whom she had fought, would under
similar circumstances have a motive to testify falsely against the defendant with whom she
admittedly had a prior disagreement. Id. at 656-57.
Smith v. State, 377 S.E.2d 158 (Ga.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 825 (1989). Held: it was error
to exclude evidence that the complainant had accused ten or twelve people of sexual mis-
conduct and later recanted some of these accusations. Id at 159-60. The court empha-
sized that the rape shield law did not prohibit evidence that the complainant lied about
sexual misconduct; such evidence did not involve her past sexual conduct but rather the
victim's propensity to make false statements regarding sexual misconduct. Id. at 160.
Cox v. State, 443 A.2d 607, 613-14 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982), aff'd, 468 A.2d 319 (Md.
1983). The trial court erred in not allowing the defendant to challenge the victim's credibil-
ity by questioning her about a previous incident where she allegedly charged another man
with assault and later recanted her testimony against him under cross-examination.
Thomas v. State, 669 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984). Held: the trial court's refusal to
permit cross-examination of a ten-year-old complainant in the jury's presence regarding
admittedly false past accusations of rape and attempted rape deprived the defendant, the
complainant's stepfather, of his constitutional right to fully examine a witness testifying
against him. Id. at 423. The complainant and her mother both testified, out of the hearing
of the jury, that at least one of the prior accusations was false. Id. at 421-22. The appellate
court stated: "Although the false accusations may have indicated emotional or psychologi-
cal trauma rather than lack of trustworthiness, the jury should have been allowed to hear
the testimony and decide on the issue of the complainant's credibility." Id. at 423.
A number of courts reached similar conclusions in cases substantially predating rape
shield legislation:
People v. Hurlburt, 333 P.2d 82, 87-88 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958) (discussing a case involving a
nine-year-old complainant).
People v. Wilson, 137 N.W. 92 (Mich. 1912). The case involved a fifteen-year-old com-
plainant who admitted to charging three others falsely. Id. at 92. The court emphasized
that the evidence was not offered to prove other sexual acts of on her part or to show that
her credibility could be affected by her lack of chastity; rather, the evidence was offered to
show that she was subject to hallucinations or some type of mental dysfunction which gave
her a propensity for making charges of this kind. Id.
State v. Crabtree, 296 N.W. 79, 82 (Wis. 1941) (allowing cross-examination of conflicting
testimony regarding prior acts of intercourse).
But see State v. Weymouth, 496 A.2d 1053 (Me. 1985). The defendant was prosecuted
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out more may support the inference that the prior complaints were
probably false.256 It is insufficient, however, merely to show that no
arrest was made, that the charges were dropped, or that the accused was
acquitted.257
for incest with his daughter, and offered evidence that after she accused him, she also
accused her stepfather of abusing her but later recanted that accusation. Id. at 1056. Held:
no error to exclude this evidence because its relevance was outweighed by its potential for
confusing the jury. Id.
256. People v. King, 156 Cal. Rptr. 268, 273 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (approving the trial
judge's decision to permit the defendant to cross-examine the complainant about her claim
to have been raped on six previous occasions while hitch-hiking, while restricting defend-
ant's questions to the issue of consent on those prior occasions).
Woods v. State, 657 P.2d 180 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983). A fifteen-year-old complainant
accused her father of incest. Id. at 180-81. The appellate court held that the trial court
improperly limited cross-examination which was intended to elicit that the complainant
had made similar accusations against other family members, who, like her father, had
threatened to have her twenty-four-year-old boyfriend prosecuted for statutory rape. Id.
at 181. The pattern of retaliatory accusations was highly probative as to the complainant's
motive to fabricate the charges against her father. Id. (Use of the complainant's prior
sexual behavior to show bias is discussed supra notes 148-235 and accompanying text.)
257. Hughes v. Raines, 641 F.2d 790, 792 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that evidence that the
accused in a prior incident denied the charge and that the District Attorney chose not to
prosecute is not enough to prove the falsity of the prior charge).
Phillips v. State, 545 So. 2d 221, 224 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989) (ruling that mere dismissal
of charges does not establish that they were unfounded).
State v. Hutchinson, 688 P.2d 209, 213 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984) (finding that a dismissal of
the prior charge is not sufficient proof of its falsity and that the intrinsic veracity of the
complainant's accusations should not be confused with the inability of the State to meet its
burden of proof for a criminal conviction).
People v. Alexander, 452 N.E.2d 591 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983). Evidence of prior rape com-
plaints by the complainant was inadmissible where the only suggestion that they were un-
founded was that one prior accusation ended in a finding of no probable cause and the
other culminated in two hung juries. Id. at 595. The intrinsic veracity of the complainant's
accusations should not be confused with the inability of the State to meet its burden of
proof for a criminal conviction. Id.
State v. Anderson, 686 P.2d 193 (Mont. 1984). In a prosecution for sexual assault of
three minor children, the trial court did not err in excluding evidence of a previously dis-
missed allegation of sexual assault against a third party by one of the victims. Id. at 200.
There was no competent evidence that the previously dismissed charge was false; indeed,
the prosecuting attorney in the prior case testified at a hearing that the charges were dis-
missed because the victim's mother did not want to subject the victim to the trauma of a
trial. Id.
State v. Anthony, 365 S.E.2d 195 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988). The court found no error in
prohibiting cross-examination of the fourteen-year-old complainant as to her previous
claims of abuse by both her natural father and her stepfather. Id. at 195. The only evi-
dence as to the falsity of those charges was the complainant's vague statements that the
charges had been dismissed. Id. at 196.
State v. Kringstad, 353 N.W.2d 302, 311 (N.D. 1984) (holding that the accused's denial,
and the fact that the police and courts took no action, did not establish the falsity of the
accusation).
Commonwealth v. Brinton, 418 A.2d 734, 736 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (concluding that
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Aside from these isolated rulings, the courts have provided little ex-
plicit discussion of how persuasive the defendant's proof must be that the
prior accusation was a lie. One court has held that it is enough to "pro-
duce evidence at the pre-trial hearing [from which] ... a reasonable per-
son could reasonably infer that the complainant made prior untruthful
allegations of sexual assault. '2 58 This is the standard threshold of rele-
vancy.259 The alternative to this is to require the defendant to persuade
the judge of the falsity of the complainant's prior rape allegation by a
preponderance of the evidence. Suppose, for example, the defendant: (a)
offers proof that two years ago the complainant accused X of rape; and
(b) calls X to testify that he did not rape her. X's testimony suffices to
satisfy the "reasonable person could reasonably infer" test,260 even if the
judge believes the complainant rather than X.
In appropriate circumstances, a defendant should be afforded a reason-
able opportunity for discovery of evidence as to the falsity of the prior
accusation.26'
there was no abuse of discretion in refusing to allow cross-examination concerning prior
rape charges which complainant had brought and subsequently refused to prosecute).
State v. Demos, 619 P.2d 968 (Wash. 1980). The trial court excluded evidence of one
prior rape complaint which was not pursued for lack of suspects and the inability of the
police to contact the victim, apparently because she had moved. The defendant's challenge
to the victim's credibility on the second charge was also excluded because it rested entirely
upon inadmissible polygraph evidence, even though no charges were filed as a result of the
witness' "consistent deception" during the polygraph examinations. Id. at 969-70. The
Washington Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's exclusion. Id. at 968. The court may
have been unduly restrictive with regard to the second complaint. Even though polygraph
evidence is inadmissible, it may provide a valid basis to permit defense counsel to question
the witness about the underlying incident. Cf. FED. R. EVID. 104(a) Advisory Committee's
Note (stating that in deciding upon the admissibility of evidence, a judge may consider
other evidence which itself is inadmissible).
State v. Williams, 513 P.2d 854, 855 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973) (holding that the trial court
properly precluded defendant from cross-examining the complainant regarding a prior
rape accusation on which the prosecutor had decided not to proceed).
258. State v. DeSantis, 456 N.W.2d 600, 606-07 (Wis. 1990).
259. See infra note 424 (discussing Huddleson v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 690
(1988)). See generally 2 C. FISHMAN, JONES ON EVIDENCE §§ 11:4-11:6 (7th ed. 1994) (dis-
cussing relevance, admissibility, and weight of evidence including direct and circumstantial
evidence).
260. See generally 1 C. FISHMAN, JONES ON EVIDENCE §§ 3:32-3:33 (7th ed. 1994) (dis-
cussing inferences and witness credibility).
261. People v. Mikula, 269 N.W.2d 195, 197-99 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978). Defense counsel
stated in a pretrial motion that a police report contained an allegation that the complainant
had made a similar charge, some months prior to the alleged incident with the defendant,
against a third party who was not prosecuted. Id. at 197. Held: the trial court improperly
denied defendant's motion to order discovery of the details of the prior incident. Id. at
198-99.
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3. Extent of Admissibility
It is a generally accepted rule of evidence that an attorney seeking to
impeach a witness's character for truthfulness may cross-examine the wit-
ness about prior, unrelated lies and misrepresentations, but may not offer
extrinsic evidence to prove the witness in fact uttered those falsehoods.262
The rules permit these questions to enable counsel to probe a witness's
character for truthfulness, but ban extrinsic proof because unrelated
falsehoods are collateral to the issues being tried. On the other hand, it is
also a generally accepted rule that evidence that a person behaved in an
unusual and idiosyncratic manner on a prior occasion is admissible to sug-
gest he or she behaved the same way and with the same state of mind on
the similar occasion in question.2 63 The issue then is which rule to apply
to evidence that on a prior occasion the complainant falsely accused
someone of a sex offense.
To falsely accuse a man of rape is quite a different thing than exagger-
ating one's qualifications on a job application, fudging on a loan applica-
tion, or the like. A false rape accusation reveals a flaw in character of a
particular, and particularly dangerous, kind. Its relevance, in a case
where the key question is whether the complainant is lying about rape
262. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 608(b), providing:
SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF CONDUCT. Specific instances of the conduct of a witness,
for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness' credibility, other than con-
viction of crime as provided in rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence.
They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or
untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concern-
ing the witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which charac-
ter the witness being cross-examined has testified.
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other witness, does
not operate as a waiver of the accused's or the witness' privilege against self-
incrimination when examined with respect to matters which relate only to
credibility.
Id. Thus, subject to the judge's discretion and assuming the attorney has a good faith basis
to do so, an attorney may ask a witness questions such as, "Did you make false statements
on an application for a loan you submitted to the X Bank in May of 1984?" If the witness
denies doing so, however, counsel is not permitted to call witnesses or offer documentary
evidence corroborating the accusation.
263. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404(b), providing:
OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS, OR ACTS. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in con-
formity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the
prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial,
or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the
general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.
[Vol. 44:709
1995] Consent, Credibility, and the Constitution
this time, is palpable. Accordingly, although a few courts have held that a
defendant may only cross-examine the complainant about prior untrue
sex assault allegations,26 the prevailing, and correct, view is that if the
complainant denies making the prior accusation or denies that it was
false, the defendant may offer extrinsic evidence to establish these
facts.265
In rare cases, however, evidence of prior false accusations may have so
little probative value that exclusion is justified.266
VI. IMMEDIATELY SURROUNDING CIRCUMSTANCES
The complainant's conduct at or near the time immediately surround-
ing the alleged offense may be highly relevant on the issues of consent
and credibility.267 Some rape shield laws reflect this.268 In other circum-
stances, however, admission of such evidence would directly contradict
264. State v. Boggs, 588 N.E.2d 813, 816 (Ohio 1992) (applying state evidence rule
608B, discussed supra note 262); see also People v. King, 156 Cal. Rptr. 268, 273 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1979) (holding that cross-examination of complainant's prior accusations was cor-
rectly restricted to the issue of consent); Woods v. State, 657 P.2d 180, 181-82 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1983) (suggesting that the defendant is restricted to cross-examining the complainant
to prior false accusations and may not offer extrinsic evidence to rebut a denial). Other
aspects of King and Woods are discussed supra note 256.
265. People v. Wall, 157 Cal. Rptr. 587, 591 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (admitting such evi-
dence of complainants non-sexual conduct to prove truthfulness or untruthfulness).
People v. Gorney, 481 N.E.2d 673 (Ill. 1985) (recognizing the rule, but holding that it
was not error to exclude the evidence in this case).
People v. Mikula, 269 N.W.2d 195 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978) (allowing the defendant to put
forth evidence of complainant's truthfulness or untruthfulness).
Miller v. State, 779 P.2d 87, 90 (Nev. 1989) (ruling such extrinsic evidence is only admis-
sible if the complainant denies making the prior accusation).
Clinebell v. Commonwealth, 368 S.E.2d 263 (Va. 1988) (holding that where the com-
plainant denies making the prior accusation, the defendant may offer proof).
266. Commonwealth v. Gaddis, 639 A.2d 462, 466-67 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (holding
that the probative value of complainant's false accusation was negligible because of the
"horrific sexual, physical and emotional abuse" exhibited by the defendant upon the com-
plainant, his minor daughter, and the fact her testimony about frequent sexual abuse was
corroborated by the testimony of her mother, brother and sister).
267. Such evidence is sometimes relevant with regard to physical evidence offered by
the prosecutor. See supra note 80.
268. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-42-101(c) (Michie Supp. 1994) (authorizing the
judge to admit "evidence directly pertaining to the act" in question); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§§ 491.015.1.(3) and .2 (Vernon Supp. 1994) (authorizing admission of "[e]vidence of im-
mediate surrounding circumstances of the alleged crime" if, after an in camera hearing, the
judge finds the evidence "relevant to a material fact or issue").
FED. R. EvID. 412(a) excludes "evidence offered to prove that any alleged victim en-
gaged in other sexual behavior." The Advisory Committee's Note to the 1994 amendments
commented, "The word 'other' is used to suggest some flexibility in admitting evidence
'intrinsic' to the alleged sexual misconduct." FED. R. EVID. 412(a) Advisory Committee's
Note.
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the principles underlying rape shield legislation, and hence, courts should
exclude it.
A. Complainant's Attire
The issue of whether a defendant should be permitted to elicit testi-
mony as to how the complainant was dressed at the time in question re-
mains controversial. Florida's statute prohibits ". . . evidence presented
for the purpose of showing that manner of dress of the victim at the time
of the offense incited the sexual [assault] .... ,269 The Advisory Commit-
tee Note to the 1994 Amendment to FRE 412 observes that evidence of
the complainant's "mode of dress" is inadmissible unless the evidence
relates to prior conduct with the defendant on the issue of consent.27 °
Georgia's statute also excludes evidence of the complainant's "mode of
dress, 271 but Georgia's Supreme Court has held its rape shield law does
not exclude evidence offered to impeach the victim's direct testimony as
to how she was dressed.272 This result is not necessarily inconsistent with
the intent of the statute.
A court should exclude evidence of how the complainant dressed on
other occasions, barring some showing of special relevancy.273 An abso-
lute ban on evidence of how the complainant dressed on the occasion in
question, however, goes too far. A woman who dresses in an overtly sex-
ual and provocative manner presumably wishes to draw attention to her
sexual attractiveness. 274 This, of course, does not mean that she is willing
to have sex with the man (or any man) she hopes or happens to attract.
But, depending on circumstances, it may have a legitimate tendency to
suggest willingness. On the one hand, evidence that Ms. A dressed pro-
vocatively while accompanying her husband to a night at the theater is
virtually irrelevant if offered to suggest that she sought sexual advances
from other men, let alone that she consented to have sex with a stranger
who accosted her in an alcove during intermission. Ms. B's decision, on
269. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022(3) (West Supp. 1995).
270. FED. R. EvID. 412(a) Advisory Committee's Note.
271. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2-3(a) (1982) (including within the definition of excluded
"past sexual behavior," evidence of "the complaining witness['s] ... mode of dress...").
272. Villafranco v. State, 313 S.E.2d 469, 474 (Ga. 1984). The court held that, where the
state introduced into evidence the underpants the complainant claimed to have been wear-
ing the night she was raped, it was error to exclude the testimony of a female co-worker
stating that earlier in the day the complainant boasted that she was not wearing underwear.
Id. "The rape shield law is not applicable to evidence offered to impeach the prosecution's
principle witness as to her mode of dress at the time in question." Id. at 474.
273. Such evidence might merit admission if it fits within evidence of a particular pat-
tern of sexual behavior. See generally infra notes 320-48 and accompanying text.
274. To coin a universally acceptable definition of "sexually provocative clothing" is, of
course, impossible; provocation, ultimately, is in the eye of the beholder.
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the other hand, to wear a micro-miniskirt and a see-through blouse for a
night of singles bar hopping will be perceived by many men (and women)
as indicating receptiveness to a casual sexual encounter. Moreover, un-
less she was remarkably naive, Ms. B must have known this as well. Does
not her willingness to send that signal in such a setting have some ten-
dency to suggest that the signal was accurate? And if she accepts an invi-
tation to visit a new acquaintance's apartment to look at his goldfish, is
not her provocative costume relevant in assessing whether she consented
to the sexual advance that immediately followed the feeding of the
goldfish?275
B. Conduct With the Defendant
Evidence that the complainant demonstrated affection for the defend-
ant or behaved in a sexually provocative or inviting manner toward him
shortly preceding the alleged rape supports the inference that she con-
sented to sex with him later, and should therefore be admitted. 276 Of
course, if a woman invites or allows the defendant physical contact some-
what more intimate than a handshake, it does not necessarily follow that
she also consented to intercourse. "All or nothing at all" is not an iron-
clad rule of inter-gender behavior.277 Still, such evidence meets the test
of relevance: it makes her subsequent consent more probable than it
would be without the evidence. A court must trust the jury's common
sense to evaluate it for what it is worth. Moreover, such evidence is not
evidence of "prior sexual behavior," rather it constitutes an important
part of the events in question. Finally, because it involves behavior with
the defendant, it falls within that commonly recognized exception to the
rape shield exclusionary rule.278
275. To belabor what I hope is obvious, I am not saying that a woman who dresses
provocatively is "asking for it" or is to blame for "provoking" a man to rape her. The law,
and society, must recognize that a woman always has the right to say no and that a man
never has the right to ignore her when she says no. But on the factual question, "Did she
say no," how she was dressed is sometimes a highly relevant consideration.
276. Massey v. Commonwealth, 337 S.E.2d 754, 755-59 (Va. 1985). Testimony of wit-
nesses that the complainant attended a dance with the defendant on the night of the al-
leged rape and spent most of the evening dancing with him, sitting on his lap and kissing
him was relevant to victim's consent and credibility. It was therefore error to exclude it.
Id. at 759.
277. The norm in the paleolithic era of my courtship days (the 1960s) was that as a
couple got to know and like each other better, physical intimacy would intensify gradually
over time-measured in weeks and months, not minutes. I hope, despite the impression
one receives from movies, TV, and the like, that this still is the norm.
278. See supra part III (prior sexual relationship with the defendant).
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C. Discussion of Complainant's Prior Sexual Behavior
Application of rape shield legislation can pose problems when a de-
fendant seeks to testify that the complainant discussed her sex life with
him shortly before the alleged rape. Verbal foreplay that explicitly invites
a sexual advance-"my boyfriends do a lot for me. . ., I can get any man
I want . . . if I'm in the mood, and I just so happen to be in the
mood"Z7 9-is clearly relevant on the issue of consent. This evidence,
therefore, must be admitted even though it also portrays the complainant
as promiscuous.
When the complainant's words are not so clearly inviting, a court is
faced with more difficult questions. Two Missouri decisions illustrate this
point. In State v. Gibson,280 the trial court permitted the defendant to
testify that the complainant told him, while she was with him at the time
of the alleged kidnapping and rape (between 11:15 p.m. and 1 a.m.), that
she was having sexual problems with her boyfriend, 8' but precluded de-
fendant from offering evidence that the complainant had told the attend-
ing physician and the nurse who examined her after the alleged rape that
she had sexual relations with her boyfriend at approximately 10:30
p.m.282 The trial court also forbade the defendant from examining the
boyfriend as to whether any argument had occurred with the complainant
earlier in the evening.283 The state supreme court reversed, holding that
the evidence fell within the state statute's "immediate surrounding cir-
cumstances" exception.2 84 Moreover, the court agreed with the defend-
ant's contention that the evidence was highly relevant to show the
complainant's motive-her motive to have sex, to falsely accuse him of
rape, and to go to a hospital (fear of pregnancy)-and to corroborate the
general credibility of his testimony.285 The court stated:
[T]he proffered evidence ... was "evidence of immediate sur-
rounding circumstances" and . .. was highly probative of the
issue of consent and appellant's mental state. [R]ape cases gen-
erally turn upon whom a jury believes. Here evidence tending
to corroborate appellant's testimony came from the complain-
ant's own mouth within two or three hours of the alleged rape.
The evidence was not offered to show a general inclination to
279. State v. Calbero, 785 P.2d 157, 159 (Haw. 1989) (holding it was error to exclude
testimony that the complainant said this to the defendant just before he fondled and un-
dressed her).
280. 636 S.W.2d 956 (Mo. 1982).
281. Id. at 958.
282. Id at 958-59.
283. Id. at 959.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 958-59.
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have a sexual experience, but, rather to prove a specific motive.
That it may have been inflammatory is outweighed by the fact
that this evidence was extrinsic to appellant's own testimony,
tended to corroborate that testimony and concerned statements
and sexual acts that occurred in very close temporal proximity
to the alleged rape. The statement to the physician was the sin-
gle shred of evidence available to appellant that came from a
third party, one who had no apparent reason to lie, and this evi-
dence was part of the immediate surrounding circumstances. 2 86
In State v. Madsen,287 by contrast, the same court held that the "sur-
rounding circumstance" exception to the rape shield statute did not enti-
tle a defendant to testify that the complainant discussed her sexual
activity with him before and after they had intercourse, including the
facts she was living with one man, regularly seeing another, and had two
children who were fathered by yet different men.288 The court distin-
guished Gibson because in this case the complainant's sexual promiscuity
with other men did not "surround" the alleged assault.289 At least one
other court also has categorically rejected such evidence.29 °
The result in Madsen is problematic because the court apparently gave
no consideration to the reasonable argument that a woman's discussion
of her sexual exploits with a new acquaintance 291 may be a form of verbal
foreplay intended to encourage a sexual response.292 Yet, it must also be
cautioned that broad acceptance of this argument could undermine much
286. Id. at 959. On retrial, the prosecutor, during jury selection, asked the panel,
"would [you] give the victim's testimony any less weight or tend to disbelieve her solely for
the fact that she will admit she had intercourse with her boyfriend before this alleged rape
took place?" Following his second conviction, an intermediate appellate court rejected
defendant's objection that this was tantamount to instructing the jury to disregard evidence
specifically ruled relevant by the state supreme court. State v. Gibson, 684 S.W.2d 413, 415
(Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
287. 772 S.W.2d 656 (Mo. 1989).
288. Id. at 663.
289. Id. at 661.
290. Logan v. State, 442 S.E.2d 883, 885 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994). In holding that the rape
shield law pre-empts all other rules of evidence, including the "res gestae" rule, Georgia's
intermediate appellate court upheld the exclusion of the defendant's testimony. The de-
fendant alleged that the complainant, a white, told him, an African-American, that she had
been involved with several African-American men, had given birth to children by different
African-Americans, and that her husband had left her because of these involvements. Id.
291. Madsen, 772 S.W.2d at 658. Madsen claimed he picked up the complainant late at
night in the parking lot of a combination pool hall/bar; the complainant claimed he forced
her into his car at knife point as she walked along a country road. Id.
292. The opposite is also true: complainant might have said what she said (if she said it
at all) in an effort to dissuade the defendant from raping her-"Please don't-I'm so
messed up already, I'm living with one guy and seeing another and my two kids have
different fathers .... .
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of what rape shield legislation is designed to achieve.293 To illustrate, a
rapist who, after his arrest, learns about his victim's past sexual behavior,
could falsely claim she boasted to him about her sexual exploits while
consenting to having sex with him, and then offer evidence of her promis-
cuity to corroborate his testimony about the conversation and, circum-
stantially, that she consented to have sex with him.
Statements by the defendant about the complainant's prior sexual con-
duct may also have special relevancy that justifies admission.294
D. Conduct With Others; Public Conduct
A court should exclude evidence that the complainant indicated sexual
interest in another man shortly before the defendant allegedly raped
her.295 The inference that interest in sex with one man equals interest in
sex with any man is precisely the inference that rape shield statutes re-
293. See, e.g., Wood v. State, 736 P.2d 363, 365 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987). Contradicting
the complainant's testimony that her prior relationship with the defendant had been a pla-
tonic friendship, the defendant testified that it had been intensely sexual. Id. at 364. As
corroboration, the defendant offered evidence that the complainant had told him she had
performed in pornographic movies and had posed nude for Penthouse and had shown him
the magazine in which she had appeared. Id. at 365. Held: the trial judge properly ex-
cluded the evidence, which "could have added little on [the issue of whether the prior
relationship had been sexual] except by implying that M.G. was likely to have formed a
sexual relationship with Wood because she was, by character, a promiscuous woman," pre-
cisely the inference forbidden by the rape shield statute. Id. The court also rejected, as
unpersuasive and "attenuated," the related argument that M.G.'s willingness to discuss her
prior sexual conduct with the defendant suggested a willingness to have a sexual relation-
ship with him. Id. at 366. Noting that the trial court permitted Wood to offer "other, more
direct evidence corroborating his characterization of the relationship," the appellate court
concluded that, "[o]n balance, it is apparent that the realistic impact of the excluded evi-
dence ... could only have been to impress the jury with the fact that the complaining
witness was a person of questionable morals and character." Id.
See also Commonwealth v. Reed, 644 A.2d 1223 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994). Defendant was
accused of indecent assault on his son's fourteen-year-old ex-girlfriend. Id. at 1224. To
support his claim that he should be convicted of only corrupting a minor because she con-
sented to the sexual behavior (which did not involve penetration), he sought to cross-ex-
amine her as to whether, while he was driving her home, she told him she had engaged in
intercourse on several occasions with his son. Id. at 1229-30. The appellate court held it
was error to preclude the cross-examination. Whether the complainant said that she had
had intercourse with defendant's son was relevant on the question of defendant's state of
mind at the time. Id. at 1230-31. The court emphasized, however, that on retrial it would
be improper to allow either side to introduce evidence as to whether or not the complain-
ant had in fact had intercourse with defendant's son. Id.
294. Stephens v. Miller, 13 F.3d 98 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 57 (1994). See
supra notes 202-12.
295. One reason to exclude such evidence, although not often mentioned in the litera-
ture, is that it is too easy for an unscrupulous defendant to manufacture, i.e., simply pro-
duce a friend to testify that complainant propositioned him earlier that day or evening.
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ject.2  At the other extreme, courts generally recognize that a defendant
should be permitted to offer evidence that shortly before the alleged
rape, the complainant engaged in conduct that clearly demonstrated she
was generally looking for a sexual encounter without caring who the part-
ner would be.2 97 The following cases in Georgia, New Hampshire and
Michigan illustrate the issues and difficulties in deciding what kinds of
behavior fall within this exception to the rape shield exclusionary rule.
In Villafranco v. State,2 98 three teenage boys were charged with raping
the complainant, whom they had met for the first time when she volunta-
rily got into their car and asked them to take her to a party.299 Two ac-
quaintances, who had attempted to dissuade the complainant from going
with the boys, testified at a rape shield hearing that a few minutes before
encountering the defendants, the complainant, after drinking steadily for
296. Consider, for example, Ellis v. State, 353 S.E.2d 822, 825 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987).
Charged with being one of five men who raped the complainant, the defendant sought to
testify that earlier in the evening, he and a codefendant double-dated with the complainant
and another woman. The defendant stated that the other woman engaged in oral sex with
him in the front seat of a car while complainant and codefendant were engaging in sexual
conduct in the back seat. Id. The court excluded the evidence, holding, in essence, that
these allegations, even if true, did not create an inference that the complainant would
thereafter consent to sex with the defendant, let alone with four other men as well. Id.
The court also commented on the overwhelming evidence proving that the complainant
had in fact been forced by the five men.
Accord Moore v. State, 395 S.E.2d 13, 14 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (evidence that complain-
ant propositioned two of the defendant's acquaintances on the night of the alleged rape
properly excluded); State v. Salkil, 659 S.W.2d 330, 333-34 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (evidence
that on two prior occasions complainant resorted to extramarital relations after arguments
and separations from her husband was not admissible on the issue of consent under the
"immediate surrounding circumstances" provision of the state statute); State v. Cervantes,
881 P.2d 151, 152 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (evidence that, just before the rape, the complainant
was seen "hanging all over" another man was not admissible to suggest another source for
the state's medical evidence of rape); Commonwealth v. Folino, 439 A.2d 145, 149-50 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1981) (holding evidence that the complainant had solicited sex from another
man prior to meeting defendant was properly excluded).
See also Bobo v. State, 589 S.W.2d 5, 8 (Ark. 1979) (applying the state rape shield stat-
ute, which authorized the judge to admit "evidence directly pertaining to the act" in ques-
tion). Complainant alleged that she was raped by several students in an university athletic
dorm. Id. at 6. Held: the trial judge properly admitted evidence of her prior sexual rela-
tions with two of the men involved and evidence that she consented to have sex with a
third man in the same room earlier in the evening wherein the subsequent rape allegedly
occurred; and properly excluded evidence of her prior sexual relationship with that third
man, as well as evidence that over the previous months she had consented to sex with
numerous other men. Id. at 8.
297. "[S]tatements in which the victim [sic] has expressed an intent to have sex with the
first person encountered on a particular occasion might not be excluded without violating
the due process right of a rape defendant seeking to prove consent." FED. R. EviD. 412
Advisory Committee's Note.
298. 313 S.E.2d 469 (Ga. 1984).
299. Id. at 469-70.
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several hours, approached a stranger in a motel parking lot, asked him to
take her to a party, and announced, "I want to . ..get me some
nookey."30 Georgia's Supreme Court properly held that exclusion of
this testimony was reversible error:
[T]his statement was not inadmissible as evidence of past sexual
behavior but was admissible as evidence of existing motive and
state of mind. [T]he statement was made very shortly before
[the complainant] encountered the defendants... [and] there is
substantial evidence that during the brief time which elapsed
[complainant's] desire to go to a party was continuous.3° '
In State v. Colbath ,302 the defendant offered evidence that in the hours
before the complainant voluntarily left a bar and accompanied him to his
trailer, she directed sexually provocative behavior toward several men,
"hanging all over" and "making out with" several of them, particularly
the defendant (according to a female witness).30 3 Indeed, the complain-
ant admitted she "had engaged in close physical contact with at least one
man besides the defendant" in the bar.304 New Hampshire's Supreme
Court, per then state Justice Souter, held that exclusion of this evidence
violated the defendant's constitutional rights to present relevant evidence
and confront his accuser.30 5 The court particularly stressed the public
3 6
and apparently indiscriminate nature3 7 of the complainant's conduct and
the close proximity in time between that conduct and the alleged rape,30 8
in conjunction with evidence suggesting a reason why the complainant
might falsely accuse the defendant.30 9
300. Id. at 470 n.2.
301. Id. at 473.
302. 540 A.2d 1212 (N.H. 1988).
303. Id. at 1213.
304. Id. at 1213, 1215. The quoted language is the court's, not the complainant's or the
woman witness'.
305. Id. at 1217.
306. Id. at 1216-17. "[E]vidence of public displays of general interest in sexual activity
can be taken to indicate a contemporaneous receptiveness to sexual advances that cannot
be inferred from evidence of private behavior with chosen sex partners." Id. at 1216.
307. Id. at 1216-17. "[T]he jury could have taken evidence of the complainant's openly
sexually provocative behavior toward a group of men as evidence of her probable attitude
toward an individual within the group." Id. at 1217.
308. "Evidence that the publicly inviting acts occurred closely in time to the alleged
sexual assault by one such man could have been viewed [by the jury] as indicating the
complainant's likely attitude at the time of the sexual activity in question." Id.
309. While defendant and complainant were still in his trailer, they
were joined unexpectedly by a young woman who lived with the defendant, who
came home at an unusual hour suspecting that the defendant was indulging in
faithless behavior. With her suspicion confirmed, she became enraged, kicked the
trailer door open and went for the complainant, whom she assaulted violently and
dragged outside by the hair. It took the intervention of the defendant and a third
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Similarly, in State v. Ray,3 1 ° Missouri's Supreme Court held it was error
to exclude evidence that the complainant knowingly thrust herself into a
situation where the probability of sexually licentious group conduct was
high, because such evidence "supported a finding that ... the complain-
ant [went] to her ... alleged assailant's... apartment to engage in sexual
relations" with whomever might be present.311
In People v. Wilhelm ,312 by contrast, Michigan's intermediate appellate
court held a trial judge properly excluded testimony by the defendant and
another witness that the defendant first noticed the complainant (whom
he had never met before) in a bar at 1:30 in the morning when she lifted
her shirt, exposed her breasts to two men who were sitting at her table,
woman to bring the melee to an end.
Id. at 1212-13. The jury could interpret this attack "as a motive for the complainant to
allege rape as a way to explain her injuries and excuse her undignified predicament." Id. at
1217.
310. 637 S.W.2d 708 (Mo. 1982).
311. Id. at 710. Defendant was accused of being one of four men who raped complain-
ant during the early morning hours of July 19, 1980. Id. at 708. Asserting a defense of
consent, the defendant offered evidence that during the previous night (July 17-18th), the
complainant arrived uninvited at the apartment of one of the men whom she later accused
of rape. Id. at 710. The defendant offered further evidence that the complainant became
extremely intoxicated with alcohol and marijuana; that she was the sole female among five
or six men; that the complainant invited one of the men who allegedly raped her on July 19
to engage in sexual relations with her in the bathroom on the night of the 17-18th. The
defendant also offered evidence that she refused to engage in sexual relations with a sec-
ond man; that the complainant subsequently told someone in the group that she had just
been raped; and that she was "freaking out" on drugs. Id.
Evidence was introduced at trial that in the early evening of July 18-19th, the complain-
ant telephoned the man whom had allegedly raped her the previous night and invited her-
self to his apartment again. Id. The trial court rejected appellant's evidence that this man
told the complainant she would be the only woman among four or five men. Id. Appellant
introduced evidence that the complainant left work on the evening of the alleged rape,
because she was too intoxicated on drugs to function. The appellant offered further evi-
dence that (at the scene of the alleged rape) the complainant was seen smoking several
"joints" of marijuana, taking valium pills, drinking beer and "chugging" Wild Turkey whis-
key. Id. The Missouri Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court should have
admitted appellant's proffered evidence relating to the evening of July 17-18th because it
was probative of the issues of the complainant's perception and recollection and her con-
sent. Id.
A jury could infer and should have been permitted the opportunity to infer that
[because of her extended period of intoxication] the complainant had confused
the events and that appellant had never raped her. The evidence also supported a
finding that when the complainant responded to her first alleged assailant's tele-
phone caveat that the conditions in his apartment on July 19 would be the same as
July 18 by returning uninvited on July 19, she returned to engage in sexual
relations.
Id.
312. 476 N.W.2d 753 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2359 (1993).
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and allowed one man to fondle them.313 Later, the defendant took her to
his boat which was parked in his parents' driveway, during which time,
according to the complainant, the defendant raped her; according to the
defendant, she consented.314 The trial court excluded the evidence of her
self-exposure in the bar and the appellate court affirmed.31 5 The appel-
late court rejected Colbath's emphasis on the public nature of the com-
plainant's alleged conduct: "We fail to see how a woman's consensual
sexual conduct with another in public indicates to third parties that the
woman would engage in similar behavior with them. '31 6 The court also
rejected the defendant's arguments that the complainant's exposure of
her breasts in the bar was sexual conduct that involved the defendant (a
categorization which would bring it within an exception to the state rape
shield law) merely because he observed it. The court stated that "the
conduct was clearly directed at the men with whom the victim was
sitting. '"317
Wilhelm is distinguishable from Colbath, Roy and Villafranco. In the
latter cases, the conduct was directed indiscriminately at several men in-
cluding the defendant, while the conduct alleged in Wilhelm was (at least
primarily) directed at only two men, neither of whom was the defendant.
But a court should consider the nature of the conduct as well as the
number of people with whom the complainant apparently sought to share
the conduct. That a couple clung passionately to each other all evening at
a dance, and exchanged caresses which might better be saved for a pri-
vate location, should be considered irrelevant in a prosecution of another
man accused of raping the woman later that night, because her affection
for her partner is not presumed to be transferrable to other men. If, on
the other hand, a woman dances with several men during the course of
the evening, groping and being groped by each in turn, this seems highly
relevant on the question of whether she consented to have sex with the
man from whom she later accepted a ride home-even if he was not one
of her dance partners. If a woman in a bar lifts her shirt, exposes her
breasts to anyone who cares to look, permits a man to fondle them, and
shortly thereafter accepts a ride home from a stranger, does this not sug-
gest a readiness for a casual sexual encounter with that stranger? The
Michigan court held that it did not; I am not so sure.318
313. Id. at 756. No hearing was held on the admissibility of this evidence, so the com-
plainant was never given an opportunity to deny or confirm the allegation.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 759.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. The woman still has the right to say "no" and the right not to be raped. But the
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VII. "PATTERN," "PROMISCUITY," "PROSTITUTION"
The basic effect of rape shield legislation is to exclude evidence of the
complainant's prior sexual behavior and "alleged sexual predisposi-
tion. '319 Some courts and statutes recognize, however, that evidence of
prior sexual behavior may have special relevance if it is sufficiently fre-
quent, unusual, and similar to the defendant's version of the complain-
ant's behavior on the occasion in question.
A. Pattern; Promiscuity
Several state statutes authorize a judge to admit evidence of a com-
plainant's prior sexual behavior if it falls into a distinct pattern which
elevates its relevance on the issue of consent above the forbidden "yes to
some men sometimes means yes to any man anytime" inference. The
Florida provision permits admission of such evidence when consent is the
issue
if it is first established to the court in a proceeding in camera
that such evidence tends to establish a pattern of conduct or be-
havior on the part of the victim which is so similar to the con-
duct or behavior in the case that it is relevant to the issue of
consent.320
North Carolina's rule permits admission of evidence if the behavior
is evidence of a pattern of sexual behavior so distinctive and so
closely resembling the defendant's version of the alleged en-
counter with the complainant as to tend to prove that such com-
plainant consented to the act or acts charged or behaved in such
a manner as to lead the defendant reasonably to believe that the
complainant consented .... 32
Tennessee's statute has a nearly identical provision.3 22 Minnesota's pro-
vision recognizes "evidence of the victim's previous sexual conduct tend-
ing to establish a common scheme or plan of similar sexual conduct under
circumstance similar to the case at issue, relevant and material to the is-
sue of consent ....
question is whether her conduct earlier that evening is legitimately relevant on whether she
said no and whether the defendant reasonably believed that she was willing.
319. FED. R. EVID. 412 Advisory Committee's Note. "[E]vidence such as that relating
to the alleged victim's mode of dress, speech, or life-style will not be admissible." Id. The
Advisory Committee's Note provides no definition of "life-style." Id.
320. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022(2) (West 1994).
321. N.C. R. EVID. 412(b)(3). To secure admissibility, the defendant must move for an
in camera hearing and persuade the judge that the evidence is "relevant" on the issues of
consent or reasonable belief. Id. at 412(d).
322. TENN. R. EvIm. 412(c)(4)(iii).
323. MINN. R. EVID. 412(1)(A)(i). To secure admission, defendant must move for a
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Although the precise language of these provisions varies, the statutes
are similar enough so that evidence admissible under one statute is likely
admissible under them all. Even in the absence of such a provision, such
evidence may have legitimate probative value on the issue of consent ex-
clusive of the forbidden "yes/yes inference," that exclusion of it would
deny a defendant his constitutional right to present a defense.324
The key questions a court must resolve are: (1) how unusual, idiosyn-
cratic, kinky, abnormal, bizarre, or disgusting325 must the behavior be;3 26
(2) how many prior instances must be proved to establish a common
scheme or pattern; (3) how closely must the other instances resemble the
(defendant's version of the) facts in the instant case; and (4) once the
judge has assessed the legitimate probative value of the evidence, how is
that value to be weighed against the risk of unfair prejudice? The fourth
question has already been addressed; 327 this section of the article focuses
on the first three questions.
Evidence that the complainant engaged in occasional, merely fungibly
similar conduct does not satisfy the pattern exception.328 Nor, according
hearing. Id. at 412(2). At the hearing, defendant must persuade the judge that the proba-
tive value of the evidence "is not substantially outweighed by its inflammatory or prejudi-
cial nature .... " Id. at 412(2)(C).
324. The cases cited infra notes 326-46 acknowledge this principle, although generally
holding that defendant's evidence does not qualify; see also United States v. Kasto, 584
F.2d 268, 271 n.2 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 930 (1979) (discussing, in dictum,
the possible probative value on the issue of consent); People v. Hackett, 365 N.W.2d 120,
184 n.4 (Mich. 1984) (discussing, in dictum, the circumstances enhancing the probative
value of complainant's past sexual conduct, citing Kasto, 584 F.2d at 271 n.2).
325. Attentive readers have no doubt noted that the first two terms in this list of adjec-
tives are value-neutral; thereafter the list grows increasingly judgmental. The list was writ-
ten thus to remind the reader of an issue that lurks near the surface in these cases. In
assessing the legitimate probative value of the evidence and its risk of unfair prejudice,
how much (if at all) should a judge consider the extent to which the behavior in question
violates contemporary social norms and mores?
326. The Illinois Supreme Court has commented that to find evidence that "fits the
'prior pattern' exception ... require[s] us to determine that the particular practice was so
unusual, so outside the norm, that it had distinctive characteristics which make it the com-
plainant's modus operandi." People v. Sandoval, 552 N.E.2d 726, 738 (Ill.), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 938 (1990) (holding that anal intercourse does not qualify as a distinctive enough
characteristic). This is consistent with the view taken by others. See Tanford & Bocchino,
supra note 8, at 586-89 (discussing the probative value of sexual habits and arguing that the
more unusual a practice is, the fewer the instances are required to be considered a habit);
Harriet R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A Proposal for
the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REv. 763, 830-48 (1986) (stating that "pattern" evidence
can be probative to the issue of consent if restricted to distinctive circumstances similar to
the circumstances of the alleged rape).
327. See supra part I.B.3. (discussing relevancy in the context of weighing probative
value versus prejudicial effect).
328. One episode of sexual intercourse with another man some time before the alleged
assault has been held to not establish a pattern of conduct or behavior. See, e.g., Hodges v.
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to a Connecticut court, does evidence of a single, somewhat idiosyncratic,
somewhat similar episode satisfy the pattern exception. 329 Courts have
State, 386 So. 2d 888, 889 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (three or four weeks earlier); State v.
Friend, 493 N.W.2d 540, 545 (Minn. 1992) (two weeks earlier); State v. Booker, 348 N.W.2d
753, 754 (Minn. 1984) (one week earlier); State v. Rhinehart, 316 S.E.2d 118, 119 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1984) (earlier that same evening).
Sandoval, 552 N.E.2d at 738. Defendant was accused of anal rape; the complainant testi-
fied that she had anal intercourse only twice before with defendant (her ex-boyfriend) and
never with anyone else. Id. at 728. Held: defendant's proffered evidence that she had also
consented to anal intercourse with another man does not fit within the "prior pattern"
exception to rape shield statutes. Id. at 738.
People v. Paquette, 319 N.W.2d 390 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982), aff'd sub nom. People v.
Hackett, 365 N.W.2d 120 (Mich. 1984). Held: that the complainant on another occasion
met a man in a bar and accompanied him elsewhere for consensual intercourse was inad-
missible, where the defendants' version of the incident in question was that complainant
instigated simultaneous sexual relations with two strangers in the cab of a pick-up truck.
Id at 391-92.
State v. Shoffner, 302 S.E.2d 830 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983). Defendants offered to drive the
complainant to the home of a mutual friend, then stopped the car in a wooded area and,
according to the complainant, raped her. The defendants insisted she had consented. Id.
at 831. The court held that the trial judge properly excluded evidence of three incidents
during the eighteen months preceding the rape in which the complainant had consensual
sex with other men. Id. at 832. The court also held, however, that the trial judge erred in
excluding other evidence more suggestive of a pattern. Id. at 832-33. See infra notes 333-
35 and accompanying text (discussing Shoffner further).
State v. Wilhite, 294 S.E.2d 396 (N.C. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 297 S.E.2d 403 (N.C. 1982).
Three defendants, two of whom the complainant knew previously, were charged with forc-
ing her to leave a bar and grill early in the morning, and then raping her. Id. at 397-98.
They claimed her behavior was entirely consensual. Id. at 399, 403. The allegation that the
complainant left a bar at around 2 a.m. on another occasion with a "perfect stranger" was
inadmissible: the latter incident was at most fungibly similar to defendants' version of
events, and did not constitute a distinctive pattern nor did it closely resemble defendants'
version as required by statute. Id. at 400.
State v. Cecotti, 639 P.2d 243 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982). Evidence of complainant's prior
sexual relations with two other men was inadmissible, the court concluded, because only in
an extreme case of indiscriminately promiscuous conduct could it be argued that past sex-
ual behavior with third persons is even minimally relevant to consent. Id. at 246.
State v. Bray, 594 P.2d 1363 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979). Defendant, 38, was charged with
forcibly raping a slightly retarded sixteen-year-old female. Id. at 1365. The Washington
Court of Appeals held that the trial court properly excluded evidence that at age 13, the
complainant engaged in sexual intercourse with her adoptive father, without any clearly
expressed lack of consent. Id. at 1368. The defendant's contention that the complainant's
"passive acceptance of an older man's sexual advances on a prior occasion infers passive
acceptance of the alleged sexual intercourse with defendant" was highly speculative "ab-
sent scientific proof for the proposition that child incest victims tend in adult life to submit
passively to sexual advances of older men." Id. at 1368.
329. State v. Cassidy, 489 A.2d 386 (Conn. App. Ct.), cert. denied, 492 A.2d 1239
(Conn. 1985). The complainant testified that after she met the defendant (with whom she
had consensual sex on prior occasions) at a bar, accompanied him to his house, undressed
and got into bed to have sex with him, he suddenly became abusive, struck her, threatened
her, tied her up and raped her. Id. at 387-88. The defendant denied threatening or striking
her, insisted that she suggested the bondage, and testified that after several rounds of con-
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held, however, that a defendant must be permitted to introduce evidence
that the complainant had "a distinctive pattern of past sexual conduct,
involving the extortion of money by threat after acts of prostitution, of
which her alleged conduct in this case was but an example .... ,330; that a
defendant must be permitted to cross-examine the complainant concern-
ing a pattern of consensual intercourse with men she barely knew in fur-
therance of her attempt to run away from home; 331 and that a defendant
must be allowed to elicit complainant's acknowledgment that her addic-
tion to crack-cocaine had, on numerous occasions, caused her to engage
in sex in exchange for crack.332
Where the alleged pattern does not involve a motive extrinsic to sexual
activity such as money (extortion), a desire to escape an unpleasant
home, or drugs, it is difficult to define the degree of similarity or abnor-
mality required to qualify as a pattern. Logic suggests that the more unu-
sual or inherently unlikely the defendant's version of events is, the
greater the probative value that the complainant engaged in similar con-
duct on other occasions.
Cases from North Carolina and Washington illustrate the difficulties in
applying such a standard. In State v. Shoffner,333 the defendants testified
that the complainant had initiated the sexual encounter by going to their
apartment, unzipping the trousers of one defendant, fondling him, sug-
sensual sex the complainant suddenly became hysterical, screamed something about her
husband who had been killed in Vietnam, said that she "shouldn't be doing this" and
wanted to be with her husband, and began striking the defendant. Id. at 388. To bolster
his version of events, defendant sought to have another man testify that about a year
before the night in question, the complainant had taken him to her home, where, after
consensual sex, she began "going crazy" and screaming about her husband who was killed
in Vietnam. Id. at 378-79. The appellate court affirmed the trial judge's exclusion of this
testimony, holding that a single somewhat similar episode one year earlier was not enough
to establish a pattern, "[p]articularly since there was also evidence of more recent nights
which the defendant and the victim had spent together with no similar behavior by her
.... " Id. at 391.
330. Winfield v. Commonwealth, 301 S.E.2d 15, 20 (Va. 1983) (noting that evidence that
the complainant was a prostitute, without more, does not suffice). Virginia's rape shield
law does not have a "pattern" or "common scheme" provision. It does, however, permit a
defendant to offer evidence, including evidence of her sexual behavior with others, that the
complainant had "a motive to fabricate the charge." VA. CODE ANr. § 18.2-67.7(B). The
Virginia Supreme Court held that evidence of a pattern of similar extortionate conduct in
the past should be admitted to prove her motive in accusing the defendant. Winfield, 301
S.E.2d at 20. It is unclear whether the court would consider one such similar incident to be
enough to constitute a "pattern." Id. at 20-21.
331. State v. Vaughn, 448 So. 2d 1260, 1262 (La. 1983) (reversing defendant's
conviction).
332. Johnson v. State, 632 A.2d 152, 161 (Md. 1993) (evidence of complainant's admis-
sion of exchanging sex for drugs on prior occasions admissible).
333. 302 S.E.2d 830 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983).
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gesting that he, the codefendant, and others have an orgy, and then di-
recting him to drive to a certain location before having sex with them
both. A North Carolina appellate court held that it was error to reject
evidence of conduct on other occasions that suggested the complainant
"was the initiator, the aggressor, in her sexual encounters." 334 Although
the other incidents involved her behavior at clubs and parties the court
stated, "[w]e do not believe the Rape Victim Shield Statute requires the
prior sexual behavior of a complainant to parallel on all fours a defend-
ant's version of the prosecuting witness's sexual behavior at the time in
question." 335
This should be contrasted with a Washington case, State v. Hudlow 336.
The defendants saw the complainants hitchhiking during the early morn-
ing, offered them a ride, drove to an isolated location; and, according to
the complainants, raped them at knife point. The defendants maintained
that the complainants directed them to the location, initiated the sex, and
willingly changed partners during the episode. At a pretrial hearing, the
defendants called a sailor, who testified that he had engaged in oral sex
with both women on a number of occasions, had sexual intercourse with
one of the women at least twice and with the other woman more often
although not on a regular basis. In addition, the sailor participated and
witnessed them having "group sex" with one or two men at a time, and
that one woman had admitted to engaging in sexual intercourse with nu-
merous other sailors.33 7 The trial court excluded this evidence; an inter-
334. Id. at 832-33. The appellate court held that the trial court erred in rejecting the
following evidence: (1) A woman testified that she had observed the complainant many
times at a club, " 'attracting some of the men,' dancing with them, and getting out of con-
trol by 'feeling on them and stuff like that .... [Her] hands [would be] every which way on
the man's body.'" Id. at 832; (2) The older brother of one of the defendants testified that
about eighteen months before the alleged rape, the complainant approached him and told
him to come by her house later that night. Id. When he did so, she got in his car clad only
in a gown without underclothes and had intercourse with him in the car. Id.; (3) A third
witness testified that he had observed the prosecuting witness seated on a "soda crate" in
the Circle Inn with two men standing in front of her, one of whom was zipping his pants.
Id.
335. Id. at 833. The court explained:
The evidence excluded suggests that the prosecuting witness's modus operandi
was to accost men at clubs, parties (public places) and make sexual advances by
putting her hands "all over their bodies." Defendants contend that the prosecut-
ing witness's sexual behavior on 20 November 1981-fondling their genitals, try-
ing to get them to engage in an orgy, and telling them where and when to stop the
car-was no different from the prosecuting witness's pattern of sexual behavior.
Id.
336. 659 P.2d 514 (Wash. 1989).
337. Id. at 517. The court used fictitious names to protect the complainants' true identi-
ties, although it noted that they were known locally as Sunshine and Moonshine. Id. at
516.
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mediate appellate court reversed. The Supreme Court of Washington,
after considering both statutory and constitutional arguments favoring
admissibility, reversed and reinstated the convictions. The court ruled
that the proffered evidence
concerned only the general promiscuity of the two victims and
lacked further indicators showing any past consensual sexual ac-
tivity comparable to the story offered by respondents ... For
instance, no testimony was offered showing that the two women
had ever engaged in sex with men other than sailors whom they
knew or that they had sexual relations with men who had picked
them up hitchhiking. Such evidence would have had greater
value in aiding the jury to predict whether consent was given in
this case. Without such particularized factors, however, the rele-
vancy of the evidence was limited at best.33 8
Hudlow's insistence on precise parallels between the prior episodes
and the defendant's version of events reflects the prevailing attitude.
Although a number of courts have commented in dictum that it would
suffice to show that the complainant regularly has sex with men she meets
in bars or parking lots,3 39 courts generally have excluded evidence of pro-
miscuity, even promiscuity of a highly nonselective, indiscriminate
kind.34 ° For example, although there is a tendency in multiple defendant
338. Id. at 523.
339. State v. Fortney, 269 S.E.2d 110, 116-17 (N.C. 1980).
If the defendant had shown that the victim commonly accosted strangers in park-
ing lots seeking sexual partners or that she often met men in apartment parking
lots and took them to her car for sexual congress, then clearly the relevance of
such evidence is established under the statute and would have been admissible.
Id.
State v. Hudlow, 659 P.2d 514, 523 (Wash. 1980) (see supra notes 55-57, 336-48 and
accompanying text, and infra notes 378-85 and accompanying text). The Washington
Supreme Court, citing the state's rape shield law, commented that evidence establishing "a
pattern of indiscriminate consent to sexual activity" might have sufficient relevance "as to
be [legitimately] helpful in predicting whether there was consent in [a particular] case."
Hudlow, 659 F.2d at 523 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.020(3) (1993) and WASH. R.
EVID. 403). The court added:
[1]f a complaining witness frequently engages in sexual intercourse with men
shortly after meeting them in bars, this would have some relevancy if the defend-
ant claims she consented to sexual intercourse with him under similar circum-
stances. Such a particularized factual showing would demonstrate enough
similarity between the past consensual sexual activity and defendant's claim of
consent that it would have the necessary predictive value required by [WASH. R.
EVID.] 401. Nevertheless, this evidence may be so slightly relevant in comparison
to its prejudicial effect that it may not be admitted into evidence.
Id. at 520.
340. Bobo v. State, 589 S.W.2d 5, 8 (Ark. 1979). Complainant alleged that she was
raped by several men in a university athletic dormitory. Id. at 6. Held: the trial judge
properly admitted evidence of her prior sexual relations with two of the men involved and
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cases to admit evidence that the complainant consented to prior acts of
group sex if a defendant was a participant in both the prior consensual
episode and the one giving rise to rape charges, 341 courts generally ex-
clude evidence of the prior episode if there is no common male
participant. 2
Some of these decisions raise the troubling question of whether the law
has shifted too far in the correct direction. In Hudlow, for example, ex-
cluding evidence concerning the complainants' past sexual conduct would
leave the jury with the impression that the complainants' attitudes toward
sex lie somewhere on the spectrum of what may be considered "nor-
mal.",343 Because "normal" women do not invite total strangers to have
group sex with them in a car after an acquaintance of just a few minutes,
the complainants' accusation of rape is inherently believable and the de-
fense of consent is inherently incredible. If, on the other hand, the
evidence that she had consented to have sex with a third man in the same room earlier in
the evening wherein the subsequent rape allegedly occurred; and properly precluded de-
fendants from cross-examining her as to whether she had previously consented to sex with
fifteen other men. Id. at 8.
Capps v. State, 696 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985). The complainant accused the de-
fendant of going to her trailer, dragging her out by her hair, threatening to kill her, driving
her to his home, threatening her with a gun, and raping her. The defendant denied that he
forced or threatened her and claimed she consented. Id. at 487. The Texas Court of Ap-
peals held the trial judge properly excluded a defense witness's testimony that she and the
complainant had engaged in "sex parties," including switching partners and group sex, the
most recent only four months before the alleged rape, photographs of which complainant
kept in an album; this was not sufficiently similar to the events underlying the rape charge
to justify admissibility to prove consent. Id. at 490.
Although neither the Arkansas nor Texas rape shield law contains a "pattern" or "com-
mon scheme" provision, in each case the court discussed whether the evidence had suffi-
cient relevancy beyond the forbidden inference to qualify for admission. ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 16-42-101 (Michie 1994); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011 (West 1994).
The Texas Penal Code permits a defense, in prosecutions for sex offenses not involving
force against a child aged fourteen or older, that the child was sexually promiscuous. TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(d)(1) (West 1994). Accordingly, the evidentiary rules of Texas
permit a defendant charged with such a crime to offer such evidence. TEX. R. CRIM. Evi.
412(e) Texas courts have held that "'[p]romiscuity' does not refer to an isolated incident
of sexual relations with one particular person, but denotes an indiscriminate grant of physi-
cal favors to persons of the opposite sex without any requirement of love." Ramos v.
State, 819 S.W.2d 939, 941 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991). The evidence must relate to the complain-
ant's conduct prior, but not subsequent to, the alleged offense. Rankin v. State, 821 S.W.2d
230, 234 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991); see Hernandez v. State, 754 S.W.2d 321, 327 (Tex. Ct. App.
1988) (giving an example of evidence of a pattern of promiscuity sufficient to merit its
admission to prove consent).
341. See supra part III.B.4.
342. See Hudlow, 659 P.2d at 514; see also Capps, 696 S.W.2d at 486.
343. Hudlow, 659 P.2d at 516-23. The jury may have received the impression that the
complainants were naive, inexperienced school girls. See supra notes 378-85 and accompa-
nying text.
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sailor's testimony and other evidence of the complainants' licentious-
ness 3 " was true, the defendants' story would arguably become credible.
And if this is so, should not the defendants have a constitutional right to
introduce this evidence? Washington's Supreme Court disagreed, be-
cause the facts as alleged by the defendants were not a perfect match for
the complainants' alleged idiosyncracies-the defendants were strangers
from whom they hitchhiked a ride early one morning, not sailors with
whom the complainants were casually acquainted.345
Query whether this difference is significant enough to justify exclusion.
Rape shield legislation rejects the "yes/yes inference" in significant part
because it is often inaccurate. A woman's decision to have sex with a
man is understood to be a personal, private, intimate choice, based at
least in part on the characteristics of the man involved. A woman's
choice to have sex with X on a particular occasion says very little about
whether she is likely to agree to have sex with Y on a different occasion.
A history of behavior such as that alleged of the complainants in Hudlow
and Shofner, however, suggests something very different, i.e., an abnor-
mal compulsion 346 to engage in sexual activity for its own sake with com-
paratively little regard for the characteristics of the man or men involved.
This condition has probative value in helping a jury decide whether the
complainant consented on the occasion in question. And if a woman's
embrace of prodigious promiscuity is accepted as a conscious, rational
choice, rather than an abnormal compulsion-well, choices may have
consequences. One consequence is that a jury may be skeptical of her
testimony that on a particular occasion she did not consent.
On the other hand, to admit evidence of the complainants' promiscuity
in Hudlow would have created the risk that the jury might acquit be-
cause, despite being convinced that the complainants did not consent this
344. Hudlow, 659 P.2d at 516-17. At the hearing in Hudlow, the sailor also related
several hearsay statements of other men who professed to have had sexual relations with
the complaining witnesses, and testified that he and his roommates rated the complainants'
respective performances in oral-genital sex, rating one the better of the two. Id. at 517.
The sailor also testified that he had been told that the complainant who had won the higher
ratings tutored the other complainant in oral sex to help her improve her technique. Id.
The state supreme court, correctly, held that the trial court had properly rejected this testi-
mony as inadmissible hearsay. Id. Query, however, whether exclusion would have been
proper if other witnesses were prepared to testify (truthfully, let us assume) to these facts
from first-hand knowledge. Evidence of the "rating system," in and of itself, would of
course be inadmissible on grounds of irrelevance, but the complainants' reaction to it, if
true, is highly relevant to their attitudes about sexual activity.
345. Id. at 520.
346. The words "abnormal compulsion" reflect my assumption, shared, I have no
doubt, by the vast majority of people, that a woman who regularly comports herself as the
complainants in Shoffner and Hudlow allegedly did is emotionally ill.
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time, the jurors would believe the complainants "deserved what they
got"; or because the jury would be unwilling to ruin the defendants' lives
to protect women whom they perceived to be corrupt or immoral. Either
result would be improper. But equally improper is the conviction of the
defendants, however contemptible their own conduct, 347 if in fact they
did not rape the complainant.'
B. Evidence Relating to Prostitution
1. Admissibility
Courts often express the view that, absent additional circumstances, ev-
idence that the complainant engaged in prior acts of prostitution 31 is not
admissible as proof that she consented to sex with the defendant on the
occasion in question.350 Even prior convictions for prostitution generally
347. To exploit an emotionally unstable woman's sexual vulnerability is a cruel and
contemptible act. But unless the law has certified her as incapable of giving lawful consent,
such exploitation is not a crime.
348. The dilemma posed was aptly summarized by Susan Estrich, a leading proponent
of the reforms that have changed the law of rape:
Many of the traditional rules of rape liability were premised on the notion that
women lie; Wigmore went so far as to view rape complainants as fundamentally
deranged. I don't buy that for a moment .... Yet even if only one of a hundred
men, or one of a thousand, is falsely accused, the question is still how we can
protect that man's right to disprove his guilt. Assume for a moment ... that it
was you, or your brother, or your boyfriend or your son, who was accused of rape
by a casual date with a history of psychiatric problems, or by a woman he met in a
bar who had a history of one-night stands. Would you exclude that evidence?
What else can the man do to avoid a felony conviction and a ruined life? Where
do you draw the line? But if you don't exclude the evidence, will some women as
a result become unrapable, at least as a matter of law? That is, will women who
have histories of mental instability or of "promiscuity" ever be able to convince
juries who know those histories that they really were raped?
Estrich, supra note 1, at 518-19.
349. Discussion of prostitution herein is limited to cases involving sex for money. The
related subject of sex for drugs is discussed supra notes 215-29 and accompanying text.
350. Jeffries v. Nix, 912 F.2d 982, 987 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 927 (1991).
Commonwealth v. Vieira, 519 N.E.2d 1320, 1327-28 (Mass. 1988) (held: the trial court
properly excluded evidence that complainant, two to three months before the alleged rape,
offered to engage in sex with defendant and others for money, because the statement was
too remote in time and substance to give rise to a reasonable inference of consent).
Winfield v. Commonwealth, 301 S.E.2d 15, 21 (Va. 1983) (ruling that evidence of mere
acts of prostitution by the victim would tend only to show character and reputation, and
would not be admissible).
State v. Morley, 730 P.2d 687 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986). The appellate court ruled the
refusal to permit defendant's fiancee to testify that the complainant said she had been
following her (complainant's) boyfriend, a musician, around the country, and had resorted
to prostitution to pay her expenses to do so, was proper. Id at 689. Such testimony, the
court held, was at best minimally relevant, compared to the State's compelling interest in
barring inflammatory and distracting evidence, preventing an acquittal based on prejudice
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are excluded.35' The Fourth Circuit has expressed the justification for
this exclusion: "It is intolerable to suggest that because the victim is a
prostitute, she automatically is assumed to have consented with anyone at
any time.
'352
This, however, may not be the most appropriate approach in resolving
whether to admit such evidence. A prostitute has the right to say "No,"
and to have the law punish someone who forces her to have sex against
her will. But, particularly in a case where there is little evidence cor-
roborating either version of what happened, is a woman with an extensive
record for prostitution entitled to have the jury assume, incorrectly, that
she, like most women, regards sex as a personal, private, emotional, and
intimate choice, when in fact to her it is generally a commercial
transaction?
Some states reject the prevailing view and admit evidence of prostitu-
tion. New York's statute admits evidence of a prostitution-related convic-
tion if it occurred within three years of the incident being tried.353 A
number of courts have stated, usually in dictum, that evidence of prior
acts of prostitution generally is admissible on the issue of consent.354
against complainant's past sex life, and encouraging rape victims to report crimes. Id.
Other cases banning evidence of prostitution:
United States v. Saunders, 943 F.2d 388, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1199 (1992).
State v. Quinn, 592 P.2d 778, 781-82 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978).
Lewis v. State, 549 So. 2d 620, 621-22 (Ala. Ct. App. 1989).
Brewer v. United States, 559 A.2d 317, 320-22 (D.C. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1092
(1990).
Roberts v. State, 510 So. 2d 885, 892 (Fla. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 943 (1988).
People v. Hughes, 460 N.E.2d 485, 490 (11. App. Ct. 1984).
People v. Williams, 330 N.W.2d 823, 829-31 (Mich. 1982).
State v. Romero, 606 P.2d 1116, 1119-20 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980).
People v. Woods, 549 N.Y.S.2d 116, 117 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989).
State v. Gardner, 391 N.E.2d 337, 340-41 (Ohio 1979).
Haynes v. State, 498 S.W.2d 950, 951-52 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
351. Commonwealth v. Dear, 492 A.2d 714, 716-20 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). Evidence of
complainant's three prior convictions for criminal solicitation and prostitution was inad-
missible to show she consented to having sexual intercourse with defendant. Id. at 718.
Johnson v. State, 598 S.W.2d 803, 805 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1979). Evidence of complain-
ant's prior misdemeanor convictions for prostitution was inadmissible to show consent. Id.
352. United States v. Saunders, 943 F.2d 388, 392 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1199 (1992).
353. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.42(2) (McKinney 1992).
354. State ex rel. Pope v. Superior Court, 545 P.2d 946, 953 (Ariz. 1976) (dictum). But
see State v. Quinn, 592 P.2d 778, 781 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) (discussed infra note 358).
State v. Salkil, 659 S.W.2d 330, 333 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (dictum), later proceeding, 736
S.W.2d 428 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
Walden v. State, 542 S.W.2d 635, 636-37 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976) (dictum). But see
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Even jurisdictions that generally exclude evidence of unrelated acts of
prostitution permit the defendant to testify that the complainant agreed
to have sex with him for money on the occasion in question.355 More-
over, several courts indicate that where the defendant claims the
complainant agreed to engage in sex with him for money and then falsely
accused him of rape, evidence of prior acts of prostitution has special
relevance and may be admissible.356 Such cases often arise in conjunction
with a claim that the false accusation was motivated by the defendant's
failure to pay the agreed on price. 357 Courts also have held evidence of
prior prostitution admissible where the evidence has some other specific
relevance,358  such as to prove consent 359  or motive to lie or
Johnson v. State, 598 S.W.2d 803, 805 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1979) (holding to the contrary).
Holloway v. State, 695 S.W.2d 112, 115-19 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (dictum), aff'd, 751
S.W.2d 866 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
355. See People v. Williams, 330 N.W.2d 823,829-31 (Mich. 1982); State v. Gardner, 391
N.E.2d 337, 340-41 (Ohio 1979); Haynes v. State, 498 S.W.2d 950, 951-52 (Tex. Crim. App.
1973).
356. State v. Quinn, 592 P.2d 778, 781-82 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) (holding such evidence
is admissible only where (1) defendant alleges the complainant actually consented to an act
of prostitution, and (2) the trial judge determines that the evidence is more probative than
prejudicial).
Brewer v. United States, 559 A.2d 317, 320-21 (D.C. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1092
(1990) (suggesting that if the defendant testified that the complainant agreed to have sex
for money on the occasion in question, evidence that the complainant engaged in prior acts
of prostitution might be admissible). But see Hagins v. United States, 639 A.2d 612, 616-17
(D.C. 1994) (noting that the defendant's testimony that the complainant agreed to have sex
with him for money did not open the door to DNA evidence suggesting that she had re-
cently had sex with two other men, in the absence of evidence that those other episodes
were for money).
See State v. Jenkins, 456 So. 2d 174, 179 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that complainant's
prior alleged history of prostitution is irrelevant where the defendant claims the complain-
ant and he had merely renewed a pre-existing sexual relationship unconnected to prostitu-
tion, but indicating that had the defendant claimed the encounter in question was an
exchange of sex for money, the evidence would have been admissible).
People v. Slovinski, 420 N.W.2d 145, 149-51 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (although the court
did not stress this fact, it may be noteworthy that the encounter between the defendant and
the complainant began on the same block where, according to two defense witnesses, the
complainant regularly trolled for customers).
Contra Shaffer v. Indiana, 443 N.E.2d 838, 838-40 (Ind. 1933).
357. See Slovinsky, 420 N.W.2d at 146-47; see also Hagins, 639 A.2d at 616 (rejecting
the proffer where at most defendants could only demonstrate that the complainants re-
cently had sex with other men, but not that it had been for money); Johnson v. State, 632
A.2d 152, 153 (Md. 1993) (indicating that the defendants alleged that the complainant per-
formed sexual acts in exchange for a promise of crack cocaine, then accused them of rape
when they reneged).
358. Quinn, 592 P.2d at 781 (dictum).
359. People v. Varona, 192 Cal. Rptr. 44 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). The California appellate
court held that evidence that the complainant was on probation following a prostitution
guilty plea should have been admitted after she testified that the defendants had attacked
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her, took her to a house and forced her to perform vaginal and oral copulation shortly after
a "friend" had driven her to within two blocks of a bus stop at 11:30 p.m. Id. at 45. Official
records offered by the defendant as to the complainant's prior conviction and probation
status showed that she had walked the streets in the area of the alleged attack to solicit
customers, and that she not only engaged in normal intercourse, but also specialized in oral
copulation. Id. at 46.
Demers v. State, 547 A.2d 28 (Conn. 1988). The trial court properly granted defendants'
motion for a new trial, where the State withheld evidence of the complainant's prior arrest
for prostitution after soliciting a plain-clothed police officer. Id. at 33-34. The defendants'
version of the incident in question closely paralleled that of the prior incident in terms of
time of day, location, the manner in which the solicitation was made, the sex acts involved
and the price. Id. at 36. Moreover, defendants apparently gave this version of events to
the police before they learned of the complainant's prior arrest, let alone the details of it,
which suggests that they did not merely make up a story to match the earlier case. Id.
Reversal may also have been justified by the fact that the complainant testified several
times that she was not a "hooker" and had never engaged in sex for money, although it is
unclear whether she said this on direct, thereby arguably opening the door to rebuttal. See
discussion infra part VIII.A.
Commonwealth v. Joyce, 415 N.E.2d 181 (Mass. 1981). Held: defendant had the right to
prove that the complainant had been charged with prostitution twice previously after being
found naked in a car with men, to support his defense that her accusation of rape after
being found by police in a similar situation with defendant was motivated by desire to
avoid further prosecution. Id. at 187.
People v. McNab, 544 N.Y.S.2d 930 (N.Y. 1989), later proceeding, 562 N.Y.S.2d 590
(N.Y. App. Div. 1990). Defendant claimed the complainant willingly participated in sex in
exchange for cocaine and only complained when the defendant's supply of cocaine was
exhausted. Id. at 931. Held: the trial court properly refused to permit a witness to testify
that the complainant frequented a house of prostitution and had engaged in sex for co-
caine, although this testimony was directly corroborative of the defense, but only because
the witness had been unable to identify the complainant from an array of twelve photos.
The trial court instead properly permitted the defense to cross examine the complainant as
to this allegation. Id. at 933-34.
State v. Williams, 487 N.E.2d 560 (Ohio 1986). Complainant testified on direct examina-
tion that she was a lesbian and therefore did not have sexual intercourse with men. Id. at
562-63. The Ohio Supreme Court held that under the circumstances, application of the
rape shield statute to prevent introduction of evidence that the complainant is a prostitute
was unconstitutional. Id. at 563.
Winfield v. Commonwealth, 301 S.E.2d 15 (Va. 1983). Evidence of complainant's past
sexual conduct, involving a pattern of extortion of money by threat after acts of prostitu-
tion, would be admissible where defendant claimed similar conduct in the present case.
However, evidence of mere acts of prostitution, tending only to show character and reputa-
tion, would not be admissible. Id. at 20-21.
State v. Herndon, 426 N.W.2d 347 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988). The defendant had the right to
inquire into complainant's prior arrests for prostitution in the area of the alleged rape as
evidence of consent and of complainant's willingness and motive to fabricate a charge of
rape. Id. at 358-60.
See also State v. Blue, 592 P.2d 897 (Kan. 1979), upholding the trial court's refusal to
admit evidence of an oral statement made by the complainant to a police officer when the
defendant was arrested, in which she admitted acts of prostitution with other men in nu-
merous cities throughout the United States. Id. at 900. The trial court did, however, admit
evidence that the complainant had engaged in sexual relations for money with the defend-
ant and a codefendant approximately one month prior to the alleged rape; the state
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fabricate. 6°
2. Means of Proof
Assuming evidence of prior acts of prostitution is admissible, a court
must examine the quality of evidence offered by the defendant.
Although prior prostitution convictions would seem to be reliable proof,
evidence of such convictions may be inadmissible hearsay361 and may,
where prostitution is a misdemeanor, fall outside the scope of convictions
that may be used generally to impeach the credibility of a witness.362 Ad-
ditional difficulties may arise where the custom is to permit a person ar-
rested for prostitution to plead guilty to a more generic, non-specific
offense such as loitering.
Testimony by a witness that she acted as a "go-between" for the com-
plainant and potential customers would suffice as reliable proof of prosti-
tution.363 A witness's testimony that the complainant solicited him, or
solicited others within his hearing, would also suffice. 3 4 A more difficult
question is whether circumstantial evidence that the complainant is a
prostitute-such as testimony that the complainant frequently was ob-
served walking the streets in revealing or provocative clothing and ap-
proaching men in a neighborhood noted for prostitution-should suffice.
Courts should exclude evidence of the complainant's reputation for
prostitution on the same basis for excluding evidence of a reputation for
promiscuity: dubious reliability, questionable relevancy, and (in some cir-
cumstances) the ease of fabrication.
VIII. OTHER SITUATIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS
Preceding sections of this article have discussed the admissibility of evi-
dence of a complainant's prior sexual behavior which falls into fairly
supreme court expressed no opinion on the propriety of admitting this evidence. Id.
360. See Joyce, 415 N.E.2d at 187 and Herndon, 426 N.W.2d at 358-60, both discussed
supra note 359.
361. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803(22). This rule permits felony, but not misdemeanor,
convictions to be introduced "to prove any fact essential to sustain the judgment." Id. Nor
would a complainant's guilty plea to a prior act of prostitution be admissible as an admis-
sion by a party opponent, because the state, not the complainant, is the defendant's party-
opponent. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A). Nor, is it admissible as a declaration against inter-
est, because the complainant is not unavailable as a witness. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
362. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 609 (permitting the use of a prior conviction to impeach a
witness' character for credibility only if the conviction is for a felony or for a crime involv-
ing dishonesty or false statements).
363. See People v. Slovinski, 420 N.W.2d 145, 147 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988).
364. Police officers who charged the complainant with prostitution on prior occasions
could be subpoenaed to testify as a witness for the defense.
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broad categories. This section examines the admissibility of such evi-
dence when offered under a variety of other theories of relevance. Rape
shield statutes recognize some of these situations; others have emerged in
the case law. The challenge is to permit defendants to offer such evidence
in appropriate cases, without permitting the exceptions to swallow the
rule and return the law to status quo ante.
A. Evidence Elicited by Prosecutor or Volunteered by Complainant;
"Opened Door" Doctrine
1. In General
FRE 412 and most state rape shield statutes provide that evidence con-
cerning the complainant's prior sexual conduct "is not admissible" (with
specified exceptions) regardless of who offers it.365 Accordingly, courts
generally hold that the prosecutor should not offer evidence that the com-
plainant was a virgin prior to the alleged rape.366 The same rule presuma-
bly would apply to evidence of the complainant's fidelity to her husband
or boyfriend, although one court has admitted such evidence relating to a
murder victim.3 67 Similarly, courts hold that the state should not elicit
365. FED. R. EVID. 412. But see Mo. REv. STAT. § 491.015. 1.(4) (Supp. 1994) which
exempts, "[e]vidence relating to the previous chastity of the complaining witness in cases,
where, by statute, previously chaste character is required to be proved by the prosecution."
Id.
366. See discussion supra part II.B (relating to loss of virginity as "injury"); see also
Johnson v. State, 246 S.E.2d 363, 365-66 (Ga. Ct. App. 1978). The Georgia appellate court
held that the rape shield statute supersedes all evidentiary exceptions, including the res
gestae rule. Id. Hence, it was improper for the complainant to testify that during the rape
she told the defendant she was a virgin. Id The court further held that the defendant's
failure to object waived the error and that the trial judge had correctly ruled that this did
not open the door to testimony by two defense witnesses that they had engaged in sex with
the complainant prior to the alleged rape. Id.
At least two states depart from this consensus. See Brewer v. State, 599 S.W.2d 141, 143-
44 (Ark. 1980) (noting that AR. CODE ANN. § 16-42-101(b) by its terms restricts only the
defendant, but not the prosecutor, from offering such evidence; hence, a prosecutor may
elicit testimony that the complainant had been a virgin prior to the alleged rape); State v.
Stanton, 353 S.E.2d 385, 389-90 (N.C. 1987) (indicating that a rape victim may testify that
she became pregnant after the rape and had no other sexual involvement around the time
of the rape).
367. State v. Sexton, 444 S.E.2d 879 (N.C.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 525 (1994). The
defendant, charged with rape and murder, testified that the deceased approached him in a
parking lot, offered him a ride, said she felt like cheating on her husband, initiated physical
contact, performed oral sex without being asked, and then had vaginal intercourse with
him. Id. at 890. The trial court permitted the State to elicit testimony from family and
friends that the deceased was not flirtatious, had a good reputation as a family person and
had never discussed going out with other men or cheating on her husband. The trial court
permitted her husband to testify that to his knowledge she had never cheated on him and
had an aversion to oral sex. Id. at 891. The Supreme Court held there was no error in
allowing this testimony. Id. at 913.
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evidence of the complainant's comparative inexperience with particular
sexual practices.368
A few statutes explicitly permit a defendant to answer in kind if the
prosecutor or complainant improperly inserts information about virginity,
inexperience or fidelity into the case.3 69 Even in the absence of specific
statutory authority, some courts acknowledge that the defendant may
have a constitutional right to rebuttal.37°
If the state improperly opens the door, rebuttal evidence should be ad-
mitted only if it is truly relevant, rather than collateral.371 Further, a de-
[Tihe ... victim.., was dead and could neither rebut the defense of consent nor
risk subjecting herself to possible cross-examination about her previous sexual
behavior. Therefore, the policies designed to protect rape victims personally...
are of less importance. In addition, . . . the State did not attempt in its case in
chief to introduce evidence of [the victim's] previous sexual behavior. Therefore,
permitting this rebuttal evidence does not conflict with the underlying statutory
policy ....
Id. at 900. The court further held that evidence of the complainant's reputation was admis-
sible, per North Carolina's evidentiary rule, to rebut the defendant's testimony that the
victim said she wanted to cheat on her husband, which, the court held, constituted an at-
tack on her character for marital fidelity. Id. at 901 (citing N.C. R. EVID. 404(a)(2)).
368. People v. Sandoval, 552 N.E.2d 726, 728-31 (Iil.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990)
(excluding evidence of complainant's inexperience with anal sex) (discussed infra note
371); State v. Hudlow, 659 P.2d 514, 520 (Wash. 1983) (excluding evidence of complainant's
inexperience with oral sex) (discussed infra notes 378-85 and accompanying text). Contra
Sexton, 444 S.E.2d at 900 (discussed supra note 367).
369. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1103(c)(3) (West Supp. 1995); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 461A(a)(4) (1992) (provided that the judge determines the "inflammatory or prejudicial
nature does not outweigh its probative value"); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.42(3) (McKin-
ney 1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.7A(3) (Michie 1988); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9A.44.020(4) (West Supp. 1995) (providing that the court may first require a hearing
before deciding what evidence should be admitted).
370. Virgin Islands v. Jacobs, 634 F. Supp. 933, 937 (D.V.I. 1986); People v. Sales, 502
N.E.2d 1221, 1224-25 (Il. App. Ct. 1986) (involving evidence of the complainant's prior
virginity); Commonwealth v. McKay, 294 N.E.2d 213, 217 (Mass. 1973) (same); State v.
Carpenter, 459 N.W.2d 121, 127 (Minn. 1990) (same, but holding that the defendant's fail-
ure to comply with the statutory pretrial notice requirement justified exclusion); State v.
Kroshus, 447 N.W.2d 203,204-05 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (prosecutor elicited testimony that
the complainant, a mentally retarded adult, was not educated about sexual matters; this
opened the door to testimony of a prior molestation of the complainant to rebut the infer-
ence that the complainant's ability to testify about sexual matters circumstantially corrobo-
rated the allegations against defendant).
But see Johnson v. State, 246 S.E.2d 363, 365 (Ga. Ct. App. 1978) (discussed supra note
366 and accompanying text); Wheeler v. State, 596 A.2d 78, 86 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991)
(complainant's testimony on direct examination that she had a sexual relationship with
only one person did not allow the defendant to cross-examine her about her past sexual
conduct).
371. People v. Sandoval, 552 N.E.2d 726, 733 (Ill.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990).
The complainant accused the defendant, her former boyfriend, of anal rape. On direct, she
testified that she had anal sex with him twice before, but never with anyone else. Id. at
728. Held: although the prosecutor should not have elicited this testimony, the trial judge
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fendant is precluded from opening the door by cross-examining the
complainant or other witness on the subject and then seeking to rebut the
testimony that he himself elicited.372
2. What Constitutes "Opening the Door"
Except perhaps where the complainant claims to have been a virgin
prior to the rape,373 courts tend to be reluctant to hold that the govern-
ment or complainant opened the door to such rebuttal.3 74 Cases from
did not err in refusing to permit the defendant to call another man to testify that the
complainant willingly engaged in anal sex with him. Id. at 735-36. The court noted that at
the close of the case, the trial judge instructed the jury to disregard the complainant's
testimony that she had never had anal sex with anyone else. Id. at 729. Moreover, exclu-
sion of the evidence did not leave the jury with a misleading portrait of the complainant;
the fact that she was sexually experienced "would have been evident to the jury, for it was
clear from the testimony that she was a 20-year-old mother of a two-year-old child" and
had lived with the defendant for several months in a sexual relationship before moving out
of his apartment, some time before the alleged rape. Id. at 734.
The court also rejected as collateral the defendant's attempt to impeach the complain-
ant's testimony that since the alleged rape she had been unable to date other men. Id. at
742.
372. Lewis v. State, 440 N.E.2d 1125, 1128-29 (Ind. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 915
(1983), overruled in part by Modesitt v. State, 578 N.E.2d 649 (Ind. 1991) (finding that the
defendant had not been denied due process of law when the court forbade him from intro-
ducing the complainant's husband's deposition to refute the husband's trial testimony, elic-
ited on cross-examination, as to his wife's fidelity); Sandoval, 552 N.E.2d at 729
(complainant's testimony on cross-examination that she had been unable to date other
men since the defendant raped her did not entitle the defendant to call a witness to testify
that he had seen the complainant a few days before the trial "hanging all over a gentleman
friend of hers" in a local bar); Hudlow, 659 P.2d at 526 (see infra note 384).
373. See supra notes 91-97 and accompanying text.
374. Brewer v. United States, 559 A.2d 317, 321-22 (D.C. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1092 (1990) (holding that the prosecution did not open the door to evidence of complain-
ant's alleged prior acts of prostitution with persons other than the defendant by asking a
witness, who had been sexually intimate with complainant, whether she had ever charged
the witness for sex and whether the defendant had ever told the witness that she had
charged the defendant for sex).
State v. McQuillen, 689 P.2d 822, 829-30 (Kan. 1984). The court held that when a state's
expert has testified that the complainant is suffering from rape trauma syndrome, defense
counsel may cross-examine the expert to determine how the expert reached that conclu-
sion, and may call an expert witness in rebuttal to testify that the complainant is not suffer-
ing from rape trauma syndrome. Id. at 830. Such rebuttal evidence, however, would not
allow wholesale admittance of complainant's past sexual conduct, unless that information
was used by the state's expert to make his or her determination of rape trauma syndrome.
Id.
Johnson v. State, 632 A.2d 152 (Md. 1993) (holding that complainant's direct testimony
that she approached defendants to purchase crack-cocaine, was told to get down on her
hands and knees, and that she told them she was not there to exchange sex for drugs
because she had money to pay for them, did not open the door to evidence that she had
exchanged sex for drugs on other occasions).
Joyce v. State, 474 A.2d 1369, 1373 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984) (concluding that a prose-
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Hawaii and Washington illustrate the difficulties in drawing the line. In
State v. Calbero,37 s the complainant, asked on direct why she had not told
the defendant to stop fondling or undressing her, testified, "I got scared
.... I [had] never been in that situation before." '376 Hawaii's Supreme
Court held that this testimony created the inference that the complainant
had not had any sexual experience and hence, it was constitutional error
to exclude comments allegedly made by the complainant, just before the
defendant began fondling her, that "my boyfriends do a lot for me... I
can get any man I want ... if I'm in the mood, and I just so happen to be
in the mood. 3 77
In State v. Hudlow,378 two men were convicted of assaulting and raping
two women. One complainant testified on direct examination that one of
the defendants ordered her to give him a "blow job"; that she told him
she did not know what it was; that when she said this, she did in fact know
it meant to perform oral sex; that he told her she would have to do it
anyway; and that he forced her to do so, after which she vomited.379 De-
fense counsel then sought to offer evidence that the complainant: was
indiscriminately promiscuous, was concerned that men did not consider
her sufficiently skilled at oral sex, and had previously sought advice and
instruction from a friend (the other rape complainant) on how to improve
her technique. 38 0
Interpreting a statute which explicitly permitted rebuttal evidence
where the state had opened the door,38 ' Washington's Supreme Court
cutor's offer of proof during oral argument at the bench does not trigger a defendant's
right to elicit contradictory evidence before the jury).
White v. State, 498 So. 2d 368, 372 (Miss. 1986). The State introduced evidence of Afri-
can-American pubic hairs found in the complainant's bed and on a towel outside her apart-
ment, then asked her whether any African-American persons had been in her bedroom at
any other time. The court held this did not open a line of questioning as to complainant's
sexual conduct. Id.
State v. Camara, 781 P.2d 483, 490 (Wash. 1989). A male rape complainant's testimony
that he had not wanted to engage in anal intercourse with the defendant because such
intercourse was unsafe and he did not find it pleasurable did not entitle the defendant to
cross-examine complainant about his sexual history. Id.
375. 785 P.2d 157 (Haw. 1989).
376. Id. at 158.
377. Id. at 159.
378. 659 P.2d 514 (Wash. 1983) (discussed supra notes 336-48 and accompanying text).
379. Id. at 524-26. On cross-examination, when defense counsel sought to explore the
supposed discrepancy between telling the defendant she did not know what the term meant
and her acknowledgment on direct that she did know, the complainant testified that she
knew its meaning because of discussions with other girls at school. Id. at 525.
380. Id. at 516-17.
381. WASH. REv. CODE AN. § 9A.44.020(4) (West 1995). This statute provides:
Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit cross-examination of the
victim on the issue of past sexual behavior when the prosecution presents evi-
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held that the State had not done so: "Obviously, [complainant] told Hu-
dlow that she did not know how to perform oral sex as an evasive maneu-
ver to escape having to perform the act. We do not think such testimony
was intended or interpreted to convey ideas of [complainant's] sexual vir-
tuousness., 382 Similarly, "[her] simple statement that she vomited after
being forced to perform oral sex at knifepoint had nothing to do with her
past experience or familiarity with performing oral sex with other
men., 383 Had she testified that she vomited because it was the first time
she had performed oral sex, by contrast, "[s]uch testimony would open up
her past experience to cross-examination." 3" One judge dissented, argu-
ing that however the complainant and prosecutor meant her testimony,
the jury could have understood it to mean, "I knew what he meant, but
not how to do it," and that this sufficed to open the door.
385
Indeed, a jury might interpret the complainant's testimony as the dis-
sent suggested, but it was within the trial court's discretion to assess
whether the jury was likely to interpret her testimony in that manner.
The defendant has other means available to protect against that interpre-
tation other than admitting evidence of the complainant's prior sexual
behavior. The judge, for example, could instruct the prosecutor not to
refer in summation to the complainant's claim of inexperience or to the
fact that she vomited afterward. Similarly, the judge could instruct the
jury that the complainant's prior sexual experience or lack thereof is irrel-
evant and therefore neither party would be permitted to elicit testimony
about it.
3. Evidence that Complainant Is or Is Not Homosexual
It is improper for the state, in an effort to bolster the complainant's
testimony that she did not consent, to elicit testimony that she is a les-
bian.386 One court has held that the defendant must be given an oppor-
dence in its case in chief tending to prove the nature of the victim's past sexual
behavior, but the court may require a hearing pursuant to subsection (3) of this
section concerning such evidence.
Id.
382. Hudlow, 659 P.2d at 525.
383. Id. at 526.
384. Id. The court added that the complainant's testimony on cross-examination, ex-
plaining she knew what the term meant from discussions with girls at school, did not open
the door to rebuttal, because such evidence was elicited by the defense, not the prosecu-
tion. Id. at 525.
385. Id. at 527 (Utter, J., dissenting).
386. People v. Kemblowski, 559 N.E.2d 247, 249-51 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (holding it was
reversible error to allow the prosecutor to admit such evidence, including the complain-
ant's testimony that she had not consummated her marriage).
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tunity to rebut such evidence;387 another has held that such testimony did
not open the door to evidence that the complainant previously had sexual
activity with men. 388 TWo courts, in cases involving homosexual rape,
have held that the defendant is not entitled to introduce evidence of the
complainant's prior homosexual conduct.389
B. Miscellany
1. Child Abuse Cases: Admissibility on Source of Knowledge
A prosecution for sexual activity with a child may differ in many ways
from a prosecution involving an adult complainant. Depending upon the
child's age, sophistication, and a variety of other factors, the child com-
plainant 390 may be particularly vulnerable to suggestion. In addition, the
child complainant may lack the ability to communicate clearly what hap-
pened, may be further traumatized by testifying in open court, or may be
unable to testify at all. In addition, although a jury's reaction to an adult
sex offense complainant may be skeptical or harshly judgmental, a jury's
instinctive reaction to a child complainant will almost always be
sympathetic.
A majority of states apply their rape shield laws to cases involving child
complainants.391 Some of the exceptions recognized by such statutes ob-
387. State v. Williams, 487 N.E.2d 560, 562-63 (Ohio 1986). The court held that the
defendant's Sixth Amendment rights were violated by the exclusion of evidence that the
complainant was a prostitute, of testimony by another man that he had engaged in sex with
the complainant, and the defendant's testimony that he had prior consensual sex with the
complainant. The defendant claimed the complainant had consented while the complain-
ant contended she was a lesbian and thus would not have consented to sex with a male. Id.
at 562-64.
388. Meaders v. United States, 519 A.2d 1248, 1252-53 (D.C. 1986).
389. People v. Hackett, 365 N.W.2d 120, 126-27 (Mich. 1984). "[Tlhe fact that a person
is a homosexual, standing alone, has little or no logical relevance between the excluded
prior sexual acts evidence and the issues of consent or credibility." Id. Thus it was proper
to reject evidence offered by an African-American prison inmate accused of raping a white
inmate that the complainant had consented to acts of sodomy with other African-Ameri-
can inmates. Id.
State v. Camara, 781 P.2d 483, 490 (Wash. 1989). A male rape complainant's testimony
that he had not wanted to engage in anal intercourse with defendant because such inter-
course was unsafe and complainant did not find it pleasurable did not entitle defendant to
cross-examine complainant about his sexual history. Id.
390. The term "victim" might be more appropriate in this context, because a child of
tender years who is subjected to sexual contact is by definition a victim. The term "com-
plainant" is nevertheless used because in a case without objective physical evidence that
sexual contact has occurred, to refer to the child as a "victim" presupposes that someone
has molested the child, an issue which may be contested at trial.
391. See Tanya Bagne Marcketti, Note, Rape Shield Laws: Do they Shield Children? 78
IOWA L. REv. 751, 756 (1993) (arguing that the policies underlying the rape shield statutes
apply equally to minors); Kim Steinmetz, Note, State v. Oliver: Children with a Past; The
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viously will apply in certain cases, such as the provision permitting a de-
fendant to offer evidence that someone else was the source of semen or
injury.392 Other exceptions, conversely, will not apply. For example, con-
sent is generally not a defense to a prosecution for child molestation or
statutory rape.393 Thus, evidence of prior consensual conduct between
the complainant and the defendant would not constitute a defense to
most child sex allegations.394
Nevertheless to support the admission of a child complainant's prior
sexual experience, attorneys defending child sex offense charges have de-
veloped a theory, which one student scholar has aptly named the "sexual
innocence inference" theory.395 The theory is based on the premise that
because most children of tender years are ignorant of matters relating to
sexual conduct, a child complainant's ability to describe such conduct
may persuade the jury that the charged conduct in fact occurred. To
demonstrate that the child had acquired sufficient knowledge to fabricate
a charge against the defendant, the theory reasons, the court should allow
the defense to offer evidence that the child acquired sexual experience
with someone else before he or she accused the defendant.
Most courts that have considered the issue agree that a jury might
make such an inference, and that evidence that the child had previous
sexual experiences may be relevant to rebut the charge.396 One court
Admissibility of the Victim's Prior Sexual Experience in Child Molestation Cases, 31 ARIZ.
L. REV. 677, 685 (1989) (discussing the judiciary's application of the rape shield statutes to
minors). See generally supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
But see State v. Carver, 678 P.2d 842 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984). "The evidence proffered in
this case does not fit within the concepts and purposes of the rape shield statute. [T]he
evidence sought to be admitted here was prior sexual abuse, not misconduct, of a victim."
Id. at 843. This reasoning was subsequently affirmed by Washington's highest court. State
v. Markle, 823 P.2d 1101, 1109 (Wash. 1992).
392. See supra parts II.A. and lI.D. (physical evidence).
393. 65 AM. JUR. 2D Rape § 23 (1972).
394. See, e.g., Simmons v. State, 308 S.E.2d 27, 30 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983); Thompson v.
State, 555 N.E.2d 1301, 1302-03 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990); Commonwealth v. Domaingue, 493
N.E.2d 841, 845 (Mass. 1986); People v. Mann, 569 N.Y.S.2d 270, 271 (N.Y. App. Div.
1991).
395. Christopher B. Reid, Note, The Sexual Innocence Inference Theory as a Basis for
the Admissibility of a Child Molestation Victim's Prior Sexual Conduct, 91 MIcH. L. REV.
827, 829 (1993) (arguing that evidence of a child's prior sexual activity may be admitted to
establish that the child possessed the sexual knowledge to fabricate a charge against the
defendant).
No one term is adequate to describe the broad variety of conduct alleged in such prose-
cutions, which ranges from consensual encounters between children of almost the same age
to violent, vile and depraved exploitation of children by adults. I use the term "sexual
experience" to include everything within this range of conduct.
396. See, e.g., State v. Howard, 426 A.2d 457, 462 (N.H. 1981). The court stated:
We believe that the average juror would perceive the average twelve-year-old
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held this in a case involving a mentally retarded adult complainant.397
Other state courts reject the argument that juries are likely to draw the
inference. These courts categorically exclude such evidence as having
only marginal relevance at best while having enormous potential to em-
barrass the complaining witness, invade his or her privacy, confuse the
jury, and prejudice the prosecution.3 98
A court's acknowledgement of the inference and a defendant's valid
interest in rebutting it does not guarantee the admissibility of the com-
plainant's prior sexual experience. A court must assess the legitimate
probative value of the evidence against the risk of unfair prejudice and
the other concerns underlying rape shield legislation. A number of fac-
tors are relevant to this assessment:
(1) The age of the child. The older the child, the less likely a jury is to
assume that the child could not have picked up sexual knowledge second-
girl as a sexual innocent. Therefore, it is probable that jurors would believe that
the sexual experience she describes must have occurred in connection with the
incident being prosecuted; otherwise, she could not have described it. However,
if statutory rape victims have had other sexual experiences, it would be possible
for them to provide detailed, realistic testimony concerning an incident that may
never have happened. To preclude a defendant from presenting such evidence to
the jury, if it is otherwise admissible, would be obvious error. Accordingly, a
defendant must be afforded the opportunity to show, by specific incidents of sex-
ual conduct, that the prosecutrix has the experience and ability to contrive a stat-
utory rape charge against him.
Id. The defendant sought to prove that the complainant had been seen masturbating a
bull, had sex with her father and grandfather, had undressed boys for whom she had
babysat, and had engaged in sex acts with others while being shown on closed-circuit tele-
vision. Id. at 458-59.
Other case law recognizes that a jury might draw this inference:
State v. Oliver, 760 P.2d 1071, 1076-77 (Ariz. 1988).
People v. Rice, 709 P.2d 67, 68-69 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985).
State v. Jacques, 558 A.2d 706, 708 (Me. 1989).
Commonwealth v. Ruffen, 507 N.E.2d 684, 687 (Mass. 1987).
Commonwealth v. Rathburn, 532 N.E.2d 691, 695-96 (Mass. App. Ct. 1988).
State v. Benedict, 397 N.W.2d 337, 340-41 (Minn. 1986).
Woodruff v. State, 518 So. 2d 669, 671-72 (Miss. 1988).
Summitt v. State, 697 P.2d 1374, 1376-77 (Nev. 1985).
State v. Budis, 580 A.2d 283, 290 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990), aff'd, 593 A.2d 784
(N.J. 1991).
State v. Pulizzano, 456 N.W.2d 325, 334-35 (Wis. 1990).
397. State v. Kroshus, 447 N.W.2d 203, 205 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
398. See People v. Compos, 507 N.E.2d 1342, 1348 (I11. App. Ct. 1987) (categorizing
evidence of an eleven-year-old complainant's prior sexual conduct as "irrelevant"); see also
People v. Arenda, 330 N.W.2d 814,818 (Mich. 1982). But see People v. Mason, 578 N.E.2d
1351, 1354-55 (Ill. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that excluding evidence that a seven-year-old
complainant had watched pornographic videos was reversible error); State v. Clarke, 343
N.W.2d 158, 163 (Iowa 1984); People v. Adams, 440 N.W.2d 416 (Mich. 1989) (Levin, J.,
dissenting); Commonwealth v. Appenzeller, 565 A.2d 170, 172 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
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(2) The kind of sexual behavior involved.4 °°
(3) Whether the prior sexual experience was sufficiently similar to the
conduct the defendant is accused of committing to have enabled the child
to fabricate the accusation.4° 1
(4) The availability of evidence suggesting that the child had acquired
sexual knowledge by other means, for example, from seeing the activities
of others, from movies, conversations with friends, books, sex education
classes in school, and the like.4°2
399. Compare Commonwealth v. Costello, 635 N.E.2d 255, 258 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994)
(an eighteen-year-old testifying about events alleged to have occurred four years earlier
"may be assumed to have sufficient knowledge about sexual matters to discuss inter-
course") and Commonwealth v. Rathburn, 532 N.E.2d 691, 695-97 (Mass. App. Ct. 1988)
(a thirteen-year-old girl had not demonstrated knowledge of sexual matters beyond her
years and thus the jury would be unlikely to make the sexual innocence inference) with
Commonwealth v. Ruffen, 507 N.E.2d 684, 688 (Mass. 1987) (if the prior experience of the
complainant, ten-years-old at the time of trial, resembled her allegations against the de-
fendant, evidence of the prior experience would be admissible) and State v. Howard, 426
A.2d 457, 462 (N.H. 1981) ("We believe that the average juror would perceive the average
twelve-year-old girl as a sexual innocent"). See Reid, supra note 395, at 852 n.138 (citing
studies suggesting that most children begin to mature physically at about age twelve and
that most American children have had some sort of sexual experience with another person
before reaching the age of twelve).
400. For example, while most eleven or twelve-year-old children could probably de-
scribe vaginal intercourse without having experienced it, it is difficult to conceive of a five-
year-old even imagining anal intercourse without having been subjected to it.
401. State v. Oliver, 760 P.2d 1071, 1077 (Ariz. 1988) (requiring defendant to make an
in camera showing that the prior sexual conduct did occur, and that it was sufficiently
similar to the charged conduct).
Commonwealth v. Ruffen, 507 N.E.2d 684, 687-88 (Mass. 1987) (permitting defendant
charged with sexually abusing a child to voir dire the complainant and complainant's
mother to determine whether the child had been sexually abused in the past, as such abuse
would bear on the child's knowledge of sexual acts and terminology).
State v. Budis, 593 A.2d 784 (N.J. 1991). Evidence of a nine-year-old sexual assault
victim's prior victimization by her stepfather, which she had described in language almost
identical to the language she used to describe the alleged incident with defendant, was
admissible to show her knowledge of sexual acts. Id. at 794.
In State v. Pulizzano, 456 N.W. 2d 325, 334-35 (Wis. 1990), the court held that the de-
fendant must show:
(1) that the prior acts clearly occurred; (2) that the acts closely resembled those of
the present case; (3) that the prior act is clearly relevant to a material issue; (4)
that the evidence is necessary to the defendant's case; and (5) that the probative
value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect.
Id.
402. People v. Mason, 578 N.E.2d 1351, 1353-54 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (reversible error to
exclude evidence that the seven-year- old complainant had watched pornographic videos).
People v. Arenda, 330 N.W.2d 814, 818 (Mich. 1982).
State v. Weiler, 801 S.W.2d 417, 419 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 905
(1991).
State v. Wright, 776 P.2d 1294, 1298 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (evidence of the complainant's
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(5) Availability of proof of the child's prior sexual experience other than
the child's own testimony.4 °3
(6) The existence of evidence suggesting that the complainant may have
a motive to fabricate a charge against the defendant.4 °4
(7) The conduct of the prosecutor. If the state suggests or exploits the
sexual innocence inference, this might legitimately open the door.40 5 On
the other hand, a prosecutor may be able to shut the door to evidence of
the complainant's prior sexual experience by stipulating that children of
the complainant's age usually possess enough sexual knowledge to fabri-
cate the events.406
2. Complainant "Confusion"
A claim is occasionally raised that evidence of other sexual behavior is
relevant to show that the complainant is "confused" as to what happened
or who assaulted her. Courts have admitted such evidence where there is
a substantial basis to support a claim of confusion, 0 7 while rejecting it
past sexual history was not relevant where the complainant's knowledge is not at issue).
Commonwealth v. Appenzeller, 565 A.2d 170, 172 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (noting that
where the child complainant was unsupervised and on the street, "it is highly likely she
learned of sexual terms and anatomy in her play as well as with the contacts with
appellant").
See Reid, supra note 395, at 860; see also 23 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W.
GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5387 (West Supp. 1994) (arguing
that the sexual innocence inference can and should always be rebutted with this method).
403. State v. Budis, 593 A.2d 784, 790-91 (N.J. 1991). The risk of embarrassing or hu-
miliating the child may be diminished if the evidence can be adduced from sources other
than the child, such as from another witness, official documents involving convictions aris-
ing out of the prior abuse, or by stipulation.
404. State v. Weeks 782 P.2d 430, 432 (Or. Ct. App. 1989).
405. Budis, 593 A.2d at 793; People v. Adams, 440 N.W.2d 416, 416-17 (Mich. 1989)
(Levin, J., dissenting); Appenzeller, 565 A.2d at 172; see also State v. Ross, 592 A.2d 291,
292 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (indicating that the prosecutor's argument during
summation that the complainant's naivetd precluded fabrication constituted plain error,
where the prosecutor was aware that the child's claims of prior sexual victimization pro-
vided her with a degree of knowledge potentially belying her alleged naivetd).
406. Budis, 593 A.2d at 791.
407. Saylor v. State, 599 N.E.2d 332, 335-36 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (error to exclude
evidence that the defendant's mentally handicapped stepdaughter, who had a poor concept
of time, had been molested at least two years before the defendant met her; the evidence
should have been admitted to support his claim that as a result of her poor concept of time,
her identification of defendant as the abuser was unreliable).
Wood v. State, 534 N.E.2d 1146, 1149-50 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (error to exclude evidence
of other molestations of an eight-year-old girl by other perpetrators on or near the dates
specified in the charges against the defendant).
Commonwealth v. Baxter, 627 N.E.2d 487, 491 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994) (error to exclude
evidence of a prior rape where the teenage complainant was unable to distinguish between
the prior rape and the alleged rape in the case at bar); see supra note 251. Concerning
admissibility of a complainant's prior true rape complaints, see generally supra part V.A.2.
Catholic University Law Review
where the claim is merely speculative or conjectural. °s
3. Mistake of Fact Defense: "Reasonable Belief" that Complainant
Consented
Although sex crime definitions vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction,
most sex-related felonies require the prosecutor to prove the defendant
had a culpable mental state (mens rea) with regard to the complainant's
lack of consent. Generally, in a rape prosecution, a jury must find be-
yond a reasonable doubt, not only that the complainant did not consent,
but that the defendant knew, or should have known, that the complainant
did not consent. Thus, a reasonable belief that the complainant con-
sented, even if mistaken, is a defense to the crime.4 °9 In an attempted
rape prosecution, the prosecutor generally must prove that the defendant
knew the complainant did not consent; an honest mistake, even if unrea-
sonable, is a defense.410
In many cases, mistake of fact is not an issue. If, for example, the com-
plainant alleges that the defendant raped her at knifepoint while the de-
State v. Ray, 637 S.W.2d 708, 710 (Mo. 1982) (error to exclude evidence that the adult
complainant was so intoxicated by alcohol and drugs that she may have confused what
happened on the night in question with the previous night); see supra notes 310-12.
See also Commonwealth v. Fitzgerald, 590 N.E.2d 1151, 1155-56 (Mass. 1992).
408. Laughlin v. State, 872 S.W.2d 848, 852 (Ark. 1994). In a prosecution of a thirty-
two-year-old man for sexually abusing boys under the age of 14, the defendant sought to
ask one eleven-year-old complainant whether he had ever had homosexual sex with his
brother. The defendant wanted to show that it was the brother, and not defendant, who
had molested the child; held, no error to preclude the cross-examination. Id.
State v. Kulmac, 644 A.2d 887 (Conn. 1994). Defendant claimed that the multiplicity of
people who had sexually abused two preteenage girls of less than average intelligence cre-
ated a risk of confusion between, and misidentification of, the various perpetrators. Id. at
894. The Connecticut Supreme Court held it was no abuse of discretion to exclude the
evidence of other abuses. Id. The court reasoned:
Whether there is a sufficient basis for a claim that a witness is confused, so as to
permit cross-examination that would otherwise be inadmissible, is a question of
fact that is properly left to the discretion of the trial court. In this case, the trial
court permitted extensive cross-examination concerning the numerous counts of
sexual abuse committed by the defendant, and had ample opportunity to observe
whether the victims confused or intermixed the events that were at issue at trial.
Moreover, the trial court explicitly found that neither victim appeared confused,
and that any abuses committed on [one of them] were too remote in time from
the abuses at issue in the trial to cause confusion.
Id.
409. See, e.g., People v. Mayberry, 125 Cal. Rptr. 745, 752 (Cal. 1975). Some rape
shield statues explicitly acknowledge this principle of substantive criminal law. See, e.g.,
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2-3(c)(2) (1994); N.C. R. EvID. 412(b)(3) (relating only to distinctive
patterns of behavior); TENN. R. EviD. 412(c)(4)(iii) (same).
410. This rule derives, not from any unique characteristic of the crime of attempted
rape, but from the general principles of the law of "attempts."
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fendant insists that the complainant was a willing and eager partner,
neither version raises the question of reasonable mistake of fact: guilt or
innocence depends simply on whether the jury believes the complainant
beyond a reasonable doubt. Mistake of fact is a valid issue, by contrast,
when the jury is satisfied that the complainant did not consent but con-
flicting versions of what happened create an issue of fact as to whether
the defendant used or threatened to use force, or as to how clearly the
complainant communicated her unwillingness to have sex. 411 In such a
case, the jury must decide key issues about the defendant's state of
mind-such as whether he actually believed that the complainant con-
sented and, where the charge is rape, whether that belief was reasonable.
Traditionally, the complainant's reputation for chastity or promiscuity
and details concerning her alleged prior sexual activity, if known to the
defendant prior to the events giving rise to the accusation, were consid-
ered relevant on the question of whether the defendant believed she con-
sented (and where relevant, whether the belief was reasonable). If a man
had heard that the complainant had said yes to other men,41 2 this made
his professed belief that her response to him also meant yes more believa-
ble and more reasonable.4" 3 But this reasoning, if accepted, would often
require admission of evidence of the complainant's reputation and of spe-
cific instances of her past sexual conduct, thereby undoing precisely what
rape shield legislation was designed to accomplish.
In Doe v. United States,414 the Fourth Circuit, applying FRE 412, held
that evidence of the complainant's reputation for promiscuity, if known
to the defendant prior to their encounter, was admissible on the issue of
the accused's state of mind.415 The decision was much-criticized," 6 and
the court essentially overruled that holding in United States v. Saun-
411. Many states still require the prosecutor to prove that the defendant used or
threatened force, or that the complainant resisted. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Berkowitz,
641 A.2d 1161, 1164-65 (Pa. 1994). Some statutes have eliminated these requirements,
requiring the prosecutor to prove only lack of consent. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 773
(1974 and Supp. 1994); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(3) (West 1982).
412. Information learned after the event is not relevant as to the existence or reasona-
bleness of his belief at the time. Doe v. United States, 666 F.2d 43, 48 (4th Cir. 1981);
Jeffries v. Nix, 912 F.2d 982, 987 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 927 (1991); Lamar v.
State, 254 S.E.2d 353, 355 (Ga.), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 803 (1979); Moore v. State, 395
S.E.2d 13, 15 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990); Burley v. State, 378 S.E.2d 328, 331 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989);
Rohm v. State, 558 N.E.2d 1100, 1103 (Ind. 1990); State v. Rhinehart, 316 S.E.2d 118, 120-
21 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984).
413. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 6, at 15; Tanford & Bocchino, supra note 8, at 591-602.
414. 666 F.2d 43, 47-48 (4th Cir. 1981).
415. Id.
416. See, e.g., Robert G. Spector & Teree E. Foster, Rule 412 and the Doe Case: The
Fourth Circuit Turns Back the Clock, 35 OKLA. L. REV. 87, 96-97 (1982).
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ders.4 17 Although consent was not technically an issue in Saunders, be-
cause the defendant denied that he had sex with the complainant at the
time and place she alleged, the court observed: "When consent is the
issue, ... [FRE 412](b)(1)(B) permits only evidence of the defendant's
past experience with the victim. The rule manifests the policy that it is
unreasonable for a defendant to base his belief of consent on the victim's
past sexual experiences with third persons .... Similarly, a California
appellate court has held that evidence of the complainant's past sexual
conduct with persons other than the defendant is inadmissible as evi-
dence of the defendant's reasonable belief that she consented.4 19 When a
Georgia intermediate appellate court held to the contrary,42 ° the legisla-
ture amended the state's rape shield law to preclude this result. 2 ' These
commendable developments are consistent with the policies underlying
rape shield legislation. 22
IX. JUDICIAL ASSESSMENT OF WITNESS CREDIBILITY
As previously discussed, evidence relating to a complainant's prior sex-
ual behavior may have sufficient relevance on a variety of theories to
overcome a rape shield objection; but to have such special relevance the
evidence must be fact, not fabrication. It is not uncommon for a defend-
ant to offer evidence about the complainant's past which the complainant
insists is a lie. In deciding on the admissibility of such evidence, must the
judge assume the defendant's evidence is true; or may a judge base the
ruling, in whole or in part, on an assessment of who is telling the truth?
A. Conditional Relevancy or Technical Admissibility
The answer, not surprisingly, depends upon the question being asked.
417. 943 F.2d 388 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1105 (1992).
418. Id. at 392.
419. People v. Guthreau, 162 Cal. Rptr. 376, 380 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
420. Hamilton v. State, 365 S.E.2d 120, 123 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) (holding it was error to
deny a hearing on the defendant's offer of proof relating to the witness's past sexual behav-
ior where defendant offered to prove that the complaining witness had prior sexual en-
counters with the defendant and others, and the defendant knew of her reputation at the
time of the incident). Similarly, see Hardy v. State, 285 S.E.2d 547, 550-51 (Ga. Ct. App.
1981) (admitting evidence of the complainant's sexual history in a case of an alleged gang
rape by members of a college fraternity).
421. The Georgia Code, which excepted evidence relevant to defendant's reasonable
belief from the general rule of exclusion, was amended in 1989 and now admits evidence of
the complainant's prior sexual conduct only if that conduct was with the defendant. GA.
CODE ANN. § 24-2-3(b) (1982 & Supp. 1994).
422. See, e.g., Sakthi Murthy, Rejecting Unreasonable Sexual Expectations: Limits on
Using a Rape Victim's Sexual History to Show the Defendant's Mistaken Belief in Consent,
79 CAL. L. REv. 541, 551-54 (1991).
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In deciding on admissibility, is the judge's task that of deciding whether
the evidence is relevant, or is the judge to determine whether the techni-
cal requirements for admissibility have been satisfied?
1. Conditional Relevancy
Where the issue is whether a condition of relevancy has been met, a
judge's fact-finding and credibility-assessing role is limited. In this set-
ting, the judge decides whether the offering party has presented sufficient
evidence for a jury to find the necessary connection. This principle is
codified in FRE 104(b):
Relevancy conditioned on fact. When the relevancy of evidence
depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court
shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence
sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the
condition.423
If the offering party has met this burden, the judge must admit the
evidence and allow the jury to decide whether to believe it and how much
weight, if any, to give it.
424
423. FED. R. EvID. 104(b). The Advisory Committee's Note to the rule offers an exam-
ple of such conditional relevancy: "when a spoken statement is relied upon to prove notice
to X, it is without probative value unless X heard it." FED. R. EvID. 104(b) Advisory
Committee's Note. The Note comments:
If preliminary questions of conditional relevancy were determined solely by the
judge ... the functioning of the jury as a trier of fact would be greatly restricted
and in some cases virtually destroyed... The judge makes a preliminary determi-
nation whether the foundation evidence is sufficient to support a finding of fulfill-
ment of the condition. If so, the item is admitted. If after all the evidence on the
issue is in, pro and con, the jury could reasonably conclude that fulfillment of the
condition is not [sic] established, the issue is for them. If the evidence is not such
as to allow a finding, the judge withdraws the matter from their consideration.
Id.
States whose evidence codes are modeled on the FRE as a rule incorporate FRE 104(b)
without significant variation. 1 GREGORY P. JOSEPH & STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, Evi-
DENCE IN AMERICA 3 (1994).
424. See, e.g., Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 690 (1988). Huddleston was
charged with selling stolen video cassettes; he defended by asserting that he did not know
they were stolen. Id. at 682-83. As circumstantial evidence of knowledge, the Govern-
ment, relying on the principle that evidence of other similar acts is admissible to prove a
defendant's mental state with regard to the charged conduct, offered evidence of his in-
volvement in two similar transactions, one involving stolen appliances, the other involving
several black and white television sets. Id. at 683. The Government offered direct proof
that the appliances were indeed stolen, but lacked comparable evidence as to the televi-
sions, which defendant had offered to various merchants at $28 each. Id.
The defendant conceded admissibility of the evidence relating to the appliances. Id. at
686. Defendant argued, however, that the evidence about the televisions was not relevant
as a basis to infer that he knew the video cassettes were stolen unless the Government
proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the televisions were stolen. Id. at 686-87.
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An offering party can meet this easy burden by either direct or circum-
stantial evidence. Direct evidence-testimony by a witness who claims
first-hand knowledge of the facts in question-always suffices, because
witness credibility is for the jury, not the judge, to determine.425 A wit-
ness's testimony that he participated in or observed prior sexual behavior
by the complainant therefore satisfies this burden, however vehemently
and persuasively the complainant denies the allegation.
2. Technical Issues and Policy Concerns
When constitutional or technical conditions must be satisfied to secure
admissibility of evidence, by contrast, the offering party generally must
persuade the judge as to the existence of those conditions by a prepon-
derance of the evidence. Frequently this requires a judge to assess the
credibility of witnesses. For example, the Supreme Court has held that in
order to secure admissibility of statements elicited during custodial inter-
rogation, a prosecutor must persuade the judge, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that law enforcement officials gave the defendant the "Mi-
randa warnings,"4 26 that the defendant knowingly and intelligently
waived the rights to silence and an attorney,427 and that the defendant
The Supreme Court agreed that the television evidence was relevant only if the sets were
stolen, but rejected defendant's contention that before allowing the jury to consider the
evidence the judge had to be satisfied of this fact by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.
at 690-91. The Court stressed that neither FRE 104(a) nor FRE 104(b) contained lan-
guage supporting this position. Id. at 689-90. Rather, FRE 104(b) directs that a party
satisfies the condition for relevancy by offering evidence "sufficient to support a finding"
that the evidence is relevant. Id. at 691. In making this assessment, the Court held a trial
judge neither weighs the credibility of the evidence nor makes a finding that the govern-
ment has proved the conditional fact by a preponderance of the evidence, but "simply
examines all the evidence in the case and decides whether the jury could reasonably find
the conditional fact-here, that the televisions were stolen-by a preponderance of the
evidence." Id. at 690. The Court concluded that the evidence supporting the inference
that television sets in Huddleston were stolen was circumstantial, yet sufficient. Id. at 691.
The Court acknowledged that issues other than relevance (such as the risk of unfair
prejudice) raised by the evidence were exclusively within the judge's province to resolve.
Id. at 690.
425. A witness' direct testimony to a fact presents sufficient evidence to permit a ra-
tional fact finder to accept that fact as true. See generally 1 C. FISHMAN, JONES ON EvI-
DENCE § 3:33 (7th ed. 1994). An exception to this rule exists if the "facts" to which the
witness testifies are patently impossible. A witness might testify, for example, that he was
at Wrigley Field last fall to see the Chicago Cubs win the 1994 World Series, but a jury
could not rely on such testimony to conclude that the Cubs won the Series because, due to
the strike by major league players that began in August, no World Series was played last
year. (Baseball fans know that this is the other reason why no rational jury could conclude
that the Cubs won the World Series- any World Series. Non-baseball fans should ignore
this parenthetical lest they become confused.)
426. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
427. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167-69 (1986) (applying the preponderance
[Vol. 44:709
Consent, Credibility, and the Constitution
made the statement voluntarily. 28 For each of these findings the judge
must decide whether to credit the testimony of the interrogating officers.
Similarly, in applying the Fourth Amendment, the government must es-
tablish by a preponderance of the evidence that the agents' actions were
justified or satisfied some exception to the exclusionary rule.429 This in-
evitably requires a judge to assess the truthfulness of the agents.
The preponderance standard is not reserved solely for constitutional
issues. As the Supreme Court has explained, "[t]he preponderance stan-
dard ensures that before admitting evidence, the court will have found it
more likely than not that the technical issues and policy concerns ad-
dressed by the Federal Rules of Evidence have been afforded due consid-
eration. '43 ° The Supreme Court has held, for example, that to secure
admission of a statement pursuant to the co-conspirator exception to the
hearsay rule, a party must satisfy the requirements of that exception by a
preponderance of the evidence.43'
B. Rape Shield Legislation
Most rape shield statutes are silent on the issue of judicial assessment
standard to the question of waiver).
428. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 488-89 (1972) (applying the preponderance stan-
dard to the question of voluntariness).
429. See, e.g., Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 n.5 (1984) (to satisfy the inevitable
discovery exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, the government must
show that the illegally seized evidence more likely than not inevitably would have been
discovered lawfully); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 n.14 (1974) (voluntariness
of a consent to search must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence).
430. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987).
431. Id. at 176. A prosecutor must satisfy the requirements of the co-conspirator ex-
ception to the hearsay definition by a preponderance of the evidence, rather than a higher
standard such as clear and convincing evidence. Id. There are five requirements: (1) a
conspiracy existed; (2) the declarant was a member of the conspiracy; (3) the non-declarant
defendant against whom the statement is being offered was a member; (4) the statement
was made during the conspiracy, not before or after it; and (5) the statement was made in
furtherance of the conspiracy. Id.
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of witness credibility.432 Oregon,433 Idaho,4 34 Iowa,435 Mississippi,436 and
North Carolina 437 afford such authority by statute. The language of each
provision closely models that of the former FRE 412(c) enacted in
1978.438 That language was deleted from FRE 412(c) when the federal
rule was amended in 1994. The Advisory Committee Note to the amend-
ment explains:
On its face, this language would appear to authorize a trial judge
to exclude evidence of past sexual conduct between an alleged
victim and an accused ... based upon the judge's belief that
such past acts did not occur. Such an authorization raises ques-
tions of invasion of the right to a jury trial under the Sixth...
Amendment[ ].439
432. See supra notes 47-57 and accompanying text. Some statutes authorize or direct
the judge to admit evidence of the complainant's prior sexual behavior if it is "relevant"
for a legitimate purpose beyond the forbidden "yes\yes inference," while others authorize
admission only if the special relevance of the evidence outweighs the risk of embarrass-
ment, prejudice and the like. See supra notes 47-57 and accompanying text. It is arguable
that statutes allowing evidence based on its relevance follow the "conditional relevancy"
approach, requiring a judge to credit testimony offered by defense witnesses at the rape
shield hearing, while statutes in the latter category, because they require more than merely
a finding of relevance, authorize the judge to assess witness credibility. See supra notes
423-25 and accompanying text. This inventive approach toward statutory interpretation,
however, would read into such statutes a meaning the legislature probably never intended
because most legislatures probably never considered the question in the first place. Per-
haps it is noteworthy that a state statute enacted after the 1978 version of FRE 412 (see
supra notes 25-26) lacks language giving the judge the authority to assess credibility: as-
suming the state legislature used FRE 412 as its model, exclusion of such language suggests
a legislative rejection of that concept.
433. ORE. R. EVID. 412(3)(b) provides, in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding subsection (2) of Rule 104 ... of this Act, if the relevancy of the
evidence which the accused seeks to offer in the trial depends upon the fulfillment
of a condition of fact, the court, at the hearing in chambers or at a subsequent
hearing in chambers scheduled for such purpose, shall accept evidence on the
issue of whether such condition of fact is fulfilled and shall determine such issue.
Id. (Rule 104(2) is the state equivalent to FRE 104(b), and is substantially identical to the
federal provision.) An appellate court has held that a judge's responsibility to find facts
under Rule 412(3)(b) "may include determining whether a witness is credible." State v.
Cervantes, 881 P.2d 151, 153 (Or. Ct. App. 1994); see also State v. LeClair, 730 P.2d 609,
616 (Or. Ct. App. 1986) (discussing judicial discretion in limiting testimony where proba-
tive value is minimal because the mother is testifying instead of allegedly abused child).
434. IDAHO R. EVID. 412(c)(2) (substantially identical to the Oregon provision).
435. IOWA R. EVID. 412(c)(d) (provides likewise).
436. Miss. R. EVID. 412(c)(2) (provides likewise).
437. N.C. R. EVID. 412(d) (provides likewise).
438. See supra note 28 (citing to the text of the 1978 version of Rule 412).
439. FED. R. EviD. 412 Advisory Committee's Note (citing 1 SALTZBURG & MARTIN,
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL, 396-97 (5th ed. 1990)). The Note added that the
rule already "provided adequate protection for all persons claiming to be the victims of
sexual misconduct, and that it was inadvisable to continue to include a provision in the rule
that has been confusing and that raises substantial constitutional issues." Id.
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C. Case Law
The issue has been directly addressed in relatively few cases. In most
of these cases, the defendant seeks to offer evidence of prior consensual
sex between himself and the complainant to support his consent defense,
while the complainant denies a prior consensual sexual relationship. In
such cases, the consensus is that the court must assume the defendant's
version of the prior relationship is true," 0 except in cases where the com-
plainant's injuries preclude any real issue of consent." 1 If, assuming the
defendant's testimony is true, the evidence would have sufficient proba-
tive value" 2 to survive a challenge on grounds of unfair prejudice, harass-
ment, confusion, and the like," 3 the court should permit the defendant to
cross-examine the complainant about their supposed prior relation-
ship.4 " If the complainant denies any such encounters, however, the
judge may limit the extent of the cross-examination." 5 During the de-
fendant's case-in-chief, the defendant may testify as to his version of the
relationship446 and may offer other probative evidence about it,447 subject
440. See infra notes 442-49 (discussing admissibility of consent evidence). Contra Turly
v. Alaska, 356 So. 2d 1238, 1244 (Alaska Ct. App. 1978) (analogizing to "confession" juris-
prudence, and ruling that if the trial court disbelieves defendant's in camera hearing testi-
mony that he and the complainant had prior consensual sexual relations, it could properly
exclude such testimony at trial).
441. See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
442. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
443. See supra notes 47-57 and accompanying text.
444. State v. Reiter, 672 P.2d 56 (Or. Ct. App. 1983) (defense counsel should have been
allowed to cross-examine complainant's direct testimony that prior to the alleged rape she
knew defendant only as a friend, particularly where, at the rape shield hearing, she admit-
ted consenting to sex with defendant in his car a few days prior to the alleged rape, which
also allegedly took place in his car); State v. Gonyaw, 507 A.2d 944 (Vt. 1985) (discussed
supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text).
445. People v. Tortorice, 531 N.Y.S.2d 414, 416-17 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988). Defendant
may question the complainant in regards to the alleged prior sexual act, but would be
bound by her response; if she denied any prior act, the inquiry would be required to end.
Id
446. Wood v. State, 736 P.2d 363, 366 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987); Tortorice, 531 N.Y.S.2d
at 416 (although the defendant's testimony as to prior consensual sex was "self-serving,
wholly uncorroborated and contradicted by the complainant," because the issue was con-
sent, he would be permitted to testify as to prior acts and would be permitted to enter into
evidence a hospital emergency room record which alluded to a prior act of intercourse);
Reiter, 672 P.2d at 58 (defense counsel should have been allowed to impeach complainant's
direct testimony that she knew defendant only as a friend); Commonwealth v. Baronner,
471 A.2d 104, 106 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (reversible error to preclude defendant's testimony
merely because the trial judge disbelieved him); Gonyaw, 507 A.2d at 947 (discussed supra
notes 132-34 and accompanying text).
447. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fionda, 599 N.E.2d 635, 636-39 (Mass. Ct. App. 1992)
(the judge properly allowed all four witnesses to a prior encounter between the complain-
ant and the defendant to relate conflicting versions of what had happened between them,
upon instruction to the jury that if it concluded (as complainant claimed) that she had been
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again to the judge's discretion to assess legitimate probative value against
its counter-considerations."48 A defendant's inability to recall the precise
dates and times of the prior conduct does not justify its exclusion. 4 9
The issue has also received direct judicial attention in cases in which a
defendant sought to show that the complainant previously had brought a
false rape charge against another. One court held that it is enough to
produce evidence at a pre-trial hearing from which "a reasonable person
could reasonably infer that the complainant made prior untruthful allega-
tions of sexual assault";45 ° another court, apparently taking the opposite
view, held that to show the man accused in the other incident denied the
charges was not a sufficient offer of proof.4 51
In other factual settings, direct discussion of the issue is rare, 52
although it is common for an appellate court to mention or even stress
factors that support the credibility of a complainant or defendant.453
Thus, although an imaginative reader may infer that the trial or appellate
too drunk by the end of the prior occasion to know what defendant was doing, it should
disregard the incident as not indicative of consent). Similarly, see Tortorice, 531 N.Y.S.2d
at 415-17.
448. See supra notes 122, 135, 293 and accompanying text (Wood, etc.) (re: similarity of
facts).
449. Commonwealth v. Grieco, 436 N.E.2d 167, 171 (Mass. 1982).
450. State v. DeSantis, 456 N.W.2d 600, 607 (Wis. 1990).
451. Hughes v. Raines, 641 F.2d 790, 792 (9th Cir. 1981).
452. See State v. Cervantes, 881 P.2d 151,152-53 (Or. Ct. App. 1994). Two twelve-year-
old girls met the defendant and a friend at a motel and allegedly had sex. Id. at 152. At
trial, the State offered evidence that semen less than 14 hours old was found in the com-
plainant's cervix shortly after the rape. Id. Defendant sought to elicit testimony from the
complainant's friend that she had seen the complainant "hanging all over" another man
shortly before the alleged rape, and that the complainant had admitted to the friend that
she had had sex with that man. Id. At the in camera hearing, the complainant denied
having sex with any man other than the defendant within twenty-four hours of her rape
examination, Id The trial court held that, because the defendant failed to prove that the
complainant had engaged in sex with the other man, the friend's testimony was inadmissi-
ble. Id. In essence, the trial court credited the complainant's testimony over that of her
friend. See id. The Oregon appellate court held there was no error, as Oregon's eviden-
tiary rules authorize judicial assessment of credibility in determining admissibility.
Cervantes, supra at 153. Because the defendant failed at trial to raise a Sixth Amendment
objection to exclusion of the evidence, the appellate court refused to consider the constitu-
tional question on appeal. Id. at 153 n.3.
453. See, e.g., United States v. Azure, 845 F.2d 1503, 1505 (8th Cir. 1988) (discussed
supra part II.B.); Wright v. State, 513 A.2d 1310, 1314-15 (Del. 1986) (discussed supra part
IV.A.3.); State v. Bevins, 439 A.2d 271, 272-73 (Vt. 1981) (discussed supra part IV.A.4.);
Commonwealth v. Reed, 644 A.2d 1223, 1230-31 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (discussed supra
part IV.A.4.); Stephens v. Miller, 13 F.3d 998, 1002-03 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 57
(1994) (discussed supra part IV.A.4.); State v. Morrison, 351 S.E.2d 810, 814-15 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1987) (discussed supra part IV.B.); State v. Colbath, 540 A.2d 1212, 1217 (N.H. 1988)
(discussed supra part VI.D.); Demers v. State, 547 A.2d 28, 35-36 (Conn. 1988) (discussed
supra part VII.B.).
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court was influenced by an assessment of credibility, there is no way to
tell directly.
D. Evaluation
Giving a judge explicit authority to assess witness credibility furthers
the goals of rape shield legislation because this authority strengthens the
judge's ability to protect the complainant from humiliation and embar-
rassment, and the State from possible prejudice, which would result from
the public airing of false accusations. Arguably, this would merely make
explicit in one narrow context what is implicit throughout the trial of a
criminal case, i.e., the power and perhaps also the right, of a judge to
consider his or her assessment of the defendant's guilt or innocence in
ruling on the broad range of issues delegated to the trial court's discre-
tion.454 Yet the requirement that a defendant must persuade the judge of
a fact by a preponderance of the evidence before he can use that fact to
attempt to create a reasonable doubt in the jury's mind as to his guilt
creates uneasy implications, with regard to both the jury's role as ultimate
arbiter of the facts and the prosecutor's burden of establishing guilt be-
yond a reasonable doubt.
CONCLUSION
Restricting admissibility of a rape complainant's prior sexual conduct is
a salutary development in the law. Despite the wide variations in the
nation's forty-nine separate rape shield laws, there is a unanimous con-
sensus that such evidence may not be used as a general reflection on the
complainant's credibility, 45 5 nor to suggest that because she consented to
have sex with other men on other occasions she therefore consented to
do so with the defendant on the occasion in question. 56 A consensus is
also emerging, however, that when such evidence may have sufficient spe-
cial relevance, aside from these forbidden purposes, to exclude it would
unduly deprive a defendant the right to confront his accuser and present
a defense. 57 Statutory and judicial disagreement exists, however, as to
whether a court may assess witness credibility in ruling on such evi-
454. Indeed, judicial assessment of credibility is the only plausible explanation for some
results, such as that in Cervantes. See supra note 452. Surely testimony by the complain-
ant's friend that the complainant was "all over another man," coupled with the friend's
testimony that the complainant stated that she had sex with him, suffices to permit a ra-
tional fact-finder to conclude that the semen found in the complainant's cervix was the
other man's, not the defendant's.
455. See supra part I.A.
456. See supra part I.A.
457. See supra parts II.-VIII.
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dence.458 There is also disagreement about the precise nature of the
counterweights against which the relevance of such evidence should be
measured, 459 and whether the presumption should be in favor or against
admissibility of evidence falling into a category of special relevance. 6 °
While uniformity on such matters is not possible, and probably not desir-
able, a sharper focus on such matters may make it somewhat easier for
courts to reconcile the harshly conflicting interests in this area of the law.
458. See supra part IX.
459. See supra part I.B.3.
460. See supra part I.B.3.
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